Kokrajhar Revisited

This article is not aimed at chronicling the events as they occurred in July, but rather in looking at issues which need to be deliberated upon to avoid recurrence of such conflagrations. That the area is sensitive and violence will in all likelihood assume communal overtones is not something unknown to the administration. Just a few years back, in violence which rocked the BTAD in 2008, many people lost their lives with close to two lakh people being rendered homeless. For the state government to have been taken by surprise at the unfolding of events betrays a lackadaisical attitude to security and a lack of administrative and political acumen. It is time now to take a holistic view of security requirements to avoid recurrence of such incidents which adversely impacts not just the region but the country as a whole. 

 

There is a need to carry out computer based population mapping which would assist in determining likely conflict spots. We need to create up to date and accurate database of people living in the area. This should include data on numbers, gender, age profiles, literacy levels, occupation, employment statistics, income levels, language, religious belief, land holdings and any other data which could be relevant for analysis. Analysis of data as also of change occurring over periods of time can give interesting insights into what is happening in the area and make identification of likely trouble spots that much easier. These trouble spots can be marked and periodically visited by elements of the state police forces to familiarise them with the area. The Army too could carry out reconnaissance of such areas which would give a sense of security to the local population. Data bases will mitigate fears of fresh illegal immigration; if such immigration does occur it can be detected and checked. The Unique Identity Scheme must be put on priority in the BTAD. By the end of the year, it must cover 100 per cent of the population. This will make any future influx into the area easy to monitor. In addition, how people of the area receive information assumes importance. Similar channels could be used by the state to dispel rumours and present a factual picture to the masses whenever disturbances occur. These measures do not preclude the taking of other steps in the social, economic and legal domain to address causative factors of conflict. They are simply an additional mean to pre-empt likely conflict.

 

An unfortunate aspect of the violence in the BTAD was the communal hue given to the killings which took place. Violence in the BTAD is not a new phenomenon. The primary causative factor is pressure on depleting land resources caused in part by population growth and partly by illegal immigration over the years predominantly from Bangladesh. There is also a narrative of competing economic systems between the local Bodos and the Bangladeshi immigrants which leads to conflict. While the conflict is thus not communal, it does acquire communal overtone considering the fact that most if not all Bangladeshi immigrants in the BTAD are Muslim. The narrative hence has to be factually portrayed in the media to prevent it from being communalised. The state and central governments as well as the security forces have to be proactive in portraying the true picture else anti national elements will exploit the situation and give it a communal hue. Spokespersons for the government and security forces must hence be aware of the facts and should present them before false information completely submerges the government’s narrative.

 

This incident saw for the first time the social media being used to spread hate and fear. Muslim groups were incited to target people from North East India as a result of which India witnessed a shameful exodus of its citizens from Pune, Bangalore and other cities back to their native places fearing for their lives. The action required here is to nip the evil in the bud by taking strict and visible action against the hate mongers. These actions should be well publicised to have a deterrent effect. Special courts need to be set to try the guilty in a time bound manner. In addition, the police forces need to have enough people on their rolls who patronise the social media and who can give provide information in real time of trouble likely to unfold.

 

Finally, there is the issue of the statement made by the Chief Minister of Assam that Army assistance was requested on occurrence of violence but the force was made available only after two days and that this delay led to great loss of life and property. There is no doubt that the immediate deployment of the Army would have stabilised the situation but the larger danger here is that using the Army as an instrument of first response will lead to lack of effort on the part of the state to train their own forces and lead to total dependence on the Army. This will not augur well for long term stability. While the Army must be used if absolutely necessary, it must only be called after the state government has used the considerable resources at its disposal. The police forces are not an impotent force. Properly trained and led, they will be a viable instrument of first response.

 

 

Views expressed are personal