Fourth Generation Warfare: Retrospect and Prospect

A Fellows Seminar on “Fourth Generation Warfare: Retrospect and Prospect” was organised at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) on 05 July 2010. The seminar was chaired by Lt Gen GK Duggal, PVSM, AVSM, VrC (Retd). Mr. Samarjit Ghosh, Associate Fellow, Centre for Land Warfare Studies presented his paper on the subject. The discussants were Brig Rahul Bhonsle, SM (Retd), and Dr. S Kalyanaraman, Research Fellow, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA).

Opening Remarks: Maj Gen Dhruv C Katoch, SM, VSM (Retd), Additional Director, CLAWS

When we speak of generations of war, it is essentially a term used by the United States, one of two countries to use specific terminology to draw attention to new trends in warfare (the other being China). A defining feature of this warfare was that a force fighting at the 2GW level would easily defeat an opponent fighting at the 1GW level. Essentially, 4GW is unconventional or asymmetric warfare; warfare of a kind India has been engaged in since its independence, till the present day. As such, it is not an alien conception in the Indian context.

Chairperson's Remarks: Lt Gen GK Duggal, PVSM, AVSM, VrC (Retd)

The nature of warfare has been constantly changing, Ever since the nation-states started fighting wars. Historical records testify that warfare started with the culture of order, in which line and column formations were primary. Attrition warfare followed; then dislocation of the enemy (mentally and physically) via maneuver - prominently known as the blitzkrieg. Alongside these wars, the subversive activities of the state always continued in some form or the other. It is only towards the end of the 20th century, when the state started losing its monopoly over war. Today, one can see militaries all over the world, fighting non-state actors. It is in this context that the model of generations of warfare was coined by Lind and Hammes. The drivers for the same is that (1) the state has lost its monopoly over violence (2) the rise of cultural, ethnic and religious war (3) manipulation and technological advancements in media. This conception of warfare has not set in even in the United States, and is the subject of much discussion.

Samarjit Ghosh

Introduction

At the beginning of the third millennium, there was little to distinguish the corporeal nature of war from its predecessors, consisting, as it predominantly did, of violence, devastation and above all, chaos. Yet, the systems within which such chaos takes place has changed drastically – specifically, the international system. Advancements in telecommunications and other aspects of technology had changed the nature of the chaos generated by war, whether through the increasing usage of precision-guided munitions (PGMs), improvised explosive devices (IEDs), cyber attacks, trans-national and trans-continental attacks of every kind, and so on. While nation-states still remain to be the key actors in the international system, this role is not synonymous with their presence on the ‘battlefield’, which is witnessing the presence of more non-state actors than ever before. The rise of such actors has been reasoned on the discontent and disenchantment amongst people with their respective political, social and cultural establishments, as also with the interaction of such establishments on a global level. Given the same, these actors feel free to indulge in their activities on a scale yet unprecedented, both in scale and in violence, and therefore, it behooves nation-states and militaries to understand and appreciate the challenges emanating from such quarters.

The decade preceding 9/11 was exemplified by defence thinking along the lines of capabilities of the present-day armies. The problem with this line of thinking was that it focused on how a particular country would ‘like’ to fight and then assumed that the preference was relevant. The clear and present assumption is that these conflicts will be raged conventionally and hence, the conventional capability of the Army must be primed at all times to engage. However, this assumption is at odds with the rising tide of internal disturbances, ranging from the gamut of insurgencies, internally and externally fomented, to acts of terrorism, initially restricted to the sensitive borderlands but now almost exclusively a hallmark of the hinterland of the country. The dichotomy lies not only in the idea that perforce the Indian Army has had to be called in to temper a large percentage of these situations, the desire both on the part of the Army and the civilian administration for the Army to not get involved in these situations for fear of (a) diluting the army’s primary capability; (b) decay in the morale and ethos of the Army; (c) such interventions being viewed as precursors to martial law – these fears have not resulted cohesively in (a) the development of alternate forces, not connected to the Army to handle such situations; (b) the development of alternate forces already present, to ensure that they are up to scratch when it comes to handling these situations; and (c) tackling the developmental causes of such rebellions at the ignition point itself, to prevent it spiraling into a situation that calls for the deployment of the Army.

