Pakistan's Nuclear Warheads and Safety and Security Issues

General

The Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) organised a seminar on “Pakistan’s Nuclear Warheads and Safety and Security issues” on 05 August 2009 at the CLAWS campus. The seminar was attended by officers from the armed forces and members of the strategic community. Dr Scott Sagan, co-director Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC)
Stanford University, USA, was the Chairman. Mr. Christopher Clary, Visiting Fellow, IDSA was the guest speaker. Dr Manoj Joshi, Deputy Editor Mail Today and Dr Manpreet Sethi, Senior Fellow, CAPS were the discussants.

Opening Remarks

Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd), Director CLAWS, outlined the issues facing the world today as regards the safety of Pakistan’s Nuclear weapons. The warheads and their R & D are completely under military control, which is not conducive to the strategic stability in the South Asian region. The latest apprehensions are that these might fall into the ‘wrong hands’, which could lead to nuclear terrorism or to manufacturing of a ‘dirty bomb’.

Dr Sagan introduced the subject by stating that the issue of nuclear safety is very important as in this field all the players are hostages of each other. The techniques that the US uses for nuclear safety have been published in an IAEA document: Design Basis Threat Methodology. It follows a four step approach. Firstly, an independent threat assessment should be done. Next, the operators should design the best way to counter the threats. Then, the design should be tested and lastly, it should be annually reviewed. He then spoke about the Vulnerability/ Invulnerability paradox. By keeping the weapons as secure as possible also makes them more visibly secure and therefore, more vulnerable to acts like terrorist attacks etc.

Christopher Clary, Visiting Fellow, IDSA

The lead presenter endeavoured to collate, sort through, and organise large amount of publicly available information to provide a systematic assessment of Pakistan’s nuclear security apparatus. After reviewing available evidence, he concluded that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is reasonably secure and the main dangers are from infiltrators and from conflict. The talk was structured into the following sections:-                                                 
· Scale of the Arsenal
· Safeguards and Command & Control
· Peacetime Risks
· Conflict Risks
· Domestic Instability Risks
The Scale of Arsenal of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons is decided by the Strategic Plans Division (SPD). It sizes the arsenal in consultation with the National Command Authority which is headed by the President of the country. A 5-year planning cycle is followed to determine the numbers. These are based on the status of missile defence of India and the AWACS capability of India. It also depends on the possibility of first strike by India. Lastly, various technical errors are factored in the planning process. Based on various sources of information, Pakistan has a capability of developing approximately six warheads per year. Taking a base line figure of about 60 in 2009, this could go to around 120 if the Khushab 2 and 3 reactors continue to perform as expected. This figure could go to 200 if they develop the new Khushab and composite warheads. Other factors in the development of these are the bottlenecks in procuring heavy water and plutonium and the natural uranium shortage in the world. There is also an indication that Pakistan is upgrading its cruise missiles to carry nuclear warheads.

Safeguards and Command & Control. During peacetime deployment the warheads are stored de-mated and the triggers are kept away from the fissile material. The command and control structure clearly shows the domination of the military in all matters relating to nuclear weapons in Pakistan. The SPD was formed in 1999 and is headed by a Lt General. It has various divisions. The Security Division is commanded by a Major General. The peacetime layers of defence are –
· Secrecy. The location of the nuclear assets is a closely guarded secret.
· Physical security. The SPD has taken over the inner security after the A Q Khan affair. The other two rings are the outer and intelligence.
· Personnel and human reliability programs. All the personnel are carefully chosen. However, it is not known how these programmes are structured.
· Procedural safeguards. De-mating of the warhead and the triggers, material protection through control and accounting and two man or three man rule are the safeguards in place.      
· Technical safeguards.
Peacetime problems. Trouble during peacetime is expected from:-
· External attacks.
· Insider threats, which could be infiltrators from society, insiders like AQ Khan or assassination attempts.
Problems during Conflict. These could originate from:-
· Insider threats- threats from within the organisation.
· External threats
· Accidents. There is an increase in the risk of accidents since Pakistan’s road infrastructure and the traffic system are poor.
· De facto pre-delegation. In this regard, certain individuals, for example in the second rung of leadership, may decide that the threat is enough to launch.
Problems of Domestic Instability. Chris Clary highlighted the ongoing unrest in Pakistan and opined that there could be five potential scenarios which could emerge in the future and impact the security of the nuclear warheads. These are:-
· Scenario 1:  “Islamic Republic of Pakistan” or the ‘Talibanisation of Pakistan’ which had a low probability of happening.
· Scenario 2:  Internal coup, which has a history in Pakistan but given the current higher military organisation, this also has a low probability.
· Scenario 3:  Localized mutiny, which was possible but the mutineer may not know the whereabouts of the weapons.
· Scenario 4:  Sudden loss of territory, e.g., a border province breaking off, which has the same impact as the Scenario no 3.
· Scenario 5:  Multi-faceted state collapse, which could be a probability.
After describing these scenarios, Mr. Clary concluded that the current Pakistan command and control arrangement appears to be designed to confront the most plausible scenarios with regards to domestic instability in Pakistan. He suggested that the international community should continue efforts to stabilise Pakistan, in part so that scenarios that currently seem implausible do not become a reality.
In conclusion, Mr. Clary said that the Fissile Material Cut off Treaty must be signed by all the stakeholders. He then put forward two recommendations, one to India and second to the United States. His recommendations appear to be guided by the concerns related to Pakistan’s reactions to Indian and American actions. He posed a query to India: ‘How do missile defense and precision missiles fit into your strategic vision?’ Further, India must take into greater account Pakistan’s reactions to its technical developments and decisions. He also suggested to the United States that its officials must stop the leaks and maintain a measured public tone. While acknowledging that US officials have taken the right tone, he pointed out that discussions about whether or not there are US plans to secure Pakistani nuclear weapons in a worst-case scenario are inconclusive. Mr. Clary concluded on a cautious note that nuclear risks are shared risks and in the South Asian context a trilateral discussion on restraint of nuclear weapons is the road to the future.

