Limited Wars in South Asia-Urgent Need for an Indian Doctrine

General

The Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) organised a seminar on “Limited Wars in South Asia ¬Urgent Need for an Indian Doctrine” on 30 September 2009 at the CLAWS campus. The seminar was attended by officers from the armed forces and members of the strategic community. Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, AVSM, VrC, VM (Retd), Director Centre for Air Power Studies, chaired the session. Maj Gen GD Bakshi (Retd) made a presentation on a book commissioned by CLAWS. Lt Gen VK Kapoor, PVSM (Retd) and Maj Gen PJS Sandhu (Retd), Additional Director, USI were the discussants.

Opening Remarks

Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd), Director CLAWS, outlined the need to formulate a military doctrine on limited war under nuclear overhang. He emphasised that there is still space for conventional war in South Asia under the nuclear shadow. Indian military doctrine needs to take into account the necessity for punishment without crossing the nuclear threshold. He highlighted that the seminar was organised to discuss the findings and the recommendations ofMaj Gen GD Bakshi’s book.

Air Commodore Jasjit Singh (Retd) introduced the subject by stating that in the 20th century World War-II was the only total war, all other conflicts after this being limited wars and some of them even having occurred under a nuclear overhang. India’s wars with Pakistan and China were limited wars restrained by space and resources. In 1987, the Government of India was clear about the nuclear capabilities of Pakistan and the late Gen Krishnaswami Sundarji, former Chief of Army Staff, at that time had stated that India will have to reconcile with Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities. It was Gen BC Joshi who had started to find an answer as to how India would win the next war with nuclear Pakistan. He further mentioned that the life span of insurgency and terrorism is about 15-20 years and that South Asia can witness a conventional war which can be triggered by by an act of terrorism. We as a nation have not yet evolved a concept and ability to deal with such situations. Therefore, India must crystallise the strategy to formulate the doctrine of limited war under nuclear overhang. In the end he mentioned that it must be remembered that limited wars will produce limited results.

Maj Gen GD Bakshi, SM, VSM (Retd)

Lead presenter Maj Gen GD Bakshi, commenced his presentation by carrying out the environment scan and the options India has with regard to provocation by Pakistan under the nuclear symmetry. Will India continue to adopt the reactive stance? And if so how long are we prepared to pursue this line? The gains of the 1971 war were undone in Afghanistan and proxy war in J&K. Therefore, concept and strategy needs to be examined to rework the policy to deter Pakistan so that 26/11 does not reoccur.

Nuclear parity between USSR and USA could not prevent limited wars during the Cold War era. In fact the limited wars led to a decisive outcome during Gulf War-I & II, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Georgia. Though these wars were characterised by limitation in space, time dimension, duration of conflict, aims, objectives, usage of weapon system, the prime limitation was the fact that nuclear weapons could not be used. Various theories which have been propagated revolve around the fact that strategy of limited war is the only alternative to the present paradoxical situation emerging out of nuclear deterrence and the after effects of use of nuclear weapon.

The scenario in the subcontinent changed due to the nuclearisation of Pakistan as early as 1990 and thus commenced the proxy war against India. This, even though Pakistan underpins the guarantee against Indian retaliation to proxy war under the nuclear shield. Thus it brings us to the fact that as long as conventional and nuclear parity exists, Pakistan will continue the asymmetric warfare against India. India’s inability to cross the LoC/IB has convinced Pakistan military leadership that it was conventional military parity that had deterred India from crossing LoC/IB. This brings us to the fact that there is an urgent need to field war fighting capabilities within next two to five years.

Post nuclearisation, the Indian political elite seemed convinced that conventional military force is no longer a usable/viable option. In spite of extreme provocations by Pakistan, usage of conventional forces in the last decade has been zero. As a result of this, the intensity of proxy war against India has increased and it is in the interest of the nation that the cost should be raised for Pakistan for continuing  with its present tactics. However punitive actions may attract gradual nuclear escalation by Pakistan if they suffer excessive loss of territory and is at the verge of dismemberment. The presenter explained the conditions and escalation level in the backdrop of conventional conflict with Pakistan and likelihood of graduated nuclear escalation by our neighbour if they suffer threat of dismemberment or destruction beyond repair.