Amidst the various theories which are floating around on the nature of the conflict witnessed in the 21st century is that is a return to past forms of conflict, predating the Westphalian era. To this end, however, Donald Snow argues, “In a sense, what has emerged is a kind of ‘new-old’ form of war that is both pre-Clausewitzian and possibly post-Clausewitzian. What is most notable about it is the essential divorce of war from politics. In this style, war is not so clearly the continuation of politics by other means, a situation that some, including Keegan, contend is more historically prevalent than the concept of war during the Clausewitzian interlude. In that sense, the new warfare is pre-Clausewitzian, apolitical, and self-justifying. At the same time, the apparent chaos, savagery, and pointlessness of much of the new internal war would shock most pre-Clausewitzians of the period when armed conflict was imbued with notions of warrior ethic and chivalry.  Snow further suggest that wars today are demonstrably different from classical insurgent warfare, insofar as they have an absence of clear military objectives’, since the fighting forces are irregulars, they display an ‘absence of even an appearance of military order and discipline’,  which results in a ‘level of ferocity and even atrocity that is routinely committed in these conflicts’. 

Generations of War

In 1989, William Lind, Col Keith Nightingale, Captain John F Schmitt, Col Joseph W Sutton and Lt Col Gary I Wilson created the terminology of the ‘generations’ of warfare. Lind et al stated that “the peacetime soldier’s principal task is to prepare effectively for the next war. In order to do so, he must anticipate what the next war will be like.”

First Generation Warfare - Napoleon Bonaparte’s army, marching in straight lines, forward on to the opposing army in a war of attrition on Europe’s battlefields, signified first generation warfare (hence 1GW). This generation reflected the tactics of the age of the smoothbore musket, line and column formations, to maximize the effect of firepower. These developments were products, not just of the inventions of the implements of war being utilized, but also from the politico-socio-economic transitions leading the transformation of Europe from feudalism to monarchy. Politically, the nation-state led to huge armies being structurally raised, trained and equipped, for long periods of time. Economically, these armies could only be raised if the necessary wealth could be provided through the advancements in agricultural and transportation. And socially, the development of the spirit of patriotism was essential for this generation of warfare.

Second Generation Warfare - Barbed wire, machine guns and indirect wire were the key tactics of second generation warfare (2GW), which was based primarily on the massing of firepower rather than of troop formations. The movement from the smoothbore musket to the rifled musket was the first indicator. The principal change from the first indicator was the increasing reliance on indirect fire. Yet, similar to 1GW, 2GW remained linear and the battles largely of attrition. And while ideas did have a role to play in the development of the tactics, particularly of lateral dispersion, technology was the prime mover, both in terms of heavier artillery as also in the capability of an increasingly industrialized economy to fund such battles. Technological developments in the non-war sphere was essential as well, to allow for the coordination of such forces via rail  and telegraph networks, which could only be fostered by the wealth available as a result of increased government control coupled with a boom in population.

Third Generation Warfare - Non-linearity was first witnessed on the battlefields of third generation warfare (3GW), which saw the combination of maneuver and firepower, as opposed to attrition. The development of this generation, however, while still spurred by technological advancement, owes more to the development of ideas. Attacks on the battlefield now relied on infiltrations, to circumvent the enemy’s combat forces and collapse them from within, rather than fight face-to-face. While these tactics were in use by the time the First World War drew to a close, it was the addition of the tanks to the battlefield which really revolutionized this generation. The shift this technological advancement led to was the blitzkrieg. However, there was more to this development than just the tanks. While other countries in Europe had witnessed severe reversals in the support for the armed forces, in Germany, it continued to hold strong. While every other nation had probably the same economic and technological wherewithal to unleash the force blitzkrieg did, it was only the Germans who were able to exercise the political, strategic and intellectual imperative necessary for the engagement of the same.

Fourth Generation Warfare – In fourth generation warfare (4GW), the war is within, amongst, and sometimes even against, the people, and is not centred around the armed forces on a battlefield. Its objective is to foster a collapse of the enemy internally, rather than that of its armed forces physically. It goes beyond simply the armed forces’ traditional area of operations into wider society as a whole. The objective of a 4G warrior is not limited to the destruction of military targets, but also includes political, economic, social and even psychological facets. 4GW, Lind et al asserted, while constructed on the structure created by the preceding three generations, substantially differed in terms of incentives, targets and techniques.

