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Recent developments signaling the US’ continued commitment to maintaining a presence in the Asia-Pacific have been seen as marking a turning point in the history of the region. The reasons for this are two-fold. First, references by US Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton to an “Indo-Pacific” presence for the US are believed to reflect the recognition of India’s importance in the region. Second, US President Obama’s announcement that American marines would be stationed in Western Australia is perceived as a definite challenge to China’s aggressive posturing on issues, maritime disputes in particular.
On both these counts however, the optimism generated in some quarters requires tempering. While sketching the contours of an “ Indo-Pacific” presence for the US, Mrs Clinton had reemphasized President Obama’s assertion that the “relationship between India and America will be one of the defining partnerships of the 21st century, rooted in common values and interests.” The identification of India as the linchpin of the US’ Indo-Pacific policy is seen by many in India as adding to its consequence. The preeminent power’s interest in affording India a greater role conceivably implies that a reinvigorated American presence in Asia would carry India along - towards a more prominent position of leadership in Asia. For some, an adoption of this terminology by India is advisable because it is seen as paving the way for a more expansionist view of Indian national interest. Presumably because the term is “ Indo-Pacific”, India will be justified in claiming a national interest across the region and can then tailor policies accordingly. The question this begets is whether identifying with the change in American terminology brings benefits for India.
The adoption of this terminology by India would suggest a closer alignment of interests with the West and as such send a signal to China. While such signaling may not be bereft of some utility, it would be more authentic were it based on assurances of some sort by the US. Signaling based on the assumption that this changing terminology portends a new chapter in US-India relations seems quite hasty. Would India be nudged along a path it may not be ready to follow by identifying too closely with American interests? After all, not adopting the term does not imply that India has no interests in the greater Asian region. India’s foreign policy will continue to be defined by its national interests. Its foreign policy matrix does not (and should not) change dramatically in response to a change in terminology by the United States. On the whole it would appear that the change in terminology does not bring with it any patent advantages. Its adoption by India would be unnecessary.
In fact, to read the ‘Indo’ in “Indo-Pacific” as referring to India, is in itself somewhat premature. If it is Mrs. Clinton’s references to the partnership with India that have encouraged the belief that “Indo-Pacific” is so coined as to facilitate Indian ascendance in the region, it would be prudent to look at the other “Indo” repeatedly mentioned by her in the same piece – Indonesia. Maintaining and upgrading relations with the world’s most populous Muslim country has been a task the Obama administration inherited and has continuously worked towards. Indonesia is important not only as the heart of the ASEAN but also for its location at the entry to the South China Sea from the Malacca straits and its potential in limiting Chinese projection beyond the first island chain. Could “Indo-Pacific” thus reflect the important position Indonesia may occupy in US strategy to deal with China in the South China Sea and beyond?
As a term for a geographical space, “Indo-Pacific” (referring to the Indian and Pacific Oceans) certainly seems more expansive than the term “Asia-Pacific”. Presumably, it is more rational in so far as it adequately reflects changing American priorities in the region. One would do well to remember that it is an acknowledgement of the importance acquired by the Indian Ocean maritime sphere in American geopolitical considerations, and therefore, by extension only, the increased utility of India.
This brings us to the announcement that US marines will be stationed in Western Australia. In the face of perceived Chinese aggression, with this one move the US has supposedly thrown down the gauntlet. But this is only the latest in a series of US actions. Building military to military relations with Southeast Asian countries, strengthening the alliance with Japan, actively engaging in regional forums, the US has continuously sought to maintain its presence in the region and squeeze the space China may have to carve out a leadership role for itself. That 2500 US marines will be stationed in Western Australia to utilize the extensive training facilities is not all that exceptional. It does not fundamentally change the American position on the South China Sea disputes. The US does not take sides on the territorial disputes, has not committed to intervening militarily on the issue, continues to call for multilateral negotiations and is for promoting the American interpretation of “freedom of navigation.” How useful the stationing of US marines in Australia may be in settling issues in the South China Sea thus remains to be seen.
Although military ties between Australia and the US have deepened, it has not all been plain sailing. Domestic criticism over the failure to bring home Australian troops from Afghanistan persists as does caution in some quarters over closer ties with the US. If the “Arc of Democracy” proposal floated a few years ago is any indicator then Australia will not be comfortable with any move that is considered blatantly anti-China. Recent news reports suggest that Australia felt no qualms about providing China access to a space-tracking station in Western Australia without seeking American advice on the matter. Australia is clearly committed to managing its relations with both China and the United States so as to further its own priorities – a position that cannot be faulted.
It is in the improbable event of a military conflict between the US and China that Mr. Obama’s announcement would have acute relevance. 2500 US marines by 2016-17 on rotation in the Darwin area and access to Australian air and naval bases would potentially provide the stationing of assets outside areas most vulnerable to anti-access measures by China, thwart the creation of a successful second-island chain anti-access capability and provide a sizable number of highly trained personnel in times of crisis. Even in peace time this would be an especially useful deterrent to China’s aggressive moves on Senkaku or Okinawa as a whole (which the US does consider a part of Japan).
While developments in recent weeks may help reassure those afraid of an American withdrawal from Asia and consequently a free-run for China, these do not reflect a fundamental change in the US’ policies in the region. They also do not seem to have a direct bearing on two issues repeatedly underlined by the US – the role that India, as an increasingly important member of the global community, can play; and the South China Sea disputes.
Rukmani Gupta is an Associate Fellow at the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA)
Views expressed are personal
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