China-India Relations

General

The Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) organised a round-table discussion on “China-India Relations” on 7 April 2011 at the CLAWS campus. Prof Su Hao, Professor, Center for Strategic and Conflict Management, China Foreign Affairs University, Beijing and Dr Monika Chansoria, Senior Fellow, CLAWS, gave presentations and viewpoints on the subject.

Prof Su Hao

Prof Su outlined the Sino-Indian relationship in the backdrop of the grand chessboard of Eurasia. The theory of geo-gravity could be brought to use in so far as China and its central location in Asia is concerned. A geo-gravitational centric state, China, is a big power located in a relatively centric area of Asia as a region and attracts its neighbors within proximity to determine the future of regional stability and prosperity.

China is a key regional engine of economic growth. China’s defence and foreign policy has been formulated keeping its view that it has a vast territory, it is a continental power and it is a country with in-land and over-sea territory. Geographical diversity and features determine the future of China, with plains in the coastal areas, plateau in the west, and seas to its east. The Chinese government considers water related affairs as a priority in its agenda of national governance.

China and India have emerged as the twin power-centers of Asia, with China in East Asia and India in South Asia. Both China and India should invest towards inter growth and co-existence as they address both Asian affairs and world affairs. By focusing upon communication and cooperation, both Beijing and New Delhi can work towards peace, progress and prosperity.

Dr Monika Chansoria

Dr Monika Chansoria outlined the aim of her presentation by stating that by virtue of being the two most significant players in Asia, India and China display a peculiar mix of both competition and cooperation. The complexities of Sino-Indian geopolitics display both a convergence of interests as well as strategic divergences including the territorial and boundary dispute. A strategic partnership was announced on April 11, 2005, which emphasised a shift from competition to cooperation. India and China have demonstrated a coordinated approach in international affairs by cooperating in: the Doha round of talks in the World Trade Organisation (WTO); climate change negotiations; counter-terrorism cooperation; and mutual energy security. Both nations could also collaborate towards stabilising collapsing global markets with their foreign exchange reserves. India supported China’s entry into the UN and expects China to support India’s bid for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council.

Economic synergy between New Delhi and Beijing is crucial. Bilateral trade has reached $60 billion in 2010. In the realm of counter-terrorism cooperation, the post-Mumbai terror attack period saw the first-ever Sino-Indian military combat exercise on Indian soil to jointly counter terrorism and insurgency. A Chinese Army contingent from the 1st Company of the Infantry Battalion of the Chengdu Military Area Command and Indian Army troops from the 8 Maratha Light Infantry Battalion took part in a joint counter-terror exercise in December 2008 in Karnataka.
 
Dr Chansoria elaborated upon the existing strategic divergences that include the border dispute, Sino-Pak nuclear and missile collaboration, China’s quest for increasing influence in the Indian Ocean Region; and China’s pursuance of an “encirclement strategy” towards India to gain long-term strategic advantage in the region. China still does not recognise India’s status as a nuclear weapons state. It insists that India must abide by UNSC Resolution 1172 and give up its nuclear weapons and consequently sign the NPT. As part of an ‘encirclement strategy’ against India, China is attempting to make inroads into India’s neighbourhood. This is visible as China is developing ports and naval bases in Pakistan, Myanmar, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. It is likely that the PLA Navy will be able to operate and sustain itself in the northern Indian Ocean region by 2015.

Dr Chansoria stressed that the territorial and boundary dispute constitutes the most complex and contentious issue between the two countries. China physically occupies large areas of Indian territory since the mid-1950s. In Ladakh (Aksai Chin), China occupies 38,000 sq kms of Indian territory. Besides this, Shaksgam Valley (5,180 sq kms) was illegally ceded by Pakistan to China in March 1963. It should be noted that the Karakoram highway was built close to this tract. Beijing also continues to claim the entire Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, which is more than 90,000 sq kms of Indian Territory. Chinese Ambassador Sun Yuxi reiterated this claim on the eve of President Hu Jintao’s visit to India in November 2006. Since 1962, the Line of Actual Control (LAC) has not yet been physically demarcated/delineated on ground and in military maps despite the Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement (BPTA) of 1993, CBMs in Military Field of 1996 and numerous meetings of the Joint Working Group. China is also engaged in executing a “string of pearls” strategy in the Indian Ocean through the acquisition of port facilities in the region.

China has resolved its territorial and boundary dispute with the Central Asian Republics, Russia and Vietnam, but the border dispute with India appears to be becoming interminable. Demarcating the LAC could prove to be the best CBM between India and China. Indications are that the boundary dispute will eventually become a key impediment and play the role of a spoiler in Sino-Indian ties in future. Therefore there is a need to address the issue with utmost sincerity and urgency.

(Report prepared by Dr Monika Chansoria, Senior Fellow, CLAWS)