Home Siachen Cannot be the Start Point for Peace

Siachen Cannot be the Start Point for Peace

The talk of demilitarising the Siachen Glacier which was on the back burner for a long time suddenly hit centre stage after a tragic snow avalanche buried all the 140 odd personnel of the Pakistan Army in their forward base at Gayari on 7 April 2012. In a visit to the area a few days after the incident, Pakistan’s Army Chief mooted the idea of withdrawal of Indian and Pakistani troops deployed on the Saltoro Ridge. Kayani’s statement that Pakistan was ready for demilitarisation of Siachen created a buzz in political and military circles, and many well-meaning people from both sides quickly took up the refrain. There is perhaps a certain element of glamour and grandstanding involved when people talk of peaceful settlement of issues. Peace of course is of vital concern and needs no reiteration. That peace can be brought about by withdrawing troops from the Saltoro Ridge is however etched in fantasy.

A comprehension of the geography of the place would perhaps lead to a better understanding of the ground realities. The Siachen Glacier lies between The Aksai Chin and the Nubra River. No troops are deployed on Siachen. Towards the West is the Saltoro Ridge, which lies between the Nubra and the Shyok Rivers and dominates the Siachen Glacier. Indira Col on the northern tip of the Saltoro Ridge was first reached by Colonel Narendra Kumar of the Indian Army in 1981 and he named it Indira Col. Harish Kapadia reached the same col in 1998. The col is a saddle between the Siachen Glacier to the south and the Urdok Glacier to the north, on the watershed between the Indus River Basin and the Tarim Basin. The term Indira Col has also been applied to another, higher col 2.4 km further east on the Indira Ridge. This eastern col was named Indira Col in 1912 by Bullock Workman, after one of the names of the goddess Lakshmi. The area to the north is part of the Trans Karakoram Tract, (Shaksgam Valley) illegally ceded by Pakistan to China under a 1963 border agreement between the two countries. 
 
Post the peace accord signed in Shimla in 1972 between Mrs Indira Gandhi and Mr Bhutto, the military commanders from both India and Pakistan set about delineating and authenticating the line of control (LC) as existing between the two sides in Jammu and Kashmir according to the terms of the accord. As is well known, the delineation took place up to a point referred to as NJ 9842. Beyond this point, the two sides left the boundary unmarked and chose to describe it as, “and thence Northwards, towards the glaciers.” NJ 9842 lies on the Saltoro Ridge. Northwards hence logically means starting from NJ 9842 and thence continuing along the crest line of the Saltoro which in the instant case leads to Indira Col. That is the international convention. It cannot mean descending down to the Nubra and then going over the Siachen Glacier in a Northeast direction towards the Karakoram Pass as claimed by Pakistan. In fact, it was Pakistani attempts to force the latter interpretation by according permission to foreign mountaineering teams to the Siachen that led India to occupy the Saltoro ridge. 
 
The fact that India is sitting on its own territory hence makes any talk of mutual withdrawal nonsensical. A withdrawal from territory which we are holding and which we have defended from continuous Pakistani assaults will only weaken our stated position on Kashmir. The political ramifications of such a move are tremendous. If Pakistan is so concerned about the security and welfare of its troops, they are welcome to withdraw from the posts held by them on the Western slopes of the Saltoro which are at lower heights. India can and should give them an assurance that it will respect the present line and not move into posts vacated by them. To ask for Indian troops to withdraw because Pakistan finds it difficult to maintain its troops post the disaster at Gayari is stretching both logic and goodwill a bit too far. 
 
The second argument thrown about in favour of withdrawal is that the harsh conditions at Siachen have led to many health related casualties and the expense involved in maintaining troops at such heights is debilitating. This line of reasoning too is flawed. The cost of maintaining troops on the Saltoro Ridge is no more than in maintaining troops located at other similar heights by India. Then why single out only the Saltoro ridge for demilitarisation? There is no clamour for withdrawing Indian troops from the Glacier at Sub Sector West, located South of NJ 9842. Neither is there any call for withdrawing troops from Sub Sector Hanif located West of NJ 9842 on the line of control. There is a cost of maintaining troops here too. But Pakistan has no problems of maintaining its troops opposite India in these areas and so these sectors receive no mention. The talk of casualties is also flawed and not borne out by evidence. The casualties suffered on the Glaciers are no more than suffered in other high altitude areas. A lot of care and effort is taken on the acclimatisation process and many units have returned from the Glacier with a zero casualty rate. In any case, when has cost and casualties been a consideration for defending our territory?
 
