Implications of Infrastructure Development in Tibet

General

A seminar on “Implications of Infrastructure Development in Tibet” was held on July 22, 2010 at the CLAWS campus. Lt Gen KT Parnaik, UYSM, YSM, DG PP, chaired the seminar. Maj Gen RK Arora (Retd), Prof Srikanth Kondapalli, and Dr Monika Chansoria spoke on the subject. The seminar was well attended by a select gathering of serving officers and members from the strategic community.

Opening Remarks: Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd), Director CLAWS

Infrastructure development in Tibet is an unfolding story that has been witnessed for a long time in India. Railways, roadways and airports extending right up to Kathmandu and townships, along with military camps and bunkers near India’s borders are a source of security concern to New Delhi. China is also fast developing and enhancing its cyber optics network in the region as it prepares to wage battle in the age of information. All this gives the PLA the ability to deploy additional forces in Tibet in a shorter time frame over longer periods of sustainability. China wants to remain the lone Asian tiger. They maintain that one mountain cannot accommodate two tigers and thus they aim to confine India to the backwaters of the Indian Ocean as a subaltern state. Given the existing border and territorial dispute between India and China, a minor border incident has the potential to escalate into a larger conflict.

Lt Gen KT Parnaik, UYSM, YSM, DG PP

Infrastructure development in Tibet is of immense significance to India as it would impact on Indian security concerns on its Northern and Eastern borders.  Tibet is rightly called ‘roof of the world’ but development of communication infrastructure over previously inaccessible areas pave the way for rapid build up of military power which needs to be factored while evolving suitable counter measures. Infrastructure development in TAR is linked with the overall Chinese intent towards building comprehensive national power and the fact that they want to become a leading global power. What we see in Tibet is planned regional development both economically and security wise. The road infrastructure alone has a combined capacity of one lac fifteen thousand metric tonnes, thus facilitating easy and swift movement of men, material and facilities. The issue that is of specific concern to India is that this infrastructure build up in terms of roads, railway network and airports etc flaunts capability and readiness without having to physically deploy forces. Chinese strategy appears to be that of connecting Eurasia to China and in the process enhancing military defence capability and the war waging capability of the PLA in the TAR.

Maj Gen Ravi Arora (Retd)

China considers Tibet as a defensive buffer zone between China and India. Beijing has been using the PLA for internal security duties in Tibet. The Tibetan population is only one percent of total chinese population. The average height of the Tibetan terrain is 4,900 meters making it extremely inhospitable. Tibet military district as part of the Chengdu MR has nearly 40,000 troops. Most of the highways are increasingly being prepared for troop transportation. As much as 75 percent of cargo goes via the Qinghai-Tibet Railway link.

The PLA has the capability to mobilise a Rapid Reaction Division into Lhasa within a period of 24-36 hours by a combination of rail and road movement. Strategically speaking, it is apparent that the Chinese are developing infrastructure not just to put pressure on India but also to enhance their offensive capability  and thereby keep their options open to launching and opening a second front against India. This infrastructure development is also coming up owing to the new military doctrine promulgated by the Chinese, i.e., waging short wars under conditions of informationisation. From east to west directions of the Yarlung Tsangpo River the highway is ready. In addition, the Chumbi Valley continues to remain vulnerable from the Chinese side. The capability to induct troops from Eastern China has also risen. The number of camps coming up in the region crossed 150 through available satellite imagery. These are in addition to the logistic nodes that have been established for the supply of ammunition.

Prof Srikanth Kondapalli

Prof Srikanth Kondapalli elaborated upon the entire Chinese Western Development Campaign Policy; the spatial distribution of economy crucially connecting with South, Central and West Asia—emphasizing economic integration and contesting the US under the leadership of both Hu Jintao and Hu Chunhua.

The impact of infrastructure development has been very visible in the seven prefectures as well as for military logistics. During the eighth and ninth Five-Year Plans (1991-95 and 96-2000) 5 billion Yuan were earmarked. Three-river projects in middle reaches of Yarlung Zangbo, Lhasa and Nyangqu Rivers with a 65,700 sq kms area are being developed. Additionally, 18 counties with 36 percent population are being allocated 1 billion Yuan for a “production base” in grain, meat, light industry, food processing. There are 40 on going construction projects; 100,000 hectares of cultivated land [Tibet’s 45 percent] in 4.5 million hectares grassland.

There is significant expansion of airports, highways and rail networks. Lhasa’s Gonggar Airport and Chamdo’s Bamda Airport are being upgraded. The repair and renovation of the Sichuan-Tibet highway, Qinghai-Tibet highway, Nagqu-Chamdo highway and Zetang-Gonggar highway is significant and construction of China-Nepal highway is also currently underway. In 2001-2005 about 42,700 kilometers of highway was opened to traffic.

The construction of the 90,000 KW Yamzhong Yumco Power Storage Station initiated in 1997 has been built at a cost of 2 billion Yuan. The power generating capacity has been expanded to 500,000 KW—an increase of 150,000 KW since 2000. Moreover, there is the construction of Chalong Power Station in Nagqu and the Norbuse Chromite Mine in Shannan with 2,500 sq kms of chromite deposits along Pangong Tso to Nujiang River. As many as 1,800 mines of 17 minerals have been discovered in Tibet, of which 900 mines were already built up-worth an estimated USD 80 billion including 5,000 tonnes of silver, 10 million tonnes of lead and zinc and 400 million tonnes of iron ore.

