No Red Carpets for PLA Generals

Possibly the first direction that Xi Jinping has issued to the PLA as the Chairman of the Central Military Commission(CMC) is to observe austerity measures and cut ostentatious and frivolous expenditure in every day functioning of the PLA. The list of Do’s and Dont’s include removal of welcome banners, red carpets, floral arrangements, formations of soldiers, performances and souvenirs[1]{C} Others include banning liquor from receptions, a directive which caused one of China largest liquor company to shed $ 2 billion or 5.5 per cent of its stock value in a day on the Shanghai bourse! And ban on ‘luxury banquets’ implying that officers will make do with buffet meals rather than glitzy multi-course banquets[2]{C} That this diktat was meant only for the PLA is not true – it applies to the entire state machinery. But the CMC was quick to take a cue and issue its own set of ‘ten commandments’, some going beyond even Xi’s directive. Aside from the triviality, one needs to read deeper into the message behind this diktat.  It was an acknowledgement that corruption is not alien to the PLA that it was time to clean up the stables. A damning indictment of the depth of corruption within the PLA comes from Zhu Feng, a professor of international relations at Peking University who says, ‘Military corruption is a more “imminent” threat to the PLA than the U.S. armed forces’{C}[3]{C}.

The PLA last saw action in 1979 against Vietnam and it certainly was not a war that the PLA would like to remember. Despite the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) the PLA has largely been a ceremonial army seen only during resplendent parades held every year on 01 October at Tiananmen Square. The present leadership in the CMC is largely commissioned in the period 1967-70, while Military Region Commanders and Group Army Commanders are of 1970-73 vintage. Barely a handful have war experience and those who did participate in Vietnam in 1979 or in the short air-naval engagement over Paracels in 1974  were at best company commanders/ naval lieutenants with less than 10 years service. No senior officer has ever participated in a tri-service operation. None can boast of setting an example to their junior officers of personal deeds of heroism, valour or gallantry as they lack war experience. In a system where loyalty to the Party is the paramount requirement to rise in ranks, it is but natural that reasons other than merit would be consideration for promotion. The rise of ‘princelings’, those favoured few born with ‘silver spoons’ is well documented and accepted amongst the PLA elite. The selection process for Generals is opaque and little is known about the qualitative requirements or criterion for promotion. Cliques and groupism is common and guanxi or personal relationships matter. The International Herald Tribune carried a report about General Zhang Qinsheng, Deputy Chief of General Staff of the PLA as having “lashed out in a drunken rage against what he believed was a backhanded move to keep him from being named to the Central Military Commission” at a Lunar New Year banquet hosted for the Chinese military leadership, prompting the President Hu Jintao to “leave in disgust” from the venue.^[4]Even the appointment of General Fan Changlong, a former Jinan MR Commander directly as Vice Chair in the CMC has been unprecedented, with reports that his claim to fame was his proximity to the corridors of power in the Party. Other reports suggest that General Fang Fenghui, was appointed Director of the General Staff Department for having impressed the leadership with his organizational skills in conducting the 60th Anniversary Parade as Beijing MR Commander.

The PLA elite have been used to the trappings of power for long. The dual nature of their job which involves their role in governance as well as the military affords unrivalled perks and privileges. In provinces the senior military leadership also sits on the party committees and exert  influence in governance. The salaries of officers in the PLA have been recently revised and vary from 3800- 8800 Yuan for Second Lieutenant to Major General( seven ranks) but, interestingly, from Major General to General( three ranks) it varies from 8800 -22000 Yuan- huge jump for the Generals! One PLA young officer confided in me that the biggest perk an officer received on promotion to General in the PLA is an Audi A6!!  . In a scathing observation on the present crop of Chinese Generals, Jamil Andrini quotes a party member as saying that, ‘that nothing displays structural weakness like overweight generals’ referring to pot bellied PLA Generals entering the Great Hall of People during the 18^th Party Congress. Drawing a comparison from  the history of the marble boat in the Summer palace,[5]{C} he notes that the PLA’s hierarchy ‘… can be seen in the walled communities of opulent villas on Beijing’s outskirts where the extraordinarily wealthy generals of the People’s Liberation Army and their families park their Bentleys and count their fortunes[6]{C}General Liu Yuan, son of the former Chinese president, Liu Shaoqi, was candid during his address to 600 officers on New Year last year. He warned that corruption threatened the very existence of both the PLA and the Communist Party. ‘'I'd rather risk losing my position than refrain from fighting corruption to the end,’ General Liu said, adding that he was determined to fight corruption and ‘No matter how high one's position is or how powerful their background, I will see it through.’^{C}[7]{C}  A CMC aspirant, he was overlooked for the coveted appointment to CMC at the 18^th Party Congress.

Till the 1990s, the PLA ran a business empire, delving in real estate, trading , transport and even hospitality. Deng Xiaoping banned the PLA from getting into business and intensified a crackdown on rampant corruption. But it has ‘crept back in recent years due to a lack of transparency, checks and balances and moral decay’.[8]In 2006, Vice Admiral, Wang Shouye, Deputy Commander of the PLA Navy was jailed for life for embezzling 160 million yuan ($25.4 million) in China's biggest military corruption scandal. Early this year, General Gu  Junshan was removed as deputy director of General Logistics Department for corruption in connection with construction of barracks ahead of the 18 Party Congress. The Diplomat, alluding to an analogy of the high speed train mishap  at Wenzhou in July 2011 which killed 40 people reflecting corruption in the Railways, says ‘China’s new military system remains largely untested. But if billions have been stolen by generals and contractors, instead of spent perfecting complex systems and operating procedures, then China’s military could in effect be a high-speed accident waiting to happen.’[9]

With Xi Jinping acknowledging that corruption could threaten the very existence of the Party, the clean up operation seems to have begun. Xi has already set a personal example by sitting and eating with troops in an informal atmosphere during his first visit to Guangzhou MR. The body language is clear and businesslike- professionalism matters. How much of this translates into action needs to be closely observed.

 [1] ‘Austerity Drive:  No Luxury Banquets or Liquor For China Military’, PTI,  22 December 2012.