We need to look into the larger game plan of Pakistan which seeks to take the Glaciers by guile as it has failed to do so by force. The aim appears to be to link Pakistani presence and control over the glaciers with Chinese occupied Aksai Chin. The strategic implications of such a move are obvious. Guarantees by Pakistan that it will not move into the areas vacated by India are worthless. And what would happen if Chinese troops move in? How would India respond then?
 
Peace is certainly a worthy cause and must be pursued but Siachen is not the start point. India can unilaterally stop the absurd drill being followed at the Wagah check post and let Pakistan do the silly goose stepping. That measure cannot backfire. We can unilaterally return Pakistani prisoners, at least the ones who have inadvertently strayed into Indian Territory or who have been apprehended fishing in Indian waters.  There are many ways to develop goodwill without risking our strategic interests. Then why start with Siachen? Demilitarisation as a process must encompass the entire border and for that Pakistan must stop acts of terror on Indian soil. Trust can be built if Pakistan closes the 42 terrorist training camps it has established to bleed India and also hand over the perpetrators of the Mumbai carnage. Anything less will not inspire confidence.
 
Finally, the stated position of the Indian Army that withdrawing from the Saltoro would not be in India’s interest is merely stating a military reality. Regardless of the guarantees given by Pakistan, should the Saltoro be occupied by Pakistan in contravention to any guarantees given, it would be impossible for the Indian Army to regain the feature. It is incumbent on the part of the military to give its professional opinion on military matters. This can in no way be viewed as going against government policy. The Political authority in India is supreme and can overrule military judgement based on political considerations. It must however take responsibility for its action. 
 
Maj Gen Dhruv Katoch (Retd) is Additional Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS)
 
Views expressed are personal
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Gautam Das
An excellent and timely article stating the facts and the geo-political realities of the so-called 'Siachen Glacier de-militarisation offer' from Pakistan.

Pakistan could also show some desire to normalise relations, leading to peace, if it so wanted, by itself stopping the jingoistic Wagah nonsense on its side of the check-post. India could do so too, if it wanted to show some unilateral peace-making intentions, but presently the onus is on Pakistan.
Ashim
Shaurya has a point but I do not quite see it. India is not in a position to take back occupied Kashmir from Pakistan. Then why sacrifice Siachen too? I would go with the author.
Rohit Singh (CLAWS)
The article has very lucidly underscored the importance of Siachen and the implications of a withdrawal on our national security. It is astonishing that after bearing the brunt of Pakistan sponsored terrorism for more than two decades now (we do not even have to look that far - in the year 2008 itself, multiple Indian cities were targeted with a series of IED attacks and the year culminated with the attack on Mumbai on 26 November)- the onus of taking the first step towards peace should be on India. And as the article has brought out, Pakistan has taken no step to either dismantle the terror infrastructure in POK or prevent infiltration of terrorists across the LC- despite India's strict adherence to a ceasefire since November 2003 (which Pakistan has violated on no less than 105 occassions since 2010 alone). As for military CBMs and bridging the trust deficit, how about Pakistan withdrawing from some features on our side of the LC which it continued to hold on to even after 26 July 1999 ?



Mr Shaurya - this article and the previous ones on the CLAWS website have highlighted the tactical importance of the Siachen sector for us in great detail. And in today's battlefield scenario, no army in the world would vacate a tactical advantage, especially since both the human and the economic costs of maintaining troops at those dizzy heights have stabilised in our favour. Gen Kayani's statement was meaningless and it only sought India's withdrawal from the Saltoro on the grounds that it was the 'aggressor'. Your advocacy for India to assume a larger geo-strategic role in the region runs contrary to effecting a withdrawal from the Saltoro- a dominating feature that offers us tactical and other strategic advantages which the Indian Army has well taken into consideration before firming up its stand on the deployment under Op Meghdoot.
Col (Retd) RaghuNath Banerjee,CPP
All the relevant factors have been dissected with incisive and cogent arguments for all amateaurs to view the innards clearly.

hard hitting very military like - Conclusion in Last Para is the icing on the cake for the reader.

