Encounter in Bastar: Need for Credibility

A fortnight has elapsed since the fateful encounter which took place in Chhattisgarh’s Bastar Division, leaving in its wake a trail of death. 19 tribals were killed, 17 of them in Sarkeguda village alone. What exactly happened on the night of 28 – 29 June, in Chhattisgarh’s Bastar Division? The police were quick to claim that all the people killed were Maoists, but the villagers had a different tale to tell. In a ceaseless war of accusations and counter accusations, truth has become the first casualty and wrong lessons are likely to emerge from an encounter which evidently went horribly wrong.

As per the police, the operation was carried out by the CRPF with personnel from the Special Task Force and local police. It was based on specific intelligence that top Maoists from Orissa were camping in the Silger forest. The police forces moved from their posts at Basaguda, Jagargonda and Chintalnar towards Silger. The operation was stated to be led by CRPF DIG (Ops) S Elango. This part of the story itself raises some very serious concerns on the planning of the operation. Jagargonda lies about 30 km East Southeast of Basaguda. Chintalnar lies 12 km further to the South of Jagargonda. The sheer difficulty of launching a joint operation from locations so far dispersed would have been a challenge for well led, highly skilled and superbly trained troops.  How the police forces were to operate in a coordinated manner from such dispersed locations has not been explained. Were they to meet at a pre-designated rendezvous? Were they in communication with each other? What was the marching time required to reach the objective by night in an area dominated by Maoists? Did the DIG move with the troops or was he based in the district HQ, passing instructions on a radio set? Where was the battalion commander? Who were the officers leading the police forces? All these questions beg an answer but none seem to be forthcoming.

It seems more likely however, that the police forces from each of these posts were carrying out local domination operations. The way the events unfolded on the ground certainly point to that probability. The team which set off from Chintalnar claimed they were fired upon shortly after leaving their post and in the brief encounter, two tribal were killed. The team from Jagargonda also claimed an encounter shortly after moving out from the post but there were no casualties on either side. The major action that took place was between the team that set out from Basagunda and the Maoists. The police version of how events unfolded differs dramatically from what the villagers have to say.

As per Soma, a resident of Kottaguda Village who was injured in the encounter, three Maoists came to their village at about 10 pm and herded them together for a meeting at Sarkeguda. Two of them were carrying handmade guns. Usually meetings are not held late but the villagers went as refusing a Maoist diktat was akin to risking death. The meeting discussed various issues including distribution of land for tilling. While the meeting was on, police encircled them and then there was heavy firing. The police version as given out by one of the participants is that the force moved out of the post and was marching in single file towards the Singer Forest where there was information that Maoists had assembled. Three km from their post, at village Sarkeguda they were fired upon resulting in injuries to six policemen. Though it was dark, they saw at least 30 to 40 men firing and retreating into the jungles. The police then returned the fire and cordoned off the village.

A cursory analysis of the events points to serious discrepancies in the police version. If the policemen were moving in single file and were fired upon, the only people who could have returned the fire were the leading scouts. As they were hit, the return fire from the police would have been largely ineffective as the column was moving in single file. The policemen moving behind would have been unable to see where the fire was coming from and at best could have only fired at random. It appears more probable then that the events unfolded as given out by the villagers. As part of area domination, the police forces would have encircled Sarkeguda village after moving out from their post. Seeing a meeting in progress, they probably opened fire suspecting them to be hardcore Maoist cadre and took them by surprise. It needs to be noted that the moon phase had passed the first quarter and with the moon setting about an hour after midnight, the operation would have been carried out with the moon’s illumination at about 60 per cent intensity. This was perhaps the reason why so many tribal got killed as it was a moonlit night. The police injuries are more likely to have been caused by their own cross fire. Only two of them had injuries which were serious. Constable Wahidul Islam had splinter injuries on the chest and constable Prakash received splinter injuries on the face. The absence of bullet injuries is intriguing and simply confirms the fact that the few Maoists in the group were not part of either the Maoist Main Force or the Secondary Force, but were members of the Base Force or ‘Jan Militia’ which operates at the village level and is armed with a few assorted local handmade weapons only.

Six teenagers were among the tribal killed, the youngest being just 12 years old. Possibly four or five among the dead could have been part of the Jan Militia but the rest were simply villagers herded into a meeting. And that raises serious concerns on the action of the police forces. To state that the Maoists used the villagers as human shields lacks substance. When an encounter is in progress it is not possible for the Maoist or anyone else for that matter to use civilians as a shield. The human shield works by day and in places where demonstrations are held. Terrorists may well fire from behind a crowd to prevent a reaction from the police. This was not possible in the Sarkeguda encounter. The killing of innocent villagers hence cannot be brushed aside. Attention is also being drawn to the fact that the police did not have night vision devices. This is another red herring, diverting attention from the real issue which remains lack of leadership and training to operate in a counter insurgency environment. A point of concern also emanates from reports that the bodies of some of the tribal killed were mutilated. The police have strongly refuted any wrong doing on the part of their force. What needs to be determined however is the mutilation or otherwise of any of the bodies. The post mortem report should have been accompanied by photographic evidence to confirm or deny mutilation. If there was no mutilation, the matter stands closed. But if the bodies were mutilated, then the only people who could have done so were the police personnel who took part in the encounter and they must be held accountable for the same.

There can be no letup in operations against the armed cadre of the Maoists but care needs to be taken that the tribal people are insulated from suffering collateral damage. This is as much a war of winning hearts and minds and the killing of innocent civilians only drives the tribal closer to the Maoists. This must be avoided at all costs. The aim should not be to go witch hunting and make scapegoats of the persons who participated in this operation. The larger need is to address the deeper malaise of lack of training and leadership, in the absence of which such incidences will recur with increasing frequency. Another aspect pertains to the manner in which the incident was highlighted in the media. Initial reports emanating from the police gave out a picture that all personnel killed were hardcore Maoists. This was patently incorrect as the bodies of the children and lack of weapons recovered from the dead would have shown. Greater care needs to be exercised while claiming success as wrong statements will not pass muster. It is important to win the media battle too, but that cannot be done through false claims or through misreporting.
 

Maj Gen Dhruv Katoch, SM, VSM (Retd) is Additional Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS)

Views expressed are personal