Chinese belligerence a source of concern

Chinese professions of ‘peaceful growth’ do not match its actions on the ground. Recent events indicate that China is getting increasingly belligerent and bellicose with its neighbours which calls into questions all such assumptions and also raises serious issues of stability in the region. Water issues are seemingly getting more intractable especially in view of Beijing’s provocative stance on disputes with her neighbours in the South China Sea and its opacity with respect to construction of dams on the Brahmaputra River (Yarlung Tsangpo).

China increasingly is tending to view the South China Sea as China’s sea, disregarding the claims of other nations which share its waters. Its expansive sovereignty claims include the Spratly and Paracel islets, which has pitted Beijing in conflict with the sovereignty claims and security of Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia, all of whom (except Taiwan) are members of ASEAN. About 45 islands of the Spratly archipelago, which consists of more than 750 islands, islets, atolls and cays are now occupied by Vietnamese, Chinese, Taiwanese, Malaysian and Filipino forces. Beijing has warned both Vietnam and the Philippines not to explore for oil in disputed waters that China claims. On 26 May 2011, three Chinese marine surveillance vessels cut the survey cables of a vessel operated by the Vietnam Oil and Gas Group PetroVietnam, some 120 nautical miles off the southern Vietnamese coast. Then again on 09 June, another ship owned by PetroVietnam, while operating well within Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), had its cables cut by a Chinese naval patrol craft. The Philippine government has also claimed that China has been harassing its exploration vessels and has illegally unloaded supplies to build an oil rig in disputed waters. It further claimed that its air space had been violated by Chinese fighter jets. As a counter, Beijing claims that both Hanoi and Manila broke agreements on joint exploration.

What is of concern in the above incidents is that China feels no qualms about using its military might as a dispute resolution mechanism. In response to Beijing’s belligerence, Hanoi has carried out live-fire naval drills off its central coast on 10 June 2011. While Vietnam later downplayed the incident, it also stated that it would welcome foreign involvement to resolve rival claims to the potentially resource-rich waters—an apparent reference to the U.S. This is an indication that smaller powers will not willingly toe the Chinese line and will stand up for their rights. The South China Sea is hence a potential zone of conflict. Beijing’s actions in future are likely to increase in stridency and would need to be watched.

Nearer home, Chinese actions on the Brahmaputra River are again a cause of concern. A 510 MW project is under construction at Zangmu on the Tsang Po River (in Gyaca, Shannan, Tibet) which will become operational by 2014. In an interview to The Hindu, Mr. Zhang Boting, deputy secretary-general of the Chinese Society of Hydropower Engineers, stated that with rising power shortages, coupled with increasing international pressure on China to reduce its carbon emissions, the country could no longer afford to leave the Tsang Po’s potential untapped. The Zangmu dam is but one of 28 proposed dams on the Tsang Po River. While a comprehensive plan for the development of these dams on the river has not yet been made, Zhang Boting made it clear that it was only a matter of time before more hydropower projects were approved in light of the growing power crisis. Mention was also made of a dam at the ‘Great Bend’ at Motua, where the Tsang Po begins its journey to India. Sinohydro, a state-owned hydropower company, has detailed on its website a proposal for a 38-gigawatt plant at this location. Mr. Zhang stated that this dam could bridge the power deficit being faced by China but the project had great technological barriers. He ruled out any diversion of the river waters and stressed that all the projects were run-of-the-river power generation projects. But the fear of river water diversion remains especially in view of China’s claim of first use rights for this and all rivers in Tibet.

A proposal for diversion of river waters is not new; such a proposal was mooted as early as 1990 for diverting 200.6 billion cubic meters of Tsang Po water a year to the Yellow River. China’s general lack of willingness to share information regarding the Zangmu project has left India with limited means to verify claims on the specific construction plans and impact on flows. There is still some uncertainty on what China intends for the project, and whether or not a storage reservoir, which could affect downstream flows, will be built beyond the minimal “pondage” required to operate the turbines. However, diverting waters of the Tsang Po after it crosses the Great Bend appear to be unfeasible.  But diverting the waters further upstream remains a possibility and would impact adversely on India and Bangla Desh. In the absence of a water-sharing treaty with China, India perforce would have to use other means to monitor water flows in the Brahmaputra River. The issue needs to be addressed bilaterally and also through he world body to prevent any negative impact.

China’s growing military strength and increasing assertiveness both in the Western pacific and in the Himalayas, throws up a host of issues. It appears more probable that China will increasingly use coercive tactics to force compliance of its demands. This could fundamentally change the nature of political discourse in Asia, especially amongst the smaller countries on China’s periphery. Once an initial set of demands are met, it could lead to others, which would impinge on existing cooperative multilateral patterns of behavior. If there is resistance to Chinese pressure, this could lead to the possibility of local clashes, once again leading to regional instability. China’s disruptive pattern of behavior could also encourage similar behaviour amongst some of the other autocratic regimes in the region leading to further destabilisation in the region.

For India, the writing on the wall is clear. Military weakness will be exploited by China to further its own agenda. Hence, India must ensure that its capability to deal with any situation on the Tibetan plateau or in the Indian Ocean Region is maintained at a level commensurate with the anticipated threat. India could also take the lead in promoting existing multi lateral groupings in the region as conflict control and prevention mechanisms. Finally, India while engaging with China on the issue of river waters must use all means at its disposal to monitor construction activities over the Tsang Po River. India must also maintain a data base of the flow of the Brahmaputra River at various points on a regular basis throughout the year. This will prove invaluable when changes in water flow pattern are observed.

Maj Gen Dhruv Katoch, SM, VSM (Retd) is Additional Director, CLAWS

(The views expressed in the article are that of the author and do not represent the views of the editorial committee or the centre for land warfare studies).