Strategic implications of 'Operation Neptune Spear'

Osama bin Laden’s killing in a spectacular raid by the US SEALs in a covert operation codenamed ‘Operation Neptune Spear’ is perhaps the most extensively covered military action by the print and visual media across the world. Given bin Laden’s central position in the organisation, it is a significant accomplishment for the United States and a definite blow to the morale of the al Qaeda network. However, it does not by itself indicate that the al Qaeda will be defeated any time soon. On the contrary, in the short term, we can expect al Qaeda to strike back viciously to retain credibility and to avenge the killing of a leader considered by them to be iconic. In the long term, al Qaeda and its affiliates in Pakistan, the Arabian Peninsula and the Islamic Maghreb, will continue hostilities against the United States and the West. The war is by no means over, though one battle may have been won. More importantly, the operation has thrown up a host of strategic possibilities with long term consequences for the region. The future of US policy in Afghanistan is one which must be looked at with interest.

For the United States, the killing of bin Laden offers President Obama the option of calibrating the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan in an earlier timeframe to cater to US public opinion in view of the forthcoming US elections scheduled for 2012. Considering the success achieved in killing Osama, a revised strategy for the conflict in Afghanistan may also be in the offing. Here, the counter terrorism option could be promoted with ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) troops and the Afghan Army holding select areas to check the Afghan Taliban and Special Forces being designated to target the Taliban leadership. With General David Petraeus being recalled from Afghanistan to head the CIA and the CIA Director Mr. Leon Panetta being moved to the Department of Defence, such a contingency is a distinct possibility.

The US could also stay the course in Afghanistan till the situation in that country is stabilised and the Afghan Armed Forces are capable of preventing a Taliban takeover. Stability in the Af-Pak region is a key concern of the US and fits in with their larger strategic aims in the region. This would however require continued US dependence on Pakistan for logistic support as the supply chain to prosecute its war in Afghanistan stretches from Karachi to the Khyber Pass. The US would thus have to soften its stand on Pakistan’s duplicity and possible involvement in providing support to bin Laden. In a statement to US lawmakers on Capitol Hill a few days after the operation, Mr. Leon Panetta, Director CIA, bluntly stated that the Pakistani authorities “were involved or incompetent." While the US has earlier accepted Pakistani duplicity in the war being waged against the Afghan Taliban, the possibility of Pakistan having sheltered bin Laden all these years has not gone down well with the American public and its government. On al Qaeda, the Americans expected full and complete Pakistani support. This breach of faith though hard to overcome, cannot be a veto to US-Pakistan cooperation due to lack of suitable alternatives. Reducing dependence on Pakistan for logistics would necessitate supply routes through Russia — an uncertain line of supply — or on the Caspian route, which is insufficient to supply ISAS forces in Afghanistan. Pakistan thus wins by default.

There is already a strong clamour in Washington for curtailing aid which the US has been giving to Pakistan which since 9/11, amounts to over $20 billion. Most of this money went to the Pakistani military, and there has been little accountability in its spending. The Obama administration has sought $3 billion in aid for Pakistan for 2012, but some lawmakers are questioning the value of that investment. While sending $3 billion to Pakistan right now might seem outrageous, the impact on Pakistan if the aid is denied might make the situation infinitely worse and may well result in Pakistan imploding. The US is unlikely to let this happen due to the adverse impact this will have on its war in Afghanistan. We are thus likely to see a continuation of US-Pak cooperation, albeit on more stringent terms. US aid is likely to continue but with greater emphasis on accountability and on monitoring expenditures incurred. The US is also likely to pressurize Pakistan to deliver to a greater extent than hither to fore against al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban.

For Pakistan, the prognosis is grim. The fact that Osama bin Laden was found in a safe house near the Kakul Military Academy clearly points to complicity with key elements in Pakistan’s power structure and poses uncomfortable questions to the Pakistani leadership. The trust deficit has been starkly highlighted by the fact that President Obama chose to keep Pakistan’s government in the dark about the operation. Obviously the fear of the operation being compromised by Pakistan was a factor in this calculation. On the other hand, al Qaeda and its affiliates see the US attack as having been supported by the Pakistan military and view it as a betrayal of their cause. They have already vowed to retaliate against Pakistan’s political and military leadership. A message released on Muslim Islamist web sites on May 6 stated…‘We call upon our Muslim people in Pakistan, on whose land Sheikh Usama was killed, to rise up and revolt to cleanse this shame that has been attached to them by a clique of traitors and thieves who sold everything to the enemies of the Ummah, and disregarded the feelings of this noble jihadi people. [We call upon them] to rise up strongly and in general to cleanse their country (Pakistan) from the filth of the Americans who spread corruption in It’.

