Talks vs targets: searching an option in India�s anti-Maoist operations

Analyst Daniel Byman asserts that “talking with insurgents is often a necessary first step toward defeating them or reaching an acceptable compromise.” Nevertheless, Byman is not all optimistic: “Talks with insurgents are politically costly, usually fail, and can often backfire.” However, he still believes that talks are “often necessary to end conflicts and transform an insurgent group into a legitimate political actor or wean them away from violence”.

At the other end of the ideational spectrum, theorists AE Stahl and William F Owen; while substantiating the policy adopted by Israel in its counterinsurgency-counterterrorism (CI-CT) operations, stresses on eliminating the insurgent leaders. They vouch for targeted killings (TK) of charismatic rebel leaders as an effective instrument of state policy to counter the growth of rebellion. The authors counter-argue the prevalent belief that killing one leader will simply result in ten more ready to supplant the leadership. In their view, the persistent application of TK continues to deplete the insurgent groups in terms of their brains-trust and consequently their morale.

Augmenting the TK strategy, the researchers also posit: “The more time leaders spend underground (in fear of TK), the less time they have for conducting armed activity against the state.” For example, Hamas leader Abdel Aziz al-Rantissi was forced to hide underground for four weeks, the very period for which he was the chief of the militant organisation.

In this theoretical backdrop, it may be germane to analyse the post-2004 Maoist insurrection in India and the broad strategy and tactics adopted to tackle the quagmire. There is serious debate as to the CI-strategy to be used against the left-wing ultras. Whether it shall be long-term population-centric CI-operations with the purpose of ‘winning hearts and minds’ (WHAM) or it shall be the deployment of the army with the intent of completely annihilating the rebels; are issues which need to be resolved sooner. While some activists would psychologically ‘coerce’ the authorities to talk to the insurgents, conservative thinkers would surely ‘pressurise’ the government to refrain from adopting a ‘soft’ approach.

To go back to history, when the ‘Naxal’ insurgency first erupted after 1967, the government adopted a two-pronged approach to ‘wipe out’ the rebellion.

First, through ‘Operation Steeplechase’, the triumvirate of the army, para-military and the police; formed three concentric circles (army forming the outer and police the inner to perform the combing operations) and demolished the core of the insurgency. The police penetrated deep into the organisational structure of the Naxals by planting their ‘moles’. With the aid of ground intelligence, TK and targeted incarceration (TI) of the Naxal leaders grew in considerable numbers.

Eventually, this dual approach worked. After Charu Mazumdar’s death in prison and the imprisonment of Kanu Sanyal and other senior leaders, the Naxals splintered into innumerable and hence inconsequential factions. Yet today, state governments are loath to approach this two-pronged strategy to counter the larger Maoist revolution. The anti-establishment political brouhaha and civil society-cum-media backlash are much more pronounced today than was in the early 1970s.

Bringing in the army to counter the Maoists is always fraught with politico-legal implications; let alone ethical considerations of the army ‘fighting against its own people’, keeping in mind that the ultras are mostly active in tribal-backward regions. The army has done a commendable job in the north-east and Kashmir, but with the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) to smoothen its functioning. However, unleashing the army in large swathes of the country in the so-called Red Corridor means imposition of the AFSPA in about 100 to 150 districts. This is an unfathomable and undesirable political situation.

However, this idea could be well tested in ‘pockets’. The recent deployment of the army at Dantewada, albeit for training purposes, must have had its psychological impact on the rebels. Shanthie Mariet D’Souza, an Indian security studies scholar, in fact, recommends introduction of the army to deal with Maoism. She argues that militant activities could best be resolved through police-military operations. In this regard, she cites the examples of the Khalistani insurgency and the terrorism in Tripura, both of which were quelled through brute force.

But Israeli analyst Yehezkel Dror disagrees. He says: “negotiations, compromise and conciliation rest at the heart of democratic political processes.” In this context, it is noteworthy to refer to Byman again who advocates that by opening talks, there is always a possibility of creating fissures in the group by fomenting pro-talk and anti-talk factions. Moreover, Byman cautions that if policymakers abjure the path of ‘talks’ altogether, then they might face the dead alley in terms of breaking the political stalemate.

Stahl and Owens are optimistic that with enough TK – “there will come a point” in time when the insurgent group is forced to compromise; as was the case with Hamas in 2004. Furthermore, it must be mentioned that ideologically strong movements like the Maoist rebellion might not ‘bend’ easily. For instance, the four-decade old Filipino Maoist movement is yet to see a politically negotiated settlement though the government has been ‘talking’ to the ultras since 1985. The latest round of talks commenced in Oslo. But it is yet to taste the actual fruits as reportedly, the Filipino Maoists are continuing with their ‘warlord-ism’ in the rural heartlands.

Rajesh Rajagopalan, who is a senior professor at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi, is confident that the “Maoist rebellion has the potential to be a serious headache but not a fundamental threat to the Indian state”, possibly because historically, “guerrilla fighters have had far less notable results when fighting against their own government” than they have had against foreign occupants. He further says the obvious that “a more responsive and representative political and economic order would prevent the conditions that gives rise to rebellions”.

In the Indian context, it may be hypothesized that some or all the above features may be achieved through talks. However, if talks do not provide the way out, then targeted killings/incarcerations along with WHAM-based CI operations must be employed. After all, the demise of the Maoist insurgency should be an acceptable endgame for the adivasis, the government, the police and the para-military; apart from a handful of the core Maoist leadership. If talks work, then it’s fine. Otherwise, to quote Luttwak, there would probably be no harm if “war is given a chance”. It is true that development and governance are the keys to long-term tranquility, but the 'small war' must be won as a prerequisite.

Recommendations for the Indian case

1. A carefully orchestrated dual strategy of TK-TI compounded with population-centric, WHAM-based CI operations needs to be implemented.

2. The direct deployment of the army may be kept in abeyance. However, future prospects of the army being put into effect should not be ruled out altogether.

3. Tribal militias need to be upheld. However, they must be provided legitimacy through the process of official recruitment. Tribal militias are extremely significant for acquiring knowledge of the local terrain and for useful ground intelligence.

4. The path of ‘talks’ needs to be kept open as a viable option, but only when the government would be sure that the Maoist guerillas are in an awkward position to continue their present phase of ‘strategic defence’.

5. Mere proclamations of ‘ceasefires’ by the Maoists should not be taken as pre-conditions for opening talks as these temporary cessation of hostilities are used by the rebels to regroup, rearm, revitalize and recruit. In this regard, the Andhra talks are a pertinent case in point.

6. Talks can only be initiated if the government is in a ‘position of strength’. And this could be achieved through sustained implementation of a strategic framework which houses TK-TI plus WHAM-based CI operations.

Dr Uddipan Mukherjee holds a doctoral degree from TIFR (Deptt. of Atomic Energy, India). He writes on strategic issues.

(The views expressed in the article are that of the author and do not represent the views of the editorial committee or the centre for land warfare studies).