Emerging Situation in Afghanistan

General

Dr Rudra Chaudhuri, Lecturer at King’s College, London recently concluded his tour of the southern provinces of Afghanistan on the invitation of the ISAF Regional Command South RC (S). He shared some of his experiences at a talk held at CLAWS on 6 September 2010. Dr Srinath Raghavan, Senior Fellow at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi was the Chairperson. The talk was attended by a select gathering of defence officers and analysts.

Talk by Dr Rudra Chaudhuri

Dr Chaudhuri’s talk was divided into three parts:-

• Conduct of operations in South Afghanistan.
• Interaction with the ISAF.
• Perception of India’s role in Afghanistan.

Conduct of operations in South Afghanistan  ‘Op Mushtarak’ was launched by the Coalition forces in the districts of Helmand, Marjah and Nad-i-Ali. This operation has been criticized in various quarters for reaching a stalemate as the US Marines did not have a hold policy in place. The Taliban re-surfaced after the troops withdrew. However, the recent ‘Op Nad-i-Ali’ has shown much progress on the ground. 18 months prior to launching of the operation, British forces had placed a local Governor and engaged the political leaders on the ground. As a result, post the military phase of the operation, some semblance of a local government structure had been established.

Similarly, ‘Op Hamkari’ launched in Kandahar in April 2010 has also met with some success. The province always had a loose structure of governance intact due to the Taliban’s historical influence there. The city has been divided into districts for effective governance. 205 Afghan National Army (ANA) Corps and the Afghan National Police (ANP) carry out operations in Kandahar. On the adverse side though, the civilian and military casualties in 2010 have increased over 12 times as compared to last year. A large proportion of these casualties have been borne by the ANP. The ANP is plagued by large scale corruption and their men could at best perform only basic constabulary functions. The ANA has however emerged strongly. More than 50 % of the present 1,32,000 strength can perform combat roles. In many areas the ANA is carrying out operations independent of the NATO/ISAF. For instance, the Coalition forces do not operate in Kandahar. Many civilian truck drivers coincide their movement with the ANA convoys, a testimony of their faith in their abilities.

The nature of the insurgency on the ground is much more complex. There is a parallel Tier 3 Taliban operating in many of the provinces. Local issues have led to uprisings. Therefore, the absolute control of the Quetta Shura in Afghanistan’s insurgency is questionable. In many places, the Tier 3 Taliban operate independently. On one hand this trend weakens the dominance of the various Taliban Shuras but on the other presents more players to deal with.

A multi-layered power broker system is in place. An Afghan led system of governance is in place. This system has shown signs of progress in places like Zare and Kandahar.

Interactions with the ISAF  There is no ‘Grand Strategy’ for Afghanistan. Different member countries in ISAF have their own priorities. For the US, the central focus remains Pakistan and the Al-Qaeda. The United Kingdom is exploring the idea of a regional strategy. There is no agreement on who could be the key power brokers. On the ground, there is no definition on what the regional strategy would look like. The Karzai Government’s policies have contributed to corruption and inefficiency in the governing structures. The Constitution does not give room to administer changes and is seen by many as catered to suit Karzai’s own policies. It seems that all players are presently strengthening their own positions in anticipation of a deal in the future. The nature of that deal is not clear.

Perception of India’s Role in Afghanistan India has a positive image among the local population for its developmental activities. The 218 Km long Zeranj-Delaram Highway has brought much succor to the populace. The Indian Medical Mission in Kandahar has also won the local population’s support. In addition, India is presently engaged in building a dam in Herat province and is providing vocational and other forms of training to the Afghan security forces. India follows a strategy of responding to the Afghan needs. Deliverance is the key factor which has won it the populations’ bonhomie. This has of course led to paranoia among the Pakistanis who believe that a strong and emerging India could make a deep impact in Afghanistan.

There will be only a nominal withdrawal of US forces in 2011, that too due to domestic compulsions in the US. The emphasis would be to protect the urban centres. The question is whether the red-lines can be maintained then. A reintegration of the Taliban in the government would become a more distinct possibility. Even now, the HeI has some representation in the government at Kabul.

Discussion

• The ethnic divisions within Afghanistan are going to play a major role in Afghanistan’s future. The sacking of the Afghan Intelligence Chief who was a Tajik led to strong dissent among that ethnic group.
 
• Iran’s role is seen as an increasing nuisance among the local population, especially in Heart and Farah. There is no major impact of a possible joint India-Iran involvement in Afghanistan.

• The ISAF cannot commit large number of troops on the ground, despite the surge which will take shape from end September/early October 2010. To counter the phenomenon of Taliban re-entering an area after the troops have left, a political approach of placing a local governing structure in place is being relied upon.

• A concerted effort to re-integrate the former commanders of the erstwhile Afghan army into the present day Afghan National Army (ANA) is underway.  This effort is being led by the ANA Chief of Staff, General Bismillah Khan Mohammadi who is attempting to re-integrate old commanders from the South.

• On the surface, Pakistan Army officers like to be seen as pro-nationalist when it comes to sharing their opinion on India. There is no major difference in the opinions of Punjabi, Pathan and Sindhi officers.  Personally though they may have differing opinions.

• An average time-frame of an insurgency is generally 20-25 years. The present generation of insurgents do not want their children to be drawn into the same cycle of violence. In India’s experience, the insurgency in Nagaland began to ebb after 20-25 years.

• General Mcrystal shared a good rapport with President Hamid Karzai, whereas General Petraeus is more political in his approach. The US is attempting to corner Karzai on issues of corruption, etc.

• It is to be seen whether the present governing structure which is politically dominated by the Pashtuns and the ANA which is comprised primarily of the Tajiks and Hazara would hold out after the withdrawal of the coalition forces.

• The US does not see Mullah Omar as a major card, there is more focus on the Haqqani network and the Tier 3 Taliban.  

Concluding Remarks by the Chairperson

Corruption and ineffectiveness of the Afghan government has been identified as the central problem. However, the Kabul centric view is that Pakistan is at the root of all problems. It is interesting to note what impact the divergent views of each player would have on the ground. At present, all players involved are acting according to their own interests in the region. Dr Srinath Raghavan thanked the presenter for sharing his insights on the actual situation on the ground.

(Report Compiled by Rohit Singh, Research Assistant, CLAWS)