The trust deficit between the Pakistan government and its citizenry has also taken a beating with most Pakistanis being caught unaware by the brazen manner in which Osama was hidden in Pakistan despite repeated denials to the contrary. The Government can certainly expect very difficult days ahead with the political and military leadership of Pakistan increasingly being squeezed by its own citizenry, the various terrorist factions as also the US and its allies.

For India, how the events unfold both in Afghanistan and Pakistan will impact on her security concerns. A US withdrawal from Afghanistan before the Afghan forces have developed the capacity to successfully confront the Taliban is an open invitation to the latter to assume the reins of power in Kabul. While India has supported the government of President Hamid Karzai, little effort has been made to build bridges with the erstwhile Taliban leadership now located in Pakistan. India thus faces the prospect of getting completely marginalised in the event of a Taliban takeover. The larger danger here is twofold. The first of these is the spectre of terrorists and large quantity of weapons finding their way into India from Afghanistan. While the Taliban will certainly not be lackeys of Pakistan, the relationship between the two is robust and will only get stronger once the Taliban are in power in Kabul. Increasing influence of the Pakistani Military-Jihadi complex within Afghanistan gives the former the strategic depth it continually seeks to be used against India. While it will not be easy to push a large number of terrorists and weapons into India, the situation is fraught with serious consequences for India’s internal security. It may hence be prudent for India to develop contacts with the first and second rung leadership of the Quetta Shura Taliban (QST) of Mullah Mohammed Omar, the Haqqani network and the Hizb-e Islami-Gulbuddin to remain relevant in Afghanistan and to reduce the impact of negative fallout. The more serious concern however remains ideological. The spread of radical Islam has crossed the Indus and is affecting some parts of Sind and Punjab. If Pakistan gets radicalised, the pernicious ideology will seep into parts of India further compounding the internal security challenges. India needs to be watchful on this count. 

The US may however continue on course in Afghanistan, albeit with a smaller presence. But India is still unlikely to play a larger role in Afghanistan. As of now, Indian assistance to the war effort in Afghanistan has been focused on the social sector, agriculture, capacity building and infrastructure projects to which $1500 million have already been committed. This assistance has been very well received and has led to the generation of a great deal of goodwill amongst the target population for India. The recent visit of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to Afghanistan on 12 May 2011 has further strengthened this relationship. While this is no small achievement, there is a lot more that India can do if its assistance is sought. The catch here is that the US views Indian involvement as a zero sum game due to violent opposition from Pakistan. The latter is more important to the US war effort both for logistic supply as well as for targeting the Taliban and al Qaeda leadership which is holed up in the mountainous region astride the Durand Line.  Even indirect military assistance in the form of training the Afghan National Army will not be accepted so we can expect the status quo to remain.

Pakistan’s current internal situation may encourage it to divert externally against India. A major crisis erupting between India and Pakistan gives two distinct advantages to the latter. The possibility of hostilities gives Pakistan the necessary alibi to move its forces from its western border with Afghanistan where they are presently engaged in combating terrorist groups, to its eastern border with India. This will hinder the larger US aims in their war against the Taliban and in bringing stability to Afghanistan. Pakistan thus gets leverage over the US which it sorely needs after losing credibility in the Osama operation. Secondly, there is nothing like a threat from India to rally all Pakistani’s around a common cause. This could well lead to the emergence of a unity government in Pakistan in which distinctions between secularists, moderate Islamists and radical Islamists would be buried under anti-Indian feeling. The possibility of a conflict erupting in Jammu and Kashmir or of major terrorist attacks taking place within India hence assumes a high degree of probability for which India needs to be prepared. At this sensitive period when Pakistan is reeling under a multitude of difficulties India needs to be pragmatic and mature in its responses to Pakistani posturing.

As an alternate solution to the situation in Afghanistan, India could use its good offices to seek a rapprochement between Iran and the US. While such a course is easier said than done, it could well be the silver bullet that brings peace to the region. Iranian support to the war in Afghanistan eliminates the problems of logistic support to the ground troops and would force Pakistan to give up its dual policy on terrorism. Also, the regional “Silk Road” strategy which the late Ambassador Richard Holbrooke championed could become part of a larger framework to bring peace to the region. This implied a regional economic framework amongst the countries bordering Afghanistan and also included India and China. With economic interests as the prime movers, emphasis would shift to promoting cross border trade, commerce, investment and integration. If the killing of Osama could propel the region towards this course, we may yet see peace in the region.

Maj Gen Dhruv Katoch, SM, VSM (Retd) is Additional Director, CLAWS