Indo-US Relations

The Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) organised a round table discussion on ‘Indo-US Relations’, in conjunction with the RAND Corporation on 15 July 2009. The round table was chaired by Amb Lalit Mansingh. The RAND Corporation was represented by Dr C Christine Fair, Dr Karl Mueller, Walter Ladwig and Anit  Mukherjee. The Indian speakers were Lt Gen V K Kapoor (Retd), Maj Gen G D Bakshi (Retd), Brig Rahul Bhonsle (Retd), Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd), Director CLAWS, and Dr. Monika Chansoria, Research Fellow, CLAWS. The round table, attended by armed forces officers and members of the strategic community, successfully created larger awareness and discussion on various aspects of Indo-US relations and how they can be taken forward, in the current security environment.

Amb Lalit Mansingh

The relations between India and the US have undergone a sea change especially in the last 10 years. In the 1950s, when the US had been looking for allies in Asia, particularly in South Asia, to act as a bulwark against the growing threat of communism emanating from the Soviet Union, it chose to partner itself with Pakistan. Today, while continuing to maintain a donor relationship with Pakistan, it has officially come to recognise the importance of a meaningful relationship with India. This volte-face had its evolution in a number of events: nuclear tests by India and Pakistan; the strategic dialogue conducted by Strobe Talbott and Jaswant Singh; President Clinton’s visit in 2000; and growing relations with the Bush administration since 2001.

There are rumours that the new Obama administration is not interested in carrying on the level of relations which had been built up by its predecessors. Such sentiments are not justified. The new administration has reiterated that a new chapter in Indo-US relations is only just beginning, and would be based on the pillars of strategic and defense cooperation, science and technology, energy, education, trade and agriculture. Two high-level meetings between the heads of both governments have already taken place.  Difficulties may exist, but there is a level of comfort between the two administrations and, in due course, there will be improvements.

Dr C Christine Fair

 Project Air Force of the RAND Corporation is very interested in the future of Indo-US relations, as also to understand how India imagines itself as a global power, and how it intends to go about fulfilling such a role.
 
President Obama might well be in trouble with his policy on Afghanistan. While it was a positive step to undertake a full assessment of their position in the sector before launching a strategy, no sooner had they launched an Af-Pak one, did the realisation begin to come through that it would have been better as Pak-Af. It does not help that the Obama Administration is completely at sea with Pakistan. The Afghan National Security Forces do need to be fortified, especially with air assets and medical evacuation capabilities. Alongside, the economy also needs to be developed. Agricultural development, in particular, would go a long way in reducing the indigenous reliance on opium.

A little-known fact about the apparent surge currently underway in Afghanistan is that the augmentation of civilian strength has been far more than the military one, and the former might just last up to 10 years. It is these civilians, in the sectors of reconstruction, economic development, humanitarian endeavours and so on, who have been involved from the beginning in Iraq and were long overdue in Afghanistan.

India’s Strategic Goals – A View from the United States: Walter Ladwig

Important sectors for India to concentrate on would be regional stability, finding new avenues of energy, keeping the extended neighborhood in perspective, maintaining a balance with other regional powers at all times, and distilling the nation’s international aspirations.

Presently, the level of integration in South Asia is very low. Within South Asia, India’s exports and imports stand respectively at five and one per cent, a rather difficult position to be in, when one seeks primacy in the region. India is surrounded mostly by failed states, and thus, suffers a slew of transnational problems such as illegal immigration, smuggling, trafficking and the like. While there is no question that India would want a stable Afghanistan, with its territory secure, it still bears debate whether India wants a stable or fractured Pakistan, and what it is willing to do, in either regard.

India and China have a number of frictions in their bilateral relations, predominant among which are the shadows of 1962 war, the military buildup on the border areas, China’s supply of military and other resources to Pakistan, both countries vying for the same sources of energy in Central Asia, and great power aspirations.

A rising concern for India is energy. Given its rate of economic development and the rise in urban population, the demand for energy is increasing at a rate of five to seven per cent annually, three times the global average. This demand for oil would call for increasing engagement with the Gulf. And while a simultaneous Look East policy, especially with regards to ASEAN countries would not hurt, primacy, as it should be understood, lies in Central Asia, with the substantial energy resources in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.

The Indian Ocean, which is a major trade conduit, is another important area of concentration. India also seeks to prevent other global powers from gaining primacy in the Indian Ocean. While China’s so-called ‘String of Pearls’ strategy may or may not be as concrete as it is made out to be, it is no secret that China is attempting to build sympathetic relations with Burma, Sri Lanka and Pakistan, among other nations connected to the Indian Ocean littoral.

