The Long War

Military bases are an effective means to project power. As a global player, the US maintains hundreds of them worldwide. If the locale is friendly- Europe, Japan, South Korea, the smaller Gulf States- it works out well. An island like Diego Garcia, especially acquired for this purpose, would also do. The problem starts when the people around or the host government become uncomfortable with foreign presence. Prince Sultan Air Base, built near Riyadh after the 1991 Gulf War, was for the Saudis a violation of their sacred territory. In due course it had to be moved to Qatar. A base in Uzbekistan had to be vacated when Tashkent no longer wanted to play ball.

Establishing long time military presence in hostile environment is therefore dangerous business. But that is precisely what the US plans to do in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. A combination of bases in comparatively safe areas and converting diplomatic missions into fortresses is its recipe to make up for the less than friendly surroundings. Traditional bases will be maintained in relative safety of Bagram and Mazar-e-Sharif in Afghanistan, and the embassy complexes in Baghdad and Islamabad are to be fortified.

The real reasons may vary: preventing Iran from dominating its neighbourhood; maintaining a foothold in regions of strategic significance; or reluctance to beat a retreat from lost battlefields. The rationale of course is different: training of local forces; overseeing a transition; and when nothing else gels, “fighting terror”. Security of sensitive installations can always justify the presence of armed groups like Xe Services and DynCorp. The local population may not like it, but since all three regimes depend heavily on US support, they are not likely to do much about it. The problem is that not everyone in these countries intends to do nothing.

When would the Iraqis take charge of their country and how would they deal with the remnants of the occupation is not clear, but the developments in the AfPak region indicate that the clash may take place sooner rather than later.

The framework announced in Lisbon to withdraw from Afghanistan was a political expediency; to placate domestic constituencies and maintain unity in NATO ranks. As exit strategy, it is unworkable. Afghan National Army, regardless of its strength or state of training and equipment, cannot ensure security in any part of the Country. Where the mightiest of the armies have failed, an ethnic hybrid had no chance. Security in Afghanistan was always a function of the broadest possible consensus. An Afghan-led reconciliation process was therefore agreed upon and even proclaimed, but the US Military and some of the vested interests want to give war another chance.

Many of them argue that before any meaningful negotiations the Taliban must be weakened (what if they got further strengthened!). Reinforcing failure is one way to describe it, digging deeper in the hole, another. The militaries in any case know nothing better, and hate to concede defeat- that too to a rag-tag militia! The war lobby has two scapegoats. Karzai, who controls neither the money nor the military, is blamed for the deteriorating security situation- and Pakistan for its failure to seal the AfPak borders (who can?). Consequences are obvious. This war is doomed to get deepened and widened, Drones amply contributing to its proliferation.

Whatever else may happen when the fireworks intensify, one thing is certain. Some of our angry factions, who up to now could do no more than target this quisling government and its tentacles, will join the battle against the US and its allies.

Those who had suggested creating these fortresses must have been blessed with foresight and will no doubt claim credit, but a game theorist would describe it as acts of pre-emption that inevitably lead to mutual escalation. Whoever said it would be a long war was being very prophetic.

Lt Gen Asad Durrani is a former Director General, ISI

Courtesy: Express Tribune, 10 January 2011

(The views expressed in the article are that of the author and do not represent the views of the editorial committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).