It is imperative to understand that the land forces are simply irreplaceable in terms of deterrence by denial but have little capability to provide deterrence by punishment, except through destruction of the enemy’s land forces. However, in a limited war, such destruction could raise the risk of escalation across the nuclear threshold. It also raises issues of escalation control and dominance. Once engaged in combat, land forces cannot be disengaged unless one side concedes defeat or ceasefire is agreed upon. Escalation control therefore is poor if land forces are employed. Whereas naval and air power are capable of deterrence through denial and especially deterrence by punishment.
 
Chinese theory of limited war revolves around massive retaliation with conventional forces and leaves the onus of beginning a nuclear war on its adversaries. Chinese theorists believe that conflict escalation and termination must be kept under control by seizing initiative during all phases of conflict. He proposed that India’s doctrine should be a mirror image of the Chinese doctrine of limited war. Doctrine of limited war under nuclear overhang proposed by the presenter has following important aspects:-

• Switch from a Massive Conventional Response Strategy to Graduated or Flexible Response Strategies.
• To adopt such a proactive policy that seizes the initiative from the very outset, India first and foremost needs to translate its growing economic strength into usable hard power.
• It needs to field dominant war fighting capabilities in South Asia. These dominant war fighting capabilities will stem primarily from an overwhelming emphasis on increasing Indian aerospace power in a manner that provides a visible asymmetric edge over its likely adversaries.
• It must outline escalation ladders with several rungs/steps that will provide just, focused and proportionate response options to any Mumbai-type attacks.
• These must constitute just and proportionate responses to terrorist outrages that place the onus of any further escalation entirely upon the adversary.
• There must be a series of escalation plateaus in the escalation ladder to higher intensities of violence/combat. These decision plateaus must provide the political leadership clear options to escalate /de-escalate.
• India must assert escalation dominance /escalation control.
• The goals of such an offensive would not be terrain oriented but force oriented. Occupation of territory across the IB would be purely temporary.
• The counter offensive would be designed to raise costs for Pakistan and inflict a deterrent level damage upon its armed forces and war waging capability.
• The stated aims would simply be to raise costs of terrorism for Pakistan by imposing attrition upon its prime sponsoring agency – the Pak Armed Forces and the ISI.
• Pakistan’s ARN (Army Reserve North) and ARS (Army Reserve South) would be the key centre of gravity of this campaign and would be targeted in air-land battles for degradation.
• All attempts would be made to damage the infrastructure of terrorism and target key Tanzeem leaders (either by air strikes or by Special Forces’ action).
• It must seek to seize the initiative from the very outset and retain it till the end of the conflict. The conflict must be terminated on Indian terms and seek to dramatically raise costs for Pakistan.
• India must assert escalation dominance/escalation control.

Lt Gen VK Kapoor, PVSM (Retd)

India has failed to evolve a credible conventional response to Pakistan’s asymmetric provocations. Purely defensive actions will not deter Pakistan and what is needed is a proactive and pre-emptive response to deter the adversary. Therefore, there is a need to have a “Limited War Doctrine” for India. Situation with India and Pakistan is different than the limited wars fought by US and allies in Gulf and Afghanistan, because the opposition in both cases was negligible and that too very weak, therefore we cannot template the same situations between India and Pakistan. Air power will play a predominant role in all wars in future, but wars will have to be integrated. Tri-service in addition the spectrum of conflict will be very wide and India may be fighting Hybrid wars – LICO and Limited Conventional wars simultaneously. There is need to define the deterrence which can be caused by ground, air and naval forces. Deterrence values of ground forces is still very potent, however, it depends upon how they are employed and with what capability.
 
