Future of Indo-US Defence Relationship

The Defence Division of the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) organised an interaction with Dr. Ashley Tellis, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C., on the ‘Future of Indo-US Defence Relationship’ on December 19, 2008. The interaction was attended by members of the strategic community, research scholars and representatives from the defence industry. The session was chaired by Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd), Director, CLAWS.

Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd) began the session by lauding the contribution of Dr Ashley Tellis in the successful conclusion of the Indo-US Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. He said that this deal would enable India to gradually come out of the technology denial regime. He brought out that India was no longer satisfied with buyer-seller, patron-client arrangements and that future defence acquisition will emphasise transfer of technology as well as joint research and development and joint marketing of weapons systems. He also argued that a show piece joint development project is necessary to take the Indo-US defence cooperation relationship to the next plane. India will be increasingly called upon to discharge its responsibilities as a regional power and is likely to join future international coalitions and undertake joint operations in India’s area of strategic interest. India will do so not because it may be in the US interest but because it will be in India’s national interest. Hence, the Indian armed forces need to enhance their interventionist and expeditionary capabilities.

Dr. Ashley Tellis began by saying that the subject of the interaction was timely and appropriate. He said that the nuclear deal was capable of opening new vistas for the bilateral relationship and if we are able to capitalise on the right start that has been made, the next decade will be dramatically different from the past. For India, the security environment has become very complex as the internal and external challenges to security have merged. Moreover, the redefining of national threats poses new kinds of challenge for defence preparedness. In addition to this, there are new non-traditional threats, including WMDs, cyber war, threat to space assets and to critical civil infrastructure that demand broadening of the definition of preparedness. The recent period has also seen change in the spatial dynamics of conflict. So far, India has never had to operate beyond its immediate neighbourhood whereas palpable threats have emerged in India’s extended periphery. This increasingly complex regional environment poses serious challenges to national security. At the same time, it opens up new opportunities for Indo-US cooperation.

There has been a rapid transition in the balance of power in the South Asian region and the conventional wisdom is proving to be erroneous. What one observes today is the balance of capabilities amidst transformation. It has been wrongly assumed that India had significant strategic superiority over Pakistan. As far as China is concerned, the advantage that India has had since 1971 has been eroding progressively. It has been happening silently and has not captured the imagination of the majority of thinkers. The Himalayan shield no longer exists. How one arrests this progressive deterioration in the coming decade is an important that need serious consideration.

The issues of management of defence technology and armed forces will be critical for India. This is what differentiates between the states with real capability and those with apparent capability. The introduction of defence technology does not get enough attention in the areas where it should. The management of technology, its integration into formations and units and harmonisation are equally important aspects. Procurement should cater for full life cycle costs, training costs and logistics sustenance. These aspects are equally important while deciding on the kind of technology one acquires. There is also a need for doctrinal and organisational change in the armed forces. Joint exercises are not enough and the lack of joint fighting capability will be a serious challenge in the times to come. It takes great effort to ensure that everybody is geared to fight the same war. The long term challenge is to transform the discreet package of capability to something more than the sum of its parts.

The US-India defence relationship has been transformed in the past eight to 15 years. Even then the process has been spotty and less than fully coherent. Enhanced cooperation has taken place in four different sectors:

·        The military-to-military relationship has been the most successful. Bilateral military exchanges and exercises have taken place to the immense benefit of both the militaries.

·        India’s acquisition of US defence equipment and access to US defence industry is still very small.

·        Indian cooperation with the US defence industry has been minimal. The problem here is of scale. The private sector works on commercial considerations. The US forces buy much more than any other buyers from the US defence industry. Hence, the threshold for the US industry to invest in India is very high. They will not come to India unless they are assured of real and sustained income. For this, India will need to transform the way it does business.

·        Joint research and development is there in some form but has seen only limited success. There is no incentive for the US industry to go out for this. However, rate differentials and cost aspects will be major incentives in the times to come.

The immediate challenges facing India-US defence cooperation are threefold:

·        How is the vexed issue of end use monitoring (EUM) to be managed? There are legal issues involved here. India may not get the best technology if it does not accept EUM. Certain modalities can be managed but, from the US point of view, EUM cannot be done away with. The early resolution of this issue is important because there are certain critical agreements in the pipeline that can be hampered because of this.

·        Issues relating to the protection of the copyright information are also equally important.

·        Cross servicing issues about payments and transfer modalities for logistics services provided to each other is another important area that needs early agreement.

Over the long term, the important issues will be different:

·        The long-term vision must be to enhance joint operations capability. It is necessary to develop joint operations capability only for launching joint conventional operations. There is need for better planning and management of inter-operability complexities, including communications protocols.

·        There will be a need for efficient division of labour. US forces are becoming smaller and the US will have to rely increasingly on its partners to “pick up the slack”.

·        Greater industrial cooperation can be ensured as India’s skilled labour force can help reduce US defence budgets. The challenge for the US is to come up with cost effective solutions as it cannot sustain $700m defence budget during peacetime.

Discussion

·        Joint research and development can be undertaken in all areas. In order to kick-start such an approach, a big-ticket project is needed; e.g. something such as the development of a joint BMD project.

·        In future, the software component will form a major part of the cost of developing defence equipment and India can play a major role in this respect.

·        The US has enhanced its military aid to Pakistan even as it concluded the civilian nuclear agreement with India. It will balance its multiple interests in the region. One should not see US relations with the two countries in the region in a competitive framework. While India has been offered top of the line high quality technology, it has not been the same in the case of Pakistan.

·        India cannot wish away the competitive nature of the international arms trade. Instead, it must exploit competition to get the best value for its money.

·        The Indo-US nuclear deal has strengthened China’s grand strategy designs against India. China wishes to be a great power and wants India to be confined to the Sub-continent. After the deal, China has taken various steps to further enhance its cooperation with Pakistan.

·        India and the US can conduct joint operations in the field of counter-terrorism, which is being done in the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks. Enhanced cooperation should replace earlier lackadaisical efforts.

·        For the US, EUM is a global clause and it is not India specific alone. The more sophisticated the technology, the more stringent will be the norms on EUM. But the ultimate choice of products will remain with India.

·        India does not need to conduct Anti-satellite (ASAT) test to prove its capability. It can gain the knowledge without carrying out such a test in outer space. It should concentrate in doing more to protect its space-based assets.

It emerged clearly form the interaction that Indo-US defence cooperation is moving forward in a positive direction as it is based on mutual interest and shared desire for peace and stability. However, there are some contentious issues to be resolved in order to strengthen the relationship further and take it to the next plane.

(Report prepared by Avinash Godbole, Research Assistant, CLAWS)