May 01, 2009
1127
By Centre for Land Warfare Studies |
Col Anil Chauhan, Senior Fellow, CLAWS presented his paper on ‘Consequence Management in the Aftermath of a Nuclear Strike’ on 1 May. The seminar was presided over by Maj. Gen. (Retd) R.K. Malhotra from the NSC Secretariat. Lt Gen. (Retd) J.R. Bharadwaj from the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) and Brig. Anil Harnal from Army HQ (NBC Warfare section) were discussants. General Gen. Malhotra in his opening remarks said that such a study was long overdue. He added that the development of nuclear capabilities by India, both the offensive aspects and nuclear civil defence were taking place in an incremental manner. The present study has rightly identified the gaps in the defensive aspects of this capacity building and this should be of immense assistance to various agencies dealing with aspects of nuclear civil defence in the country. Col Anil Chauhan Col Anil Chauhan highlighted the aim and purpose of thestudy and then spoke at length on aspects mentioned in succeeding paragraphs. Nuclear Damage Estimation Nuclear damage estimation is fraught with a lot of uncertainty, especially predicting the number of casualties from the long-term effects of a nuclear detonation. As far as the estimation of damage from the immediate effects of a nuclear explosion is concerned, uncertainties may creep in due to variations in the strike parameters (yield, ground zero and height of burst), seasonal and atmospheric conditions and in layout or the nature of the target. To make the damage assessment as accurate as possible reasonable assumptions on meteorological conditions and the capabilities of adversaries have been made in the study. Hence the study should provide military and civil defence planners a rough idea of the scale and magnitude of the disaster that will follow in the aftermath of a nuclear strike. The study also provides simplified tables for casualty prediction and nuclear damage estimation in case there are minor changes in the target or strike parameters. Nuclear Strike Scenarios. The second part of the study attempts to narrow down areas including targets (both counter-value and counter-force) where nuclear weapons can be used both by Pakistan and China without its adverse effects impacting on their territories. The possibility of Pakistan nuking Indian’s offensive formations inside Pakistani territory, a widely believed scenario, was ruled out because the pay-offs of such a strike would not be commensurate with the losses in terms of territory that would be laid waste. In case Pakistan chooses to exercise its nuclear option on the Indian side of the border, it will have to take into consideration aspects related to meteorological conditions, drainage pattern of the area and demography. Based on such considerations the border areas of Rajasthan and Gujarat stand out as more vulnerable for counter-force strikes. The risk assessment of counter-value strikes indicated that New Delhi and Greater Mumbai stood more vulnerable as compared to other Indian cites. Ironically these two metros have also been at the receiving end of terror strikes. Col Chauhan also presented his estimates of the likely fatalities that may occur in case Delhi has the misfortune of being hit with a 20 kiloton, 50 kiloton or a one megaton nuclear weapon. Casualty estimates were also presented for nuclear strikes of lower yields on military targets. Post-Strike Operations Post Strike operations were discussed under two heads, military operations and civil disaster management. Military operations in a radiological contaminated environment necessitate that radiation exposure limits are laid for each type of operation so that soldiers are not over-exposed to radiations. To lay down these limits commanders must have some criteria and guidelines available to them. The problems and methodology for carrying out specialized NBC operations like radiological reconnaissance monitoring, survey and marking; search and rescue operations; medical management operations; contamination control including decontamination; conduct of combat operation besides aspects related to disposal of dead, refugee control, equipping etc were explained. On the civilian disaster management side, Col Chauhan was of the view that the existing framework of natural disaster management with minor modifications was sound enough to take care of low yield nuclear strikes. He also explained the rational for establishment of an Incident Command Post and its organisation and its detailed functioning. Lt Gen. JR Bharadwaj (Retd) Gen. Bharadwaj said that efficient consequence management in the aftermath of a nuclear strike would depend upon preparatory work undertaken by the NDMA and the respective state disaster management authorities during peace time. Presently there may be a lack of knowledge or desired degree of expertise among the response elements that may be employed for the mitigation effort in a post-strike environment. There is a need to increase the awareness level of not only the responders but also of the general population. He also added that efforts are being made by the NTRO or other such organisations so that some sort of advance warning is available of an impending nuclear strike. He also assured the audience about the soundness of the overall disaster management framework and response organisations available in the country besides concepts drills and procedures being developed for mitigation of nuclear and radiological disasters. Brig Harnal explained that disasters having a WMD dimension are now referred to as CBRNE disasters. The ‘E’ in the acronym stands for environment and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear are mentioned in a specific order based the possibility of their threat manifesting. He said that the study on the aftermath of a nuclear strike should have also mentioned about the environmental consequences of a nuclear exchange in the sub-continent. He also said that while carrying out terrain decontamination, irradiated soil cannot be dumped into the rivers that flow into Pakistan since these will have international ramification. He also cautioned that the civil administration should not bank on the armed forces for mitigation effort in cities hit with nuclear weapons because the armed forces may be busy with their primary task. Discussion Professor R Rajaraman of JNU opined that although the Study carried out by Col Chauhan was exhaustive, it should not create an impression, especially among the civilians that a nuclear strike can be managed. He was also of the opinion that counter-value strikes are more likely because counter-force targets can be destroyed with conventional weapons. Accordingly there is a need to shore up aspects related to nuclear civil defence. He added that radiological threats in terms of radiological dispersal devices (RDD) or the so called dirty bombs are more likely during peace time and aspects to counter such threats also need to be addressed by the NDMA. Ambassador Arundhati Ghose expressed her anxiety about the designated successors surviving a nuclear strike. She said that this issue is important not only for ordering retaliatory strikes but also to provide the necessary leadership and guidance for directing the mitigation effort. She also added that the role of political and bureaucratic establishments during such a catastrophe needs further study. Col Ali Ahmed of the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses was of the opinion that the study must form a basis for further research on socio-political dimensions that may unfold after such a disaster. The importance of media management in such a scenario was also stressed by some speakers. Report compiled by CLAWS Research Team |
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