The entire debate is how India can raise the cost of proxy war for Pakistan. Will a doctrine deter Pakistan from indulging in asymmetric warfare or India needs to send out clear signal that it might take the option of fighting a limited war under the nuclear shadow?  To send out the signals to Pakistan in particular and world community as a whole, the following is recommended:-

(a) India should urgently establish national war-gaming facilities and National Defence University to train the higher commanders from three services together in military strategy, planning and conduct of war.

(b) Wars are national undertakings and a full-fledged tested process of decision-making should be in place, in case the country is plunged into a crisis such as war. Doctrine must be based on India’s capability to wage war on two fronts simultaneously.

(c) Appointment of CDS will be appropriate to give direction to build this capability.

Maj Gen PJS Sandhu (Retd)

Subject is of great importance in the backdrop of the nuclear shadow and policy of provocation by Pakistan. Nuclear symmetry has ruled out all out war, hence the compulsion for limited war. To have clear understanding there is a need to understand the nuclear revolutions. Period between WW-II to 1971 saw nations acquiring nuclear capabilities as a deterrence and guarantee for national security. The Indian nuclear revolution commenced in 1974.. limited wars are a historical fact and all wars fought in the subcontinent were limited wars. India definitely needs a doctrine but it is not a substitute for grand strategy and at this juncture India need both doctrine and grand strategy. There was an impression in certain quarters that appearance of nuclear weapons will reduce the chances of conventional war. This however does not seem too plausible.

The Cold War era may not be the right model to analyse the doctrine of limited wars, since there was no direct confrontation between two nuclear nations. Closer home, during Operation Parakram, India was not prepared for a limited war and even the national war book was not invoked. Though the cold start doctrine which is being considered to be the basis of a limited war doctrine in our context is not new and it is in vogue since 1999 and concept of integrated battle groups is part of this doctrine. Escalation ladder as discussed by the presenter may not hold good and escalation can graduate from limited war to all out war. More worrying factor in our context is hands on experience and strategic culture in armed forces. Doctrine of Limited War under nuclear overhang may work against Pakistan but may not work against China. Therefore what we need is first grand strategy, military strategy and followed by doctrine.

Discussion

• The time has come to integrate nuclear weapons with the strategy and doctrines.
• Naval capabilities must be considered even outside the ship concept of Sagrika to defend the coast is a potent deterrence.
• Future wars are likely to be hybrid wars, business of escalation is difficult to control – rather let the annihilation control the escalation itself.
• Use of technology has to be made part of doctrines.
• Time frame is difficult to be laid for limited wars.
• Incorporation of cyber and space war is a reality thus doctrine must take into account these aspects.
• Limited war is situation specific and more relevant to Pakistan. However, doctrine must lay down means to inflict maximum punishment within the domain of limited war which may be limited in timeframe.
• At present there is gap between the military and political leadership and this gap can only be breached if politicians and bureaucrats are cultivate a strategic mindset. The responsibility to do so lies on military leadership.
• Purpose of limited wars will be limited thus doctrine must underline the objectives which can be achieved.
• It is important to analyse the response of Pakistan, will they go nuclear in early stages of war or is it just rhetoric.
• Chinese doctrine of limited war, local wars under informationalised environment is potent and more punitive in nature and the option to go nuclear is with adversaries. 

Concluding Remarks

War fighting is difficult in modern times; therefore, the emphasis should be to defeat the strategy than the military. New technology and role of space as also cyberspace has changed the strategy and doctrines of future wars. China in particular has reorganised PLA and the doctrine lays down command of sea, air and space. Role of air power has assumed significance in the light of the limited war doctrine as a key source to punish the adversary. Doctrine must cater to breach the windows of vulnerability. The world considers India as a regional power but we are a hesitant people and not confident of our capabilities. India needs to develop the capabilities to convert economic power into hard military power. Air Cmde Jasjit Singh concluded by saying that there is space for ‘Limited War” under Nuclearoverhang and a doctrine is overdue.

(Report compiled by Col Narender Kumar, Senior Fellow, CLAWS)