Nepal headed in a dreadful direction

The recent election of Jhalanath Khanal of CPN (UML) as Prime Minister is a grim indicator that political developments in Nepal are moving in the wrong direction. The new secret arrangement, even before it was exposed, smacked of an unscrupulous deal between Khanal, an ambitious politician, and the Maoists.

Jhalanath had been using every trick, machinations and leverages not only in Nepal, but China as well to replace Madhav Kumar Nepal, a member of the same political party, as the Prime Minister. The Chinese factor was therefore an overwhelming consideration in the secret deal. As part of the deal, the position of PM was to be rotated, with Prachanda taking over as PM in May 2011. The Maoists wanted the critical home and defence portfolios. Thanks to the leakage of the secret deal the Maoists have now decided not to join the government.

Khanal was thus paving the way for a Maoist takeover of the country. It is widely believed in Nepal that Jhalanath Khanal is a Maoist in the garb of CPN (UML) politician. In the secret deal, he had also assured the raising of a separate force out of Maoist armed cadres. The Maoists, after all, are the only political party having an armed cadre, which was sought to be legitimised during the peace process. Financially too, the Maoists are the richest political organisation, the top ten hotels in Nepal paying a hefty sum to the Maoists as safety money.

The Maoist leadership used the Nepali Congress, the CPI (UML), and other political outfits to remove the monarchy. It used various church organisations for funding and in return it opened their way to unbridled proselytising by declaring Nepal a secular state. In fact there was no public demand for it. Now with conversions no more being illegal, the phenomenon has become rampant. It is intriguing that some Scandinavian countries which have very little economic and geopolitical stakes in Nepal have their embassies in Kathmandu.

The Maoist leadership has at times used these European countries who facilitate moving funds through church run NGOs; it has used China for ideological and covert support; it has used Indian Maoists for cross-border coordination, which includes arms smuggling and establishing linkages with other insurgent groups. It has also used Indian intellectuals to influence Indian political discourse on Nepal; used the Indian establishment to earn political legitimacy. The UNMIN, under the influence of some European countries, have also given legitimacy to the Maoist’s armed cadres by their presence. It is for this reason that there was much relief and joy in most of Nepal when the UNMIN left Nepal on 15 January 2011. Far from contributing to the peace process, it had become a facilitator for a Maoist takeover of Nepal.

The political direction of the Maoists in Nepal has strong parallels with Mao’s Communist movement in the 1930s, which eventually led to the totalitarian Communist regime taking over China, something which the Chinese have been condemned to suffer ever since. Just as the Maoists of Nepal use every alliance as an opportunity to further their cause, the Communists under Mao in China had courted the Kuomintang Nationalist Forces to fight the Japanese, who had invaded China in 1937. Later, they dumped the Kuomintang and finally captured their own country after much bloodshed.

If the Maoist game plan succeeds, the Nepalese are going to meet the same fate. Much of the blame for this now very plausible scenario must rest with India.

It is India which gave respectability to the Maoists of Nepal. Nepal should have questioned the Indian wisdom especially in backdrop of the fact that the Indian leadership and a section of its pseudo-intelligentsia have not been able to tackle the Maoist menace in its own country. The other pre-disposition of the Indians is to apply the same Westminster political template in arriving at value judgments with regard to other countries, as if our political system is ideal and infallible, and no other system can better it. It must be remembered that a given political system functions within the framework of a country’s history, geography and society. We ignored these basic facts, while facilitating a new democratic process in Nepal. There was nothing new. All the political players and political outfits are known, tried and discredited commodities. The experiment no wonder is failing. Nepal will not be able to even give itself a Constitution.

A new political system cannot be ushered in a vacuum. It cannot be done by destroying powerful symbols of nationhood, which in case of Nepal was the monarchy. A radical political transformation needs a fair and strong transitional arrangement. Unfortunately, in Nepal, this arrangement became hostage to the Maoists after they inveigled their way to power and legitimacy.

Nepal today is in the throes of uncertainty. It is being steered away from India and closer to China by Maoists. True to their roadmap, they have been focused on their objective of establishing one party rule in Nepal.

As in Nepal, the same Maoist threat is impacting on India. The same elements are supporting the Maoists. It is evidenced by the clamour of the same vested interests for release of Binayak Sen. Representatives of some of these organisations tried in vain to put international pressure on the Indian judiciary by registering their presence during the court proceedings in Chattisgarh. The same activists, international human rights groups and the media has nothing to comment about the Kangroo courts of the Maoists.

An ex-army chief of the Nepal Army warned the Indians not to commit the same mistake as Nepal in dealing with the Maoists. He said that the Nepal Army on many occasions could have easily obliterated the top Maoist leadership, but made cardinal mistake to have believed that the Maoists could be brought into the mainstream.

Jhalanath Khanal and his party, the CPN (UML) have succumbed to the Maoist trap, and bartered Nepal. There are many Indians on an overdrive to do the same with India. 

RSN Singh is Associate Editor, Indian Defence Review 

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).