Future Prospects of Indo-US Strategic Partnership, with Special Emphasis on Defence Trade

General

Mr. John Schlosser, formerly of the US State Dept & Vice President, Albright Stonebridge Group, Washington, D.C delivered a talk on ‘Future Prospects of Indo-US Strategic Partnership, with Special Emphasis on Defence Trade’ at CLAWS on 20 September 2010. The discussion was chaired by Amb KC Singh, former Secretary, MEA. The talk was well attended by a select gathering of serving officers and members from the strategic community. 
 
Opening Remarks: Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd), Director CLAWS

In the broader view the Indo-US strategic relationship is undoubtedly on an upward trajectory. Although, the trajectory is not smooth and well rounded, no one can disregard its importance and its positive aspects. In the recent past, there have been certain misgivings on part of both India and the United States with regard to the nuclear deal.

Mr. John Schlosser

The Indo-US relations have certainly seen a more fortified bond in the recent past. The Bush administration’s involvement with the BJP started the phase where both the countries were seriously involved in negotiations pertaining to many issues of common interest. As mentioned by the Director, the relationship is obviously marred by few conflicting aspects which have resulted in a certain degree of dissonance. With every Presidential visit to India, the two parties have always secured some benchmarks which take the relationship forward towards a more promising future.

President Obama’s upcoming visit should also culminate with a similar positive footing, but there are many who believe that history may not repeat itself. While this visit is very important, it is imperative for both the countries to work towards a more stable equation. The content of the visit is being worked out but these may fall short of the benchmarks one hopes to achieve. The nuclear deal has always been one of the most important aspects of the Indo-US relations. While the deal materialised theoretically, the commercial implementation has not happened and the negotiations continue. Through negotiations, many issues have been addressed like the lingering licensing issue with the US department of energy, which was overcome. Even after all these steps, the nuclear deal has been disappointing. It is important to see if the conflicting issues between New Delhi and Washington can be redressed in someway.

From the strategic point of view, the nuclear deal was a major diplomatic breakthrough and the US expended a lot of political and diplomatic capital to help India attain the NSG exemption. The nuclear deal went through but it continues to remain unrealised due to the nuclear liability bill. India needs to rectify some policies to seemingly comply with the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC) as US and Indian jobs are at stake. It is important for New Delhi to use the momentum of the Obama visit to materialise the deal in the real sense.

The defence trade between India and the US is unique considering the success through the purchase of C130J Super Hercules and Boeing C-17 Globe Master military transport aircraft. US companies have not seen any major competition but there are certain problems owing to the Indian procurement system and the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. India and the US need to realise the bona fide strategic relations that they can share and the long term contact which would help realise them the benefits of a stable strategic partnership. There have been a lot of purchases for the Air Force, Army and Navy, but the trade can rise to a much higher level resulting in a stronger bond between the two. The NMRC is another facet of Indo-US equation that should not be underestimated. This strategic partnership has sealed the relationship for years to come and is both symbolic and a practical step ahead. Purchasing defence equipment from the US companies does make the relationship stronger owing to the informal and institutional ties which US private companies have with the government.

Another regime that needs understanding is the Export Control Regime. Many people in India assume that if the US changed the nuclear export control regime to suit Indian needs, it would do the same in the export control regime of other categories too. It is important to realize that different categories come under different departments that are governed by their own rules and regulations. Additionally, the Australia Group, that governs the elements of chemical weapons and the Wassenaar arrangement that governs the transfer of advanced weapon systems are other very important spheres that need to be highlighted.

Counter-terrorism Cooperation is another area that has diminished the perceived trust deficit between India and the US Considering the case of Headley, the commitment was evident and the flow of information has led to a more stable equation. In the MoUs, there are numerous overt channels with the NYPD, customs etc which facilitate Counter-terrorism cooperation. Also, there are many covert channels that further strengthen the collaboration. Another area of great potential is the Space component, which should be materialised for benefits to be reaped in the long run.

Amb KC Singh, Former Secretary, MEA

Both the countries are democracies and are subject to changes in government and national attitude. India today feels like it has been left in a middle-ground. Some sayIndia’s relationship with the United States is indispensable while some consider it disappointing. Just like the changes in the Indian government, there has been a change in the pattern of signals originating from New Delhi. A similar thing has happened in case of President Obama, whose administration has given conflicting signals since the beginning. This has resulted in trust deficit and skepticism that is inherently leading to conflicts in the equation.

While the US ensured India of its commitment, the Security Council Resolution stipulated India to sign the NPT which was conflicting in terms of US commitment to India. Also, India was hyphenated with Pakistan in the NPR 2010. The Bush administration had created a feeling of ‘no demonisation’ of India while Obama’s government seems to have done the contrary. Considering other non-strategic issues like hike in the US visa fee and the ban on outsourcing in Ohio, the messages emanating from Washington are further adding to India’s dilemma in regard to the US. 

Discussion

• United States’ support to Pakistan has always been a source of contention in the Indo-US relation. The F-16s were given to Islamabad at a time when MMRCA evaluation was nearing its end and this was quite disappointing from the Indian perspective as Pakistan does not need F-16 ac with their advanced radar and air interception capabilities to fight the Taliban. Evidently their use will be India specific. 

• US has done little to allay the fear of its Indian counterpart and therefore has lost the sense of reliability it first enjoyed in India. What would happen if India conducted another nuclear test? Even though India has given a commitment against it, if such a case arises, will everything not be undone? Post-Pokhran I, India was slapped with sanctions and it became difficult for it to even buy weapons from European countries because of the component being American. After the second test, the Indian Navy had to suffer badly due to sanctions. Ultimately, India had to resort to other alternatives. Due to such fears, India’s strategic relations and trade allies have been spread around and not concentrated in one region.

• With Russia, India has gone in for joint-production and not just purchases which is the case in Indo-US relations. Both the countries need to have an adjustment of postures and need to understand each other’s concern and dynamism in their domestic politics which imposes limitation of them to act on certain issues.

 (Report compiled by Aditi Malhotra, Research Assistant, CLAWS)