Enjoyed reading through!
Shaurya
>>The fact that India is sitting on its own territory hence makes any talk of mutual withdrawal nonsensical.

Do we not claim sovereignty on all of Kashmir, as per 1992 parliament resolution? So, what we claim to be ours is not just what is east of the AGPL, but the west too! Words like the one above is a self goal.

This issue of Kashmir is not going to be solved overnight, or even in this generation. We simply do not have the appetite to either enforce our will or compromise on this matter of where the border is. It stretches to the Wakhan.

What we can do is build some CBM's to build this trust. Is there another desolate, uninhabited region on the LoC, an impossible area that only an insane general will use as an invasion route?

If China has to come and play, PLA is not going to come through Indira col. if the PA has the guts to come back and break such a CBM, our political leadership should ensure that they pay dearly for such a venture, by giving a free hand to the IA.

At the end of the day, there is only one answer to the trust deficit and that is our threat of the use of force to enforce our will. Let us focus on this will aspect with the polity, for Siachen seems to be a doable CBM.

I think people are imagining an all or nothing approach with Pakistan and it will be very difficult for a dysfunctional, failing and paranoid state to commit to such a thing and deliver upon it.

It has to be a step by step plan that is sequenced and expectations are managed. On what we want from Pakistan, apart from the usual whining of Hafiz Sayeed's head (which is important) but still a whine. There are far more important things, in my view. Example: Ask for transit rights for military goods to go to Afghanistan. This will be a real coup. It is time, India starts controlling this wider region of South Asia.

With great respect for your record of service, I offer the above critique.














Karan
A very cogent article. Mr. Shaurya, I wonder who you actually are?
Pankaj
Sir, Thank you very much for writing this article and
telling the common people about the IMPORTANCE of Siachen and Saltoro
Lt Gen Kamal Davar (Retd)
Just read your article onSiachen - could not agree more with your considered views, having been GOCLadakh from 1994 to 96 (there was no 14 Corps then). I have a special affinitywith Ladakh - it�s my karmabhoomi. The Pakis fondly remember me for that tenureas somebody told me In Washington for the big bamboo they got during this period!Gen Bipin Joshi had specially sent me there - the first Armd Corps offr to beGOC 3 Inf Div.

I am afraid NOTHING haschanged between the two nations for us to be in a hurry to change our stance.Even if the Pakis do not commit further perfidy, why should we give away a positionof immense tactical advantage and also give an opportunity of the Pakis joininghands from the West from POK with the Chinese in the East in Aksai Chin andthus give up or get unduly threatened in what we call our Sub Sector North (DBOareas). We have to solve all our J&K problems together in a package dealwhich will be fair for both the nations and not end up giving concessionspiecemeal on each issue. Siachen is not bothering us in anyway. If it ispinching Pak they can vacate/thin out and we can assure them that we will notmove beyond our current positions. We are not there to suit Pak's convenience; whydo we start reacting to a mere statement of the ex ISI boss and now Pak ArmyChief. Their govt has not sent any formal proposal to India. Pakistan only understands the language ofstrength. So let�s wear them out and maybe one day they will understand thebenefits of durable and fair peace. Unfortunately the China factor will keepthem, off and on, upping the ante vis-a-vis India. That is the cardinal harshtruth.

I have been disseminating my viewsprivately on Siachen to a couple of people in this country; did it for thefirst time in 2005 when Musharraf was spelling out his charm on the Indianestablishment. Thank God wisdom prevailed then! You must send this out to thenational media too.
Shaurya
Lt. Gen Kamla Dava wrote:
>>Pakistan only understands the language ofstrength. So let�s wear them out and maybe one day they will understand thebenefits of durable and fair peace.

Dear Sir: Another perspective.

Any adversary understands only the language of strength, which is the ultimate guarantor of peace. The issue with the argument that a deal on Siachen is a threat to SSN (KKP. DBO area), SSW or SS Hanif or the Shyok Valley and to Leh itself as some have alleged, assumes certain things. These assumptions are premised either on Pakistan being able to over whelm and be capable of being an attacking force in these regions, much of the above areas NOT included in the demilitarization zone of Siachen. It presumes the PA being able to overwhelm defenses south of NJ9842 by using the Siachen axis route. I am not a military person, but it seems almost impossible that the PA has the wherewithal to overwhelm the IA south of NJ9842 or for ANY army to use either of the three passes of Siachen to mount an offensive in these areas.