India seeks to portray its influence beyond South Asia. More emphasis is placed on soft power; hard power is projected only when legitimised by acceptable multilateral institutions. To this intent, India would seek reform in international organisations and multilateral institutions. A strong Navy is currently India’s preeminent avenue of projection, through which it seeks to fulfill its objectives of sea control and denial in the Indian Ocean region, the capability of littoral and amphibious warfare, and constant maritime surveillance.

The Indian Army has made significant contribution to the UN Peacekeeping Forces and has shown an inclination for out-of-area operations. Thus far, it has undertaken such operations under the UN umbrella, but in future it may consider to be part of other multinational coalitions. It has conducted several joint exercises with the armed forces of other countries, primarily in the sectors of counter-terrorism and special forces.
 
The Indian Air Force has demonstrated several times its capability for combined arms warfare, surveillance and reconnaissance, long-range and precision strike, and strategic airlift. It also has experience of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, with regard to both war-torn sectors and areas affected by natural disasters. It has also conducted several joint military exercises with other nations, and is presently in the process of training officers of other countries. As a part of increased security cooperation, over 300 foreign armed forces officers attended Indian military programmes between 2003 and 2007.

In terms of soft power, India would seek to lay its emphasis in the Horn of Africa, Malacca and the South China Sea. It has already demonstrated its capability of anti-piracy and humanitarian measures for instance in the rescue missions during the 2004 tsunami and the 2006 evacuation from Lebanon. It has also engaged in maritime cooperation through joint naval exercises over several years. 
 
India’s Strategic Perspective: Lt Gen V K Kapoor (Retd)

India’s strategic perspective has been shaped by its geographical location, and its historical experience. Geography determines its stake and interest in the Indian Ocean region. Being surrounded by several failed states, India’s security framework is determined by the number of irregular threats it faces and the borders it shares with its neighbours. India’s economic development demands sufficient energy, which in turn shapes its strategic imperatives out of its specific regional quarter. In terms of historical experiences, India has always been a fundamentally open country, and has seen more than its share of invaders. Throughout history, it has absorbed all forms of cultural influences, and has rarely sought to spread its influence out of its own initiative.

In terms of strengths, India’s economy has grown at a rate of six to nine per cent and is the fourth largest in the world in terms of purchasing power parity. Also, its demographic trends and human resources are its strong points. India’s strategic goals, therefore, are to maintain its economic growth at a rate of nine per cent per annum, focus on inclusive development of all sectors and peoples, re-energise the government machinery, and improve its delivery mechanisms. The pursuit of these goals is not entirely free of impediments: rampant inequalities and corruption in every walk of life, the rising trends of poor governance, and the increasing tendency of the political class to play the sectarian card. Therefore, to address all these, the principal requirements are reforms in the sectors of education, the political system and the police machinery.

Few countries face threats as much as India does: terrorism all across the country at an ever rising scale and tempo; threat of frequent aggression from neighbours through both conventional and unconventional means; nuclear environment; and rising threat of piracy in the maritime arena. 

Given this reality, India has to take note of a few aspects. Close to 70 per cent of India’s oil is imported. which has resulted in a huge outflow of foreign exchange. The lack of resources is compounded by a lack of awareness, not only of the resources or alternatives, but of effective utilisation techniques as well. The country has suffered under the technology control regime, and it would aid it greatly if this regime was completely liberalised. There has always been far too much emphasis on information technology, and there is now a requirement to focus more on pure sciences and on basic research. In agriculture, there is a need to make the move completely from subsistence to export orientation. Globally, multilateralism must become the norm, for which reform of the UN is required to accommodate India in the framework of global decision-making.

Assessment of Opportunities and Challenges in India’s Neighborhood: Maj Gen G D Bakshi (Retd)

India shares the values of liberty, equality and fraternity with the US, and people-to-people interactions between the two nations have always been good. Yet, for the past six months, there have been rumors of disquiet and a paradigm shift in the position of bilateral relations. The differences observed in the behaviour of the previous and the current administrations are stark. The Bush administration was highly supportive of a close relationship with India, especially as a counterweight to a rising China. There was even talk of a ‘Quadrilateral of Democracies’, comprising the United States, Japan, India and Australia. On its part, the UPA government had made a major political investment in the Indo-US Nuclear Deal. President Obama, on the other hand, appears to have different priorities. Due to the economic recession, the US has warmed up to China. Pakistan has claimed its own priority, for strategic, political and military reasons. In realist terms, therefore, the relationship between the US and India has plateaued. 