A defining point separating 4GW from the previous three generations of warfare is that the latter were defined by increased complexity in the methodology and weaponry being employed by armies of nation-states. However, the playing field changes in 4GW because one of the opponents now is not a state. So while the assumption may well be made that irregular fighters have always been involved in conflict, they have been so as adjuncts to the conventional forces and never as principal actors themselves.

Politically, the 4G warrior uses organizations and networks across all forms of borders and frontiers to convey its messages. Strategically, the focus is on breaking the will of the enemy decision-maker, while at the same time, maintaining the will of one’s own people and seeing to it that those were neutral, stay neutral, insofar as neutrality is taken as tacit approval. Tactically, direct contact is avoided as much as possible, with attacks making use of items widely dispersed in society. These organizations are not signatories to Geneva Conventions and they do not follow the laws of war, quite simply because there is no distinction between peace and war and no one to tell them different. They use the freedom present in democratic society and turn it on its head.

There has been a surge in the avenues of media that are now accessible to actors in a battlespace, ranging from news organizations of the print and television, to those on the internet. These very outlets, apart from facilitating the rapid dissemination of information within and outside the battlespace, are also responsible for facilitating funding and other kinds of economic support to a particular combatant/actor from anywhere on the planet. Their involvement has become so ingrained, that some have resorted to referring the media of participating, or even worse, being a combatant in the battlespace. Further, in terms of the media, perceptions or ‘images’ are key in 4GW. Isolation, from being difficult, has become impossible. There are, quite plainly, too many sources and avenues through which ideas can be disseminated, in real time. While the battle for the domination of the mindspace of combatants and non-combatants has always been central to any conflict, especially an insurgency, governments had always enjoyed having the upper hand. But now, the tables have turned. It is the 4G warrior whose ability to manipulate has been magnified.

Criticisms

There is a misconception which has gained wide currency in strategic circles that 4GW disavows the influence of technology both in its development and in its engagement. That is not so. The crucial difference between the influence of technology as widely trumpeted by the RMA is that if there is a technological driver to 4GW, it must be via weapons that are effective in actual combat, as opposed to those which incorporate technology in ways too irrelevant or complex for the chaos that is live combat.

Other critics are open-minded, so far as the concept is concerned, but are of the opinion that the construct of generations is not analytically reliable, given the lack of one confirmed definition, or for that matter, of uniform indicators for the same. And given the indicators posited, reliable data sets cannot be compiled. Resultantly, they believe the idea of 4GW is not solid enough to base policy or critical analyses on.

Another set is highly critical of the entire concept and believe it to be emblematic of the confusion reigning in strategic circles of the future of warfare, not to mention believing that it subverts history to suit its purpose and is not justiciable.

By far, the most prominent criticism of 4GW is that it does not identify anything genuinely new, and that warfare away from the convention has always worked against armies fighting conventionally, and that the organizations/fighters which have engaged conventional forces in this manner have always utilized the most advanced implements and tactics they had available. However, 4GW theorists contest this notion by the assertion that the influence of politico-socio-economic and cultural ingredients in the conflict mix has led to a transformation in the character of warfare, which will, with the advancements and adaptability exercised in the technological realm, lead to a wider spectrum of conflict, with an equally wide range of combatants and engagements.

What is crucial to the understanding of 4GW is that it does not signify the end of 3GW or conventional conflict, but that insofar as defence planning is concerned, it does provide some food for thought. Adversaries in a 4GW will not resort to what has whimsically been dubbed as “tactics of the weak”, nor will they be employing strategic retreats into inhospitable territory. Rather, they will exploit the tactics of the “smart and agile”, employing greater reach and lethality.

Recommendations

The Army will always be the most crucial force in a 4GW battlefield, because its mobility is unaffected by terrain, matched by the discernment of its perception, both visually and analytically. No matter how precise a PGM can be, there is nothing more precise than the infantry man firing his weapon – he is precise because he can see his target, and that is what minimizes collateral damage. It is the army which provides the crucial connection between the government (whether central or state) and the affected populace, and simultaneously carry out its missions in a hostile environment. Given, therefore, the preeminence of its role, it is vital that the Army be organized and trained to engage on the 4GW battlefield. Such an attempt would involve originating a doctrine, and given the presence of the DSC, the improvement of its next draft, and subsequently, the adaptation of training and organization for the 4GW environment.

