The War in Libya

In March 2003, a multinational force led by the US had launched a military campaign “to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to end Saddam Hussein’s alleged support for terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people.” That was sequel to a prolonged ‘no fly zones’ maintained by multinational forces over Iraq. The US had hoped that with economic sanctions, frequent air patrolling and strikes to impose ‘no flying zones’ and its funding of the Iraqi opposition groups would enable Saddam’s enemies within Iraq to overthrow him. That did not happen. It led to a full scale invasion of Iraq.

Eight years to the day, within hours of obtaining a mandate from the UN Security Council, another multinational force, led by France this time, has been launched to enforce a ‘no fly zone’ over Libya: the largest military intervention by Western powers ever since the Iraq war. According to French President Sarkozy, “it was the duty of France along with its partners to protect the civilian population from the murderous madness of a regime that has forfeited all claims to legitimacy.”

The military campaign in Iraq had resulted in its occupation followed by ‘regime change’ and then a prolonged Iraqi insurgency which very nearly exhausted the coalition partners and their multinational force. The US, in particular, paid a heavy political and military price for the intervention. It is too soon to predict how the military campaign in Libya will end. But the political aim and the military strategy followed so far raise several questions and possible lessons for political and military leaders in future.

Libya has a civil war in which poorly equipped and fractious rebel forces, mostly from its Eastern part, are opposing the better organised and equipped armed forces of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. It will be obvious to any one that the civil war would end only when there is a ‘regime change’ or when Gaddafi’s forces are able to crush the armed rebellion. President Sarkozy’s statement, though couched in more acceptable human rights rhetoric, makes it clear that the coalition partners’ main political aim is a ‘regime change’ in Libya.

Admiral Mullen, Chairman, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, has denied it. But his denial is most unconvincing. The Western powers hope that the ‘regime change’ will lead to establishment of a set up by Libya’s civilians “who want to choose their own destiny”, and thus favour political stability in North Africa.

While the couched political aim is clear, the military strategy adopted so far to achieve it gives rise to several issues. The coalition political leadership would have to be prepared to face them for the future direction and course of war.

First, it is not easy to impose a ‘no flying zone’ over a nation half the size of India. This will require substantial resources, 24/7 activity and a long duration. Will the coalition partners, already tired of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, be able to sustain it when the US has made it clear that it does not wish to be sucked into a Libyan civil war?

Secondly, imposition of a ‘no flying zone’ by itself cannot win a war or enable regime change. It will also require Libyan rebel forces to be organised, supported with military weapons and equipment, and trained to take on Gaddafi’s regular forces for a prolonged military campaign.

Thirdly, to make ‘no flying zone’ effective, it is necessary to insert Special Forces inside Libya to carry out reconnaissance, identify targets for attack, establish contact with rebel forces, and to create a post war political framework. It is believed that Special Forces from several Western powers are already inside Libya to do this work.

Fourthly, the multinational force assigned to impose the ‘no flying zone’ has to ensure its own security against enemy missile and other ground and air attacks. To achieve its own security and prevent Gaddafi’s forces from reaching rebels’ strongholds, the multinational force would have to attack his command and communication facilities, radar and missile bases and other military installations. Combat forces moving towards the rebel’s position would have to be destroyed. Such attacks, despite cruise missiles and other sophisticated targeting weapons and aids, are bound to result in substantial collateral damage including human lives.

Many political leaders who voted in favor of the ‘no flying zone’ resolution in the United Nations are surprised by the military action, which began with heavy pounding of Gaddafi’s palace, military and civil installations and his armed forces. Russia, China and many Arab nations have expressed serious concern over the aerial engagement of targets and collateral damage. The Arab League and African Union appear to be backtracking from their earlier stance. But shouldn’t they have known it better? Politically and diplomatically, the most interesting part is that both the interventionists as well as protesting nations are invoking the same rhetoric: of human rights and security of the Libyan people!

India, which abstained during the vote on the UN resolution, has protested strongly and called for an immediate halt to such attacks. The Indian response shows that the officials in the Ministry of External Affairs could neither perceive the military implications of a ‘no flying zone’ nor bothered to consult its military experts.

The military campaign is unlikely to be short unless Gaddafi decides to abdicate voluntarily or is killed along with his key supporters. His abdication and submission to the rebels and multinational force appears most unlikely at present. Even if the multinational force is able to destroy Gaddafi’s air force and some components of ground forces, that would not stop him from developing insurgency operations with his forces and tribal loyalists. Libya, then, would see a long drawn insurgency and counter-insurgency operations like in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Important questions that arise at this stage are: how far is the coalition prepared to fight Gaddafi’s forces and provide support to the rebel forces to enable a ‘regime change’, particularly in the face of Arab and some other nations’ opposition? How long will the campaign remain an air operation? Is any coalition partner prepared to send ground troops into Libya?

My hunch is that we shall soon see a change; either in the political aim or in the military strategy of the campaign. What is certain is that the military campaign launched with the ostensible political objective to “protect civilian population and end human suffering” will impose greater human suffering, not only in Libya but elsewhere too. 

Gen VP Malik, PVSM, AVSM (Retd) is former Chief of Army Staff

Courtesy: The Tribune, 23 March 2011

http://www.tribuneindia.com/2011/20110323/edit.htm#4

(The views expressed in the article are that of the author and do not represent the views of the editorial committee or the centre for land warfare studies).