The US aid to Pakistan is being misused to strengthen conventional deterrence capacity against India, and the US seems unconcerned about that. Since 2006, Pakistan has become more and more convinced that the NATO/ISAF coalition would not stay for long in Afghanistan, and at best, the US will soon withdraw, after installing a moderate Taliban regime in Kabul. The 134,000 strong infantry and 80,000 strong police, which is being planned, would be far too insufficient to hold the government steady in Kabul. In that case, the Talibanisation of Afghanistan, which would inevitably occur, would jeopardise the security of Pakistan as well.

Afghanistan would need a sustained resuscitation with able assistance from India, Iran, Central Asia and China in terms of gas and oil pipelines, and trade connections. However, if the US withdraws from Afghanistan in 3-4 years after establishing a moderate Taliban government, the position of the Northern Alliance would be curtailed; Russia, India and Iran would be left out in the cold; Pakistan and the Taliban would attempt to destabilise the region; and there would be a resurgence of Al Qaeda in the region. It is likely that a Pakistan that indefinitely survives on US aid devoting only partial attention to the ‘War on Terror’, but remains obsessed with India, will continue. In this geopolitical climate, an assertive China would start exerting its influence within Asia. In doing so, the South China Sea would take precedence over Taiwan. In terms of land borders, Beijing would soon begin a march towards Nepal and Arunachal Pradesh.

Based on these scenarios, notwithstanding diverse vital interests, it is in the best interests of both India and the United States, to develop a closer relationship.

Force Modernisation: Brig Rahul Bhonsle (Retd)

Force modernisation is basically the holistic process of doctrine, organisation, training, human resources, logistics, technology, weapons and equipment evolution. The intention, in this regard, is to add capability more than simply hardware. Force modernisation for India is a far bigger challenge than posed by Pakistan, Afghanistan or China.

India’s ‘Cold Start’ doctrine is an evolving one. The end goal should be to reach a situation where one is able to launch a punitive attack, i.e. non-retaliatory response, something the Chinese call ‘counter-attack in self-defence’. Focus must be on information superiority, and to use this to gain the capability of precision strikes. Demonstration of intent must be made clear and this would require hardwiring counter-force and counter-value targets. In the maritime sector, the focus should be on low intensity maritime operations and littoral warfare. Emphasis must also be on asset security and coastal security via regular patrols. In terms of the air force, focus should be on out-of-area operations.  Low level air defense must also be employed. Command and control integration at both strategic and theater levels is the need of the hour. India already possesses Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) but there is a requirement of multiple AWACS.

The nuclear triad should be completed. Range, lethality and launch capability of missiles, in addition to accuracy parameters, must be established. The capability of alternative cruise missiles should be developed. Anti-Ballistic Missile Defence should be brought into operation. The land forces must be made increasingly mobile, with the ability to have offensive capabilities in both plains and mountains, amphibious and littoral warfare, with enhanced depth, movement, fire power, range, lethality and the like. Counter-terrorism capabilities supplementing counter-insurgency forces must be developed. Special Forces must be capable of remote reconnaissance and launch, and possess all-terrain launch facility. Counter-insurgency doctrine requires revision.

Intervention Capabilities: Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd)

Power projection is not a new element for the Indian armed forces. India has demonstrated its capabilities in Sri Lanka and the erstwhile East Pakistan. India has never hesitated to intervene when it has been necessary in the national interest. While India may bear pacifist in its outlook, any vital national interest overrides that. In addition to the air lift capability mentioned, similar endeavours have also been exercised in the Maldives, and could have also been carried out in Mauritius, but was not eventually required. Thus, while expeditionary capabilities might be desired, it is not necessarily in vogue

India’s parachute brigade is being maintained at full readiness. India possesses heli-lift capability of battalion-strength at the tactical and operational level. The Navy possesses two battalion lift capacity. The amphibious brigade has been recently organised and requires auxiliary support. In terms of strategic air lift, the IL76s are old. However, given that India has the ability to requisition the national carriers at its disposal, there are plenty of options. An Air Assault/Rapid Reaction Division should be in place by 2012. An amphibious brigade and two Air Assault brigades are desired, which would need heli-lift plus airlift plus firepower capacities for all three forces. By the end of the 13th plan, which would be in 2022, India should have another AA/RR division. While thus far India has only intervened under the UN flag, it should now consider bilateral and multinational approaches, when vital national interests are at stake.

Irritants in the Relationship: Dr Monika Chansoria

While Pakistan is a high priority for President Obama, India is not getting the attention that the relationship deserves. Pakistan is able to constantly sidestep its donors’ questions and verifiable mechanisms with regard to the aid given are required to be put into place. India is apprehensive of the diversion of US military aid to conventional conflict against India.

On the Jammu & Kashmir front, no matter how much Pakistan and  the US desire to link it to the ‘War on Terror’, it remains a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan. While India would be willing to talk to Pakistan, it will never accept US mediation on the issue.