It is crucial for doctrine to combine the philosophies of initiative and creative thinking, to be effective in countering uncertainty. The more an opponent resorts to less/more-than-conventional methods, the more important it is for doctrine to keep up. Training doctrines, therefore, stress soldiers and leaders, both junior and leaders, by putting them in unfamiliar circumstances and compelling them to think creatively, so much so that it becomes part of their tool set to do so.

Given that 4GW encompasses the engagement of war in political, economic, social and military fields, the Army would be expected to carry out offensive, defensive, stability and support operations in the course of its duties in this regard. The training imparted will necessitate that instead of encouraging specialization amongst merely an elite of troops, individual soldiers should be trained to take on all kinds of tasks. This would be a more sensible approach than attempting to increase the ranks of the Special Forces, which would only be possible by taking the best from the regular infantry forces, thereby depleting them dangerously. Troops in a 4GW environment need to be able to combine the talents of peacekeeping, counter-guerrilla and high intensity combat operations.  The key conception should be to ensure that the infantry is imparted training in all lower spectra Special Forces skills.

The weapons primarily utilised by 4GW warriors are the omnipresent AK 47, with RPGs, bombs, handguns/pistols and grenades serving as accompaniments. While there is nothing revolutionary about these weapons per se, given that they are of the previous generation, what is new is their usage. No longer are they used for direct confrontation face-to-face with the military. They are employed for surprise attack on the military and paramilitary forces and for terrorizing the civilian populace. So, the best weapons in the employment against 4GW warriors are also those which can be carried easily, surreptitiously and yet, with sufficient firepower. While the 4GW antagonist may use it to coerce and terrorise the civilian populace, the soldier can do the same to the 4GW combatant.

Should the Army continue to prepare and plan for a war that may never take place, or should it prepare for a war it has been engaged in for decades, and is likely to remain so in the future as well? The techniques of 4GW were adopted by conventionally weaker bodies because they had no other recourse. Armies should adapt to it, secure in the knowledge that they can run the gauntlet in conventional warfare, and should approach 4GW with the confidence borne from engaging in it for decades. It is only when the ethos of the army is oriented towards institutionalised unconventionality that it will be able to adapt to 4GW.

4GW is part of a construct that questions the sanctified validity of the Clausewitzian paradigm, and serves the purpose of magnifying the gaps between western and non-western ideas and tactics of war-making. It serves as a balance between the conventional Army focus on the physical and technological dimension of war by highlighting the mental and moral dimensions, as also the impact of factors not empirically measurable, such as doctrine, organization and culture. It provides a structure for the study of the state and non-state entities and actors in battlespaces and the dynamic that revolves around their conduct within, and against each other. The contribution of 4GW is also crucial in advancing cultures, ideas and ideologies to the loci of the strategic discourse, without necessarily resorting to polemic. It adds weight to the rising importance of counterinsurgency operations for the Army. Its ability in synthesizing disconnected trends and developments to offer ideas of the potential shape the future security conceptions is its key contribution to the strategic discourse on the changing nature/character of conflict.

Brig Rahul Bhonsle, SM (Retd)

• The key problem with the contention of 4GW lies in its application to the Indian context, primarily because many of the recommendations suggested are already being implemented by the Indian armed forces.

• War is still in the third generation. The fourth generation has not come about yet. To typify insurgency and terrorism within a country as war is a dangerous assumption. These situations, within India, are not war. At the lower end, it is a violent response to socio-political issues. At the higher end, it is simply socio-political violence/conflict, and it is best to define it as such, rather than moving to the paradigm of war. For war implies a military conflict. By no means, are the insurgencies and terrorist acts military activities. They are aberrations rising out of socio-political discontent.

• There will always be a dichotomy between American and Israeli conceptions of conflict, and the Indian, for the contexts in which they are theorised are very different. For example, the methods of fighting employed in Iraq and Afghanistan are far away from any methods employed in the Indian context.

• The basic tenets of 4GW do apply in the Indian context, to the extent of society being the centre of gravity, the emergence of non-state actors. However, there are no battles any more, but 'encounters' - if the situation arrives or aggravates, it would be a 'civil war', and not a '4G' war.

• The evolution of the Indian Doctrine on Sub-conventional Operations merits more attention, for though there may not be much theoretical research to bear out its development, much practical experience, both civil and military, has gone into its development.