As much as 90 percent of TAR government budget is subsidized by Beijing. During the time period 1950-99, Beijing spent over CNY 40 billion on financial subsidies and construction. The 62 Aid Projects launched in 1994 received 75.7 percent of CNY 4 billion investment from the Chinese Central Government. Tibet received CNY 69 billion (USD8.5 billion) in fixed asset investments between 2001 and 2005—three times as much as in the previous five-year period. About CNY 50.8 billion of the investment was appropriated from the central coffer to boost infrastructure construction in the region.

China is using Bell 206 L helicopter for aerial photography and sky patrols over the Tibetan railway. Three million tonnes of cargo and 800,000 visitors are expected to visit Tibet by the railway alone a year with their figures expected to gallop to about 5.28 million by 2010. This is to fetch more than USD 725 million. In contrast, the 1.8 million visitors who arrived in Tibet by means other than railway in 2005 contributed an income of only about USD 250 million. There are more than 60,000 telephone subscribers in the region with a mobile phone capacity of 85 channels (estimated 57,000 subscribers were reached by 2000). There are 2 radio stations and 2 TV stations in the region with programme-controlled telephones and satellite communication ground stations set up. Significantly, 80% of counties were connected in national automatic telephone trunk network by 2000. China’s Advanced Info-Optical Network (CAINONET) project has seen three kinds of devices developed: optical cross-connect (OXC), optical add-drop multiplexer (OADM) and core router (CR). The optical fibre based transmission for Thimphu, Paro and Phuentsholing is crucial and needs to be taken stock of.

 Dr Monika Chansoria

The government of the People’s Republic of China comprehends the importance of Tibet and the Tibetan region since control of the region is crucial vis-à-vis enhancing its security on the western frontier. As decades passed by since the founding of the PRC in 1949, coastal China did indeed race ahead as far as development was concerned. This left western China stagnated, with Deng Xiaoping, declaring to the people of western China, “Let coastal China get rich first, you can get rich later.” Since then, once the economy of coastal China acquired a self-sustaining momentum, policy-makers under President Hu Jintao subsequently appear to have turned their attention towards western China.

The Hu Jintao Administration has significantly tightened its policy over Tibet in an apparent attempt to ensure the proverbial long reign and perennial stability of the Chinese Communist Party in the restive region. This is visible in that there are an increasing number of hard line cadres being appointed to run the TAR. PRC has been carrying out extensive infrastructure development in the TAR and areas close to its southern borders to include development of road, rail and air networks, fuel, oil and lubricants, pipelines, telecommunications and industrial base, besides giving a boost to the economy of the TAR.

The January 2010 Politburo meeting underlined the significance of Tibet in that it was exclusively devoted to the Tibetan issue. President Hu Jintao heralded two goals for the TAR in the coming decade including seeking breakthrough-style [economic] development; and sustaining long-term stability. Logistics reform has found importance with the 2008 Chinese White Paper on National Defence exhibiting a categorical focus on logistics reform including upgradation and deepening of logistical support. China has reiterated that its concepts of warfare and capability upgradation go well beyond meeting challenges in the form of Taiwan, Tibet and East Turkistan. Therefore the issue of Tibet should be read in correlation to the larger concept of Chinese national integration.

The 1,142-km Qinghai-Tibet Railway (QTR) line from Golmud to Lhasa became fully operational in July 2006. Tibet’s maiden railway line connects and integrates the Tibetan Plateau with the rest of China. QTR link is central to China’s ‘Great Western Development Strategy’ aimed at promoting the cause of Chinese nationalism; and China’s ‘Great Power Status.’ In addition, China is extending rail links west from Lhasa to Shigatse; the line to Dromo / Yatung will be an extension of the Lhasa-Shigatse line; heading east from Lhasa along the Yarlung Tsangpo to Nyingchi; the double gauging of the railway line from Lanzhou to Golmud will extend to the Lanzhou MR—these would be crucial in enhancing Chinese operational logistic capacity. Dr Chansoria underscored that the eastern link from Chengdu to Lhasa via Ngiti, Pangta and Markhan Dzong is slated to be completed by 2015 with settlements every 60 kms of this 1,118-km railway line reportedly been built. There are plans to extend Chinese National Rail Network to the border with India – likely reaching Tibetan town of Dromo near Nathu La.

The 41,000 kms of road network in Tibet, include five major highways and a number of subsidiary roads. The emphasis appears to be on trunk rail lines and inter-provincial highways linking the interior and coastal regions. These are being constructed to military specifications in order to be turned over to the PLA in the event of war. There are five airfields within Tibet and 15 surrounding it of which three are open for civilian activity. The functional airfields include Gongga, Donshoon, Hoping, Bangda, Nagchuka and Shiquanhe of which the Gongga and Bangda airfields are being upgraded to cater to nearly 2.1 million transients per year. According to the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011 to 2015) - official Chinese Press reported construction of the ‘world’s highest airport’ in Tibet’s Nagqu Prefecture – at an elevation of 14,639 ft.

Extensive development of logistics infrastructure in the TAR indicates impetus being made available to the PLA’s logistics wherewithal thus augmenting PLA’s operational capability in the TAR. The larger aim appears to be that of radically boosting rapid military deployment in the border areas with India.

Conclusion

There was a broad consensus that there needs to be comprehensive analysis and stock-taking of Chinese infrastructure developments in the TAR while scrutinizing its economic and military dimensions. These include the numerous steps that need to be taken up by India in this regard. To ensure that India is well equipped for a war in the future, it has to have both a nuclear and conventional deterrence capability along with adequate logistics in the border areas in the northern and eastern sectors.

(Report prepared by Dr. Monika Chansoria, Research Fellow, CLAWS)