The US’ Af-Pak strategy has certainly seen a surge in terror activities. The Taliban in Pakistan have spread from the Swat Valley further into the mainland, and it must be kept in mind that any such advancement holds alarming prospects for the entire South Asian region. Despite India’s huge investment and commitment in Afghanistan, the former is not being consulted adequately on Af-Pak plans. The fact that Pakistan lacks both the will and the dedication to target terror camps, shows that there is a very serious situation in store. India wants a stable Pakistan and would like its central power structures to be strengthened. In this respect, India has shown its willingness to go further in terms of confidence-building measures such as trade and commerce. But it needs to be a give-and-take relationship, and it is about time that Pakistan starts reciprocating as well, particularly on terrorism.

Further, strategic cooperation between the two nations must be considered carefully. The end-user and technological safeguards agreements will be signed shortly [they have since been signed]. However, cooperation with the US is also required in Hormuz and the South China Sea, as also in terms of counter-terrorism and intelligence sharing, even beyond the War on Terror. There are several other points of contention between the two such as national protectionism, WTO, agricultural subsidies and so on, and would require to be debated in the coming months.

Discussion

• Pakistan knows well that it is impossible for it to attain parity with India in terms of economic and political development. Therefore, it has been following an asymmetric war strategy to keep India perpetually off-balance.

• In terms of dealing with Pakistan, the US can do little more than what it is doing already. For the Af-Pak strategy, it needs Pakistan, primarily for the transport of goods as Russia will never allow the usage of the northern route for lethal military supplies

• Opinion polls show that the Pakistanis are very doubtful of President Obama’s intentions, especially given that he is more open about using Predator strikes in sensitive areas.

• The Indo-US nuclear deal is pending operationalisation. In terms of reprocessing nuclear fuel, India already has an agreement with France; Russia has also shown such an inclination. While Washington is its shifting stance on this, pushing for a case-to-case agreement, full clearance is crucial to operationalisation.

• In terms of proliferation, the FMCT and CTBT are still being debated in India. While the FMCT could still be maneuvered, attempts to force India to sign the CTBT would reignite the domestic Indian debate on it, given that India is opposed to any form of discrimination.

• Iran, WTO and climate change could be spoilers for relations between India and the US andm therefore, must be addressed.

• Pakistan is using the Taliban as a leverage to keep India out of Afghanistan. What if Pakistan fails to control the Taliban and settles at a compromise for letting the Pakistani faction free, in exchange for controlling the Afghan faction? There is a danger of nuclear technology and weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of the Taliban.
 
• The US has to engage Pakistan and China, as they both pose different kinds of threats. It feels that the level of engagement with India can be pushed and pulled, since India represents opportunity. Thus, it is, at times, put on the backburner, despite there being a convergence of interests between India and the US. Notwithstanding other perceptions, the US does consider India the most capable partner in Afghanistan.

• US and Iran actually have more interests in common than US and Pakistan. But what is happening is that Iran is trying the same kinds of threat mechanisms which Pakistan is a veteran of, and that could pose problems.

• Legislation pending in the Congress lays emphasis on aid purely in the civilian sphere. F-16s are not part of this. Mechanisms have been evolved to ensure that the aid is used for counter-insurgency (COIN) operations and training.

• While the US is scrambling to fine tune its strategy in Afghanistan, there need to be indigenous steps as well. The focus on civilian and police security can only work if there are reforms to ensure that there is no longer any government complicity in the narcotics trade. Governance is extremely crucial – the effort to clean out corruption must come from the government itself. It cannot be externally imposed.

• The Pakistani Taliban saw its origin as a result of military operations of the Pakistani Army in the FATA – these operations gave rise to feelings of alienation and resentment on the people of the region, as also a severe refugee problem. The establishment and the army were unable to comprehend the kind of threats –emanating from the FATA, and the Al Qaeda. The US is partially culpable in this matter, as they assumed the Al Qaeda had been vanquished without adequate proof.

• If sovereignty is compromised west of the Indus, the Pakistani establishment would not be concerned. But Swat Valley being overtaken was a significant shock, one from which they are still trying to recover. It showed the public in Pakistan that a policy of appeasement through peace deals is not working. As a result, they now favour the military approach over peace deals. This is an important development, since COIN requires strong public support.

• Even Pakistani journalists state that the Pakistani military continues to utilise US aid to procure weapons for anti-India purposes. Therefore, it is very important that the legislation which would impose verifiable mechanisms should go through the Congress. In the short-term, strengthening of Indo-US relations would hinge on the stoppage of the sale of conventional arms to Pakistan by the US.

(Report Compiled by Samarjit Ghosh, Associate Fellow, CLAWS)