Against the backdrop of continued terrorist attacks in various parts of India, the clearance given by Cabinet Committee on Security(CCS) for the setting up of National Counter Terrorism Centre(NCTC) with an originally planned take off date of March 1 has been described as a major step towards strengthening and widening the scope of various counter terrorism measures adopted by the country. An official order on NCTC issued in New Delhi says, “The NCTC will prescribe counter terrorism priorities for each stake holder and ensure that all the agencies have access to and receive source intelligence support that is necessary to execute counter terrorism plans and accomplish their assigned task”.
Indeed, typical of the bureaucratic way of functioning, the NTPC will have the mandate of preparing daily threat assessment reviews and disseminate them to appropriate levels in both the state and central governments. But the effectiveness of the operational philosophy of NTPC would be demonstrated only by the extent to which the disseminated information would be exploited to ward off a possible terrorist threat. As of now, India’s track record in anticipating terror strikes leaves much to be desired.
The multi agency NCTC would need to go to great lengths in extracting information it is looking for from various agencies of both the state and central governments. The possibility of “ego clashes” and “professional rivalry” hampering this process cannot be ruled out.
The genesis of NCTC is traced to the several shortcomings and weak spots in the current architecture of counter terrorism in the country. That is why NCTC is being shaped up as a single centre of control and coordination of all counter terrorism measures. ”The NCTC will fulfil this need and also ensure that it does not duplicate the roles of other agencies and work through the existing agencies in the country” say sources in Indian Home Ministry. Here one can draw a parallel to the measures that the Government of India took to designate Indian Navy as the sole, centralised authority responsible for coastal security - with plethora of other agencies having stake in country’s coastal security directed to report to the Navy - in the aftermath of 26/11 Mumbai terror attack.
Though NCTC has been named after a similar body in USA with a particular focus on combating terrorism by collecting and analysing threats, sharing the inputs and information with other agencies and converting them into actionable data, it is by no way a match to its American name sake in terms of capability, resources, support base and global reach. Of course, NCTC will be empowered to maintain data on terror modules, terrorists, their associates, friends, families and supporters. It can also seek information including documents, reports, transcripts and cyber information from any agency including CBI (Central Bureau of Investigation), NIA (National Intelligence Agency) and the NSG (National Security guard). The NCTC will work to not only “pre-empt’ terrorist attacks but also help in “post blast” analysis and seamless sharing of information between various agencies. However, as pointed out by Ajit Doval, a former Director of the IB, ‘the counter terrorist units of the states too need to be reorganised on the pattern of NCTC to bring about the uniformity and seamless integration in national counter terrorism efforts’.
The NCTC will derive its powers from Section 43A of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) of 1967 which allows it to make arrests or searches across the country in terror suspected cases. However, to give teeth to the operations of NCTC, it is planned to make it a statutory body. However, since habits die hard, intelligence and security agencies in the country functioning under various Ministries and Departments may find it difficult to submit to the authority of centralised NCTC. While the state police are supposed to be kept in the loop when NCTC undertakes searches or makes arrests many of the state governments have expressed concerns over this issue. Opposition to NCTC is also on the grounds that it would infringe upon the rights of the states. As of now, the NCTC has thus been put on hold.
Home Minister P.Chidambaram in a letter addressed to the Chief Ministers of ten Indian States who have opposed NCTC has asked them to keep the issue above the party politics. ‘When engaged in counter terrorism operations, the officers must have the power to search which are bare minimum powers that would be necessary’ noted Chidambaram. Indeed, as some experts point out that the fight against terrorism will be weakened by the objections of the state to the power of search, seize and arrest vested in NCTC. According to Anupama Roy of the Centre for Political Studies of New Delhi based Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), “when it (NCTC) is politicised as it is done now, it falls into a tension area”.
There is no denying the fact that NCTC in particular should strengthen its mechanism to intercept communications sent by the terrorist outfits through a variety of channels including satellites and cyberspace. In particular, NCTC should try to get the data from Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)satellite systems capable of picking up communications and messages with a high degree of clarity .NCTC should prepare the ground for making extensive use of India’s own ELINT satellite expected to be launched by the middle of this decade. On another front, efforts must be made to refine the techniques of low intensity warfare to tackle the 26/11 like situation. For in the battle to capture militants on mayhem, collateral damages should be minimized. On its part India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has developed a range of low conflict hardware and gadgets. Information sharing and data exchange with security agencies, anti terrorist organisations and criminal investigation organisations in other countries around the world should also top the agenda of NCTC.
But as things stand now, how best NCTC will fare in its assigned task will ultimately depend upon the strategy it adopts and tools it presses into service to interact with various agencies having stake in the anti terrorism agenda and succeeds in extracting right type of information well in advance to thwart the possible terrorist attack. The failure to do so would mean NCTC would end up as yet another bureaucratic set up that instead of being ”result oriented” would become an “expenditure oriented’ agency.
Radhakrishna Rao is a freelancer specializing in defence and aerospace issues
Views expressed are personal
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