Dr Manoj Joshi, Dy Editor, Mail Today

The Pakistan nuclear programme still has a number of unknowns because of veils of secrecy. There is a reasonable estimate of the scale of warheads. However, there is a probability of leakage of low grade fissile material which could lead to manufacture of ‘dirty bombs’. There is also a threat to the weapons in the case of a coup, though in the present set up this was an unlikely case. The threat of terror attacks on the lines of attack on Soviet facility in Azerbaijan was always a possibility. Next, the emergence of ISI as an actor can never be ruled out. With so many layers, it was difficult to separate ISI from the regular army. Pre-delegation is also worrisome, especially, after the accumulation of large numbers of nuclear weapons. Another important variable is the question mark on the safeguards which the Chinese have provided to Pakistan for their nuclear weapons.

As regards Pakistan’s internal problems, the country has seen internal unrest after Musharraf’s exit. There is conflict between the Pashtun Taliban and Punjabi LeT and JeM. The internal threat also emerges from the perception that the army is acting against the former and not against the latter. The other safety situations which could pose a threat to the nuclear weapons are the terrorist actions, the sectarian violence and the civil military tensions. Lastly, the Indian ballistic missile defence is driving increase in Pakistan nuclear arsenal.

Dr Manpreet Sethi, Sr Fellow, CAPS

Dr Sethi said that the analysis was balanced and different from those heard earlier in the sense that American analysts tend to overplay the threat and Pakistani analysts tend to underplay it. She said that much better safety systems were in place post-AQ Khan revelations and security of nuclear weapons has considerably improved. Pakistan has been helped by UN and the US in improving the safety and security of the nuclear assets. The factors which add to the concern are, first, the presence of armed, motivated terrorist organisations which are anti-west and anti-India who want to gain control of WMDs. Next, there is the threat from Islamic sympathisers within the military and the government. Then, there are the remnants of the AQ Khan network.  Pakistan is in the throes of expanding the arsenal, therefore, there is heightened activity, more movement of material and men.
She wondered how safe Pakistan nuclear complexes were with all the arrangements said to be in place. The weapons are secure as long as the military sees them as strategic assets. The material in labs and other places could possibly leak out with incentives to insiders. The security should be of as much concern for Pakistan as it should for the international community. Pakistan assumes that India could go back on its no first use doctrine.

Discussion

· There is a possibility of suicide attack on the nuclear complex. A low level coup by two star generals of Pak army is a possibility.
· Military units turning rogue are a threat and the weapons were most vulnerable when materials and warheads are being transported.
· There is a problem of Pakistani leaders being dismissive of the nuclear threat and downplaying the issue.
· Pakistan may not use the weapons as a counter force but may be as a counter value strike.
· BMD in India is being driven by the techno-bureaucracy and the scientists and the public at large would feel safer if this could be scaled down. There were arguments and counter arguments to this issue.
· Myanmar is also preparing to conduct a nuclear test in the near future.
· Chinese proliferation of nuclear weapons into South Asia is more of a worry and focus should shift on those as well as on North Korea too.
· The Indian no first use doctrine is a declaratory statement and Pakistan may chose not to believe it.
· The Indian view that the US special forces have planted killer devices to stop Pakistan nuclear weapons may not be true.

Concluding remarks

Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd), Director CLAWS said that there was broad consensus on the following issues:-
· Pakistan’s nuclear warheads are in the custody of the Pak army and are zealously guarded.
· The threat of nuclear terrorism through ‘dirty bombs’ isfar greater even though the causalities would be lesser.
There is no consensus on the issues of ballistic missile defence and the no first use doctrine which could be debated further. Security during transit is an acceptable threat. He emphasised the need is to develop CBMs. He concluded by saying that nuclear issues are far more important than the threat of coup d’etats. 

(Report compiled by Wg Cdr Manish Girdhar, VM, Research Fellow, CLAWS)