The increasing gap between Pakistan and India force asymmetries continue to widen each day. These asymmetries are not just military, but economic, political and diplomatic too (soft power). If ever, Pakistan had the capability to be a conventional threat to India, those days are long gone and the widening gap as the years and decades go by will make this point so obvious that only a hallucinating General, such as Musharrraf may at best attempt another Kargil. But, the question is, if this is the maximum that the PA can do, is it in our national interests to engage or watch Pakistan�s slide from the side.

Impact this land of Pakistan and its people, connected to our land mass shall have, that much is destined. If we do not engage, someone else may hold their hand, (PRC or KSA), which shall certainly not be in our interests. Even if no one holds their hand, the sheer push of gravity will start to have an impact on us.

There are many geo-political ends, India seeks and should control for the region. If Siachen is a manageable military risk, through a set of operational procedures as Brig: Kanwal has proposed, then we should explore it.







Shaurya
The name in the below comment should read

Lt Gen Kamal Davar (Retd)

Apologies for the typo there.
Dhruv Katoch
Dear Shaurya,
I am delighted that my article has invited a series of comments which in a sense reflects the vibrancy of discourse amongst the strategic community in India. Thank you for your comments; the larger purpose of my article is to stimulate debate. The issue which I wished to highlight is that Siachen cannot be the start point for building goodwill. There are better means to do so. Even if we give Kashmir on a platter to Pakistan, it will not build goodwill. This was stated by no less a personality than Pakistan�s former President and Army Chief Pervez Musharraf. The problems are deeper and lie on two basic fault lines. The first is that hostility towards India is the raison d'�tre of Pakistan's existence. Take away that hostility and the question then asked will be - why did you go for partition? The question of Pakistani identity is one which the people of Pakistan have to solve for themselves. It will take a long time. India does not desire any part of Pakistan; We have enough problems of our own. However, if people in Pakistan actually view themselves as conquering Arabs, as many of them mistakenly do, then it reflects more than anything else a total subjugation of an entire group of people. To make a people change not only their religion but their culture too is symbolic of accepting an inferior status. Such a race is condemned to mediocrity. The second fault line is the Pak army itself. Peace with India hurts the army's interests as their role in the power structure of the state gets reduced. Demilitarising Siachen therefore will not make a difference. We will simply demilitarise without having achieved anything. While I agree with the need for CBMs, my view is that this will not come about in this manner. The Indian Armed Forces have to look at the situation in terms of military consequences and not in terms of politics. The latter is the sphere of the Central Government which must take a political call. But while taking a political call it cannot ask the military to give advice which is palatable to the political establishment. As far as the military is concerned, it must give a military viewpoint. No one stops the political leadership from overruling the military. But they must have the courage to accept the consequences. There is no need for the military to toe the political line and be the fall guys if things do not go as planned as happened in 1962. Let us not repeat that blunder. Asking for transit routes to Afghanistan is one thing; getting it is another. Pakistan won�t give you a pin - and you can do nothing about it. Let us preserve what we have... we are so willing to give up our gains.
Shaurya
Dhruv Sir: There is probably 98% agreement with your response. The 2% is a matter of sequencing and prioritization that are viewed differently.

Especially your last part is right on dot and have always felt, the onus of responsibility falls on the political authority. The IA should provide a dire and unbiased military advise to political authority and they should be very clear on what it means, IF the IA is ever asked to retake the Saltoro, it should NOT be a repeat of Kargil. For the record, did not support the political call to restrict operations in Kargil to our side of the LoC only. I know it is a controversial call. But that is another pandora's box and do not wish to reopen.

On Pakistan in general, my thoughts revolve around the age old Indian advise from Kautilya of using Sama, Dana, Bheda and Danda ALL simultaneously with Pakistan. Wise will be the leader who manages it. I will write in detail, when thoughts on the matter are more clear.

Thank you so much for the response and making the wider public more educated on the matter.
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