Dr S Kalyanaraman, Research Fellow, IDSA

• Historically, intra-state conflict has always been far more prevalent than inter-state conflict. Since the end of the Cold War, which is around the time the theory of the generations of war was first raised, perhaps as a consequence, statistics note that between 1989 and 2006, there were only 7 inter-state conflicts, but over 115 intra-state conflicts. Between 1860 and 1899, there were 30 inter-state conflicts, but 144 intra-state conflicts. Thus, the larger prevalence of intra-state conflicts is nothing new and one shouldn't rush to conclusions based on both India's and the world's current preoccupations. Conventional conflict remains increasingly likely, which was highlighted for India by the occurrence of the Kargil conflict.

• One cannot ignore the vast potential for inter-state conflicts. While there may have been a decline in Europe, the scope in Asia is tremendous. In East Asia, for example, the China-Taiwan issue being one such which springs readily to mind, in which many actors may become involved. To add to this potential conflict, there are also many maritime disputes currently fomenting in Asian waters, which may ignite in inter-state conflict as well.

• Another dimension lies in the domain of nuclear weapons, wherein one presumed that with their arrival, conventional conflict would come to an end and conventional weapons in the arsenals of nation-states would be reduced. However, this hasn't happened yet and is unlikely in the future as well, as doing so would allow a nation-state's enemy to present them with a fait accompli.

• In terms of the 'savagery' of post-Clausewitzian conflict, one must remember that much blood and savagery has been displayed in the battlefields of the pre-Clausewitzian era, and it would be wise to keep them in mind, when one debates such notions of present-day conflict.

• The model of the generations of war is at fault, when it cites Napoleonic warfare as heralding the beginning of line and column warfare. Its historical representation and its reasoning of political-social-economic developments is misrepresentative of the reality. Even the length of 4GWs is not unusual, given the previous occurrence of 30, and even 100-year long wars.

• If the insurgencies and terrorist campaigns occurring within India were analysed within the construct of 4GW, the implications would be more apparent and better understood.

Discussion

• 4GW assumes that inter-state wars are passé, or the probability of the same is exceedingly low. It is not about conventional conflict, for the most part. It is not about guerrilla warfare either, which focused for the most part on rural insurgencies. 4GW holds that society is at war, as against the state. The Naxal issue is a perfect example of 4GW, insofar that the issues in conflict go beyond the military and security, to social, political and economic, and thus, must be studied in the context of 4GW.

• 4GW has come to stay, but the kind of conventional war which occurred during the two world wars and before that is unlikely to take place, given the balance of nuclear weapons on either side of a conflict.

• In terms of force structure, excessive deployment of Special Forces is indeed a bad step and would lead to deterioration in the ranks and the point of training regular infantry in step with the SFs holds strong.

• For developmental efforts to take place, opposing forces must be defeated militarily for the agencies of the state to take necessary action.

• Manoeuvre was started by the Central Asian horse armies well before the Germans, and therein lies a theoretical dichotomy in the generations of war model, which is overtly Euro-centric, and studying from the Indian perspective, one runs the risk of ignoring historically relevant regional examples.

• Junior officers are already exposed to various theoretical and doctrinal exercises throughout their training regimes. Insofar as JCOs, NCOs and infantrymen are concerned, the activities they would be involved in combating 4GW are what they are proficient in and engaged in every day. There would be little new that they would need to learn in this regard.

• Conventional war has certain mores and is fought within certain conventions. Insurgencies, too, have certain characteristics, primarily that they are focused on the overthrow of the state, have internal and external support, and involve armed conflict. It would be better if the mode of thinking of 4GW was limited to defining them as 'methods', such as the spread of FICN, hijacking, bombing, and the like.

• There is risk in defining 4GW as 'methods' employed by insurgents, as the logic they employ to their conflicts and the end-state they envision is quite different from those conceptualised and realised by insurgents in the past.

• Firepower has never been a problem in 4GW or guerrilla warfare in the Indian context, but what has been troublesome both for India and the rest of the world is situational awareness. It is this problem which armed forces are confronted with, when combating non-state actors, and one which may be resolved by employing electronic intelligence and surveillance techniques.

• In the conflicts espoused as 4GW, the state armed police has a key role to play, for the armed forces will only be called in towards the fag end of the conflict. Therefore, it is state intelligence, armed police and paramilitary forces which must be employed to counter such threats, as within the federal structure, the armed forces will only be deployed at the end-state.

(Report prepared by Samarjit Ghosh, Associate Fellow, CLAWS)