Afghanistan: Muddied Waters

The assassination of Prof Burhanuddin Rabbani on 20 September 2011 in Kabul can only be interpreted as an incisive blow to the peace process, upending once again the uncertain calculus of Afghan politics. Rabbani was undoubtedly the pre-eminent elder statesman who brought instant credibility to the High Peace Council (HPC). His death thus throws up questions of who benefits from killing the head of the peace talks. The finger of suspicion points to the assassination being the combined handiwork of the Afghan Taliban and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Neither President Karzai nor the US was amused at the setting back of the peace process. The US has since upped the pressure on Pakistan to do more to neutralise the Haqqani network. Afghanistan’s relationship with Pakistan also came under greater strain with Afghan officials alleging that the plan to kill Rabbani was prepared in the Pakistani southwestern city of Quetta by the Afghan Taliban with the help of the ISI. Pakistan of course denied the charge.

This perhaps was the trigger which led to the India-Afghanistan strategic partnership being inked on 04 October 2011, two weeks after the assassination. India, which was earlier a fringe player in Afghanistan, suddenly came on the centre stage.  One part of the agreement signed during Afghan President Hamid Karzai's visit to New Delhi, allows India to train and equip Afghan security forces. Pakistan has played down the strategic partnership agreement saying that Islamabad is not worried about the agreement as it is the sovereign right of any country to promote bilateral relations with any other country. But analysts and section of Pakistani media have viewed the development with concern as it throws open the possibility of Pakistan being faced with vulnerabilities on two fronts. This also has to be viewed in the light of Pakistan having earlier offered military training to the Afghan army, an offer which Kabul has yet to respond to.

But as if this was not enough, Hillary Clinton warned Pakistan during her visit to that country from 20 to 22 October 2011 that the US would act unilaterally if Islamabad failed to crack down on the Taliban-linked Haqqani network inside its North Waziristan sanctuary. In a four-hour meeting with Pakistan's top generals, Clinton called on the military to bring the Haqqanis to the negotiating table, destroy the group's leadership, or pave the way for the US to do so. Speaking later to CNN, Clinton said that "We have to have a very firm commitment to an Afghan-led reconciliation peace process." Karzai, who is scrambling to ensure his political future before the US military drawdown in 2014, needs Pakistani help to bring the Taliban to peace talks. In the event of a conflict, his army, which is dependent on US money and training, is in no position to back Pakistan. But barely 24 hours after Clinton left, President Karzai, while speaking to Geo TV said that Afghanistan owed Pakistan a great debt for sheltering millions of refugees over the past three decades, and went on to add that "Anybody that attacks Pakistan, Afghanistan will stand with Pakistan." In the same breath he complained that the Pakistani establishment has done a lot of harm to Afghanistan but softened the remark by saying that "Afghanistan is still a brother". During the interview, Karzai also attempted to dispel the impression that Afghanistan and India signed a strategic partnership agreement in view of the worsening relations of his country with Pakistan following the assassination of Afghan peace envoy Burhanuddin Rabbani. He emphasised that the signing of the strategic partnership with India did not happen at the spur of the moment but was something that the two countries had been working on for years. Karzai is thus oscillating between swinging away from Pakistan and then edging closer to it as efforts to draw the Taliban into peace talks gain momentum. The US reacted with dismay at Karzai’s comment with a western diplomat describing the comments as unfortunate. But such is the turbulent nature and the volatility of the situation in Afghanistan. 

The question which obviously emerges is what of the future of the India-Afghanistan Strategic pact which allows India to train and equip Afghan security forces. India is already training Afghan officers in India, but the quantum is small. For a meaningful impact, India would have to train and equip at least two divisions worth of troops to include the leadership elements. The options available are to train them in India or in Afghanistan or perhaps in a friendly country bordering Afghanistan. The last option is restricted to Iran and the Central Asian republics. Considering the geopolitical environment in the region this option can be safely ruled out.

Training the force in India is possible but would be very expensive considering the logistics involved. While the training facilities can be made available, the number of troops which can be trained will still be far short of what is required.

The most suitable option would be to train the Afghan Army in Afghanistan itself, in the Northern areas where the presence of the Taliban is not all pervasive. This option gives the flexibility of training a larger quantum of troops on the type of terrain they are likely to be employed in. It would require a training establishment to be set up as also about a brigade worth of troops to secure the training area against any Taliban attack. There would be problems of logistics to sustain the force but these could be overcome with assistance from Iran or some of the Central Asian Republics. Other concerns would however have to be addressed such as Pakistani fears of encirclement and the impact this would have on the already strained peace process where the Afghan Taliban is ambivalent about getting ahead with the peace talks. The deployment of a training force would also be dependent on a US commitment to stay the course in Afghanistan as without such an assurance, the move would be a nonstarter. As of now, the military component of the strategic partnership appears to be more of a psychological ploy to keep Pakistan in line. India would have to wait and watch. The waters have been muddied and it would take some time for clarity to return.

Maj Gen Dhruv Katoch, SM, VSM (Retd) is Additional Director, CLAWS

Views expressed are personal