Afghanistan: Post-exit Strategies and India's Role

The Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) organised a seminar on ‘Afghanistan: Post-Exit Strategies & India’s Role’ on 14 January 2010 at the CLAWS premises to commemorate its Raising Day. Ambassador G Parthasarathy chaired the discussion. Prof Walter Andersen (School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington D.C.), Lt Gen R K Sawhney, PVSM, AVSM (Retd) former DGMI, Mr Shakti Sinha (IAS) and Maj Gen GD Bakshi, SM, VSM (Retd) were on the panel. The seminar was attended by officers from the armed forces and members of the strategic community.

Director’s Opening Remarks

Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd):

The seminar is being hosted as part of the Raising Day celebrations of CLAWS. The topic is important because of the continuing instability in Afghanistan. President Obama’s new strategy of “surge and exit” has created some misgivings in South Asia as it is based on the premise that Afghan security forces will be able to take care of the security needs of the country in a year and a half. This strategy appears to have been based on hope rather than on reality. The impact of the post exit strategy on the region needs to be discussed, as also how the region should cope with the situation after the exit of the ISAF/NATO forces. There is also a need to discuss the contours of a regional solution to the problem.

Prof Walter Andersen

The non-state actors being engaged by the coalition forces have their core support area on either side of the Durand line in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Taliban have been successful in gaining grass root support through propagation of their radical social agenda for land reforms and distribution of mining rights. Whether the response to the Taliban–Al Qaeda should be through the means of counterinsurgency or counterterrorism is being debated in the US with opinion slanting to the former course of action.

The Taliban in Afghanistan almost exclusively recruits from the Pashtun population. The fusion of Pashtun nationalism from either side of the border with religious radicalism is a real possibility with dangerous consequences.  In effect, we already have the makings of an ethnic civil war in Afghanistan with the Pashtuns, who form 45% of the population ranged against other ethnic groups. In Pakistan, the Taliban is also almost exclusively Pashtun but unlike their Afghan brethren they have alliances with non-Pashtun radical groups.

There has been continuity in US policy on Afghanistan in terms of threat assessment and the need to take decisive action against Al Qaeda and its allies. But the present administration views the previous government’s response to the challenge over the last eight years as inadequate which enabled the Taliban to gain momentum in Afghanistan and allowed the extremist threat to grow in Pakistan. The new surge in US troops in Afghanistan will hence be in areas populated by Pashtuns.

Pakistan for its part has been selective in dealing with the Taliban threat. While the Pakistan Taliban has been attacked by the Pakistani military the Afghanistan Taliban has not been touched because Pakistan still views the latter as an asset to its foreign policy.

On 01 Dec 2009, President Obama laid out his Afghanistan war strategy in an address at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. The President, while giving out his policy for a surge in US troops also gave out a time line of 18 months for withdrawal of US forces. A few days later, in their testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hillary Clinton, Admiral Mullen and Robert Gates stated that they would execute this transition responsibly, taking into account conditions on the ground and that a review of the Afghanistan strategy would be carried out at the end of 2010. When contacted to resolve this apparent contradiction, the White House spokesperson reiterated that the US would withdraw in 18 months. The contradiction remains, for while the intent to withdraw is clear, it may perhaps be contingent on the situation existing at that time.

A US withdrawal from Afghanistan without building up adequate capacities in terms of economic development and civil and military institutions will lead to the danger of other regional players being tempted to meddle in Afghanistan for their own interests. While the intent of announcing troop withdrawal within 18 months was to provide a sense of urgency and motivate the Afghan Government to get its act together, combat corruption, improve governance, and deliver to the people, it has had a negative effect in that it is being viewed by the Taliban and many in Pakistan as a sign of American weakness. There is a sense of triumph in Taliban broadcasts which are exploiting the statement as US inability to go for the long haul.  It will be no surprise if the ISI comes in to support the Afghan Taliban. This will lead to a situation where the ethnic nature of conflict will be exacerbated because the Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras do not want to see an assertion of Pashtun dominance in Afghanistan and will seek support from Iran, India and Russia.

What needs to be done on the ground prior to a US withdrawal is:
• Enable Afghan military and police to undertake operations against the Taliban.
• Lure Pashtuns away from the Taliban.
• Defeat the Taliban in their safe havens in Pakistan.

The above is unlikely to be achieved within 18 months. A premature US withdrawal could lay the ground for the Afghan Taliban to seize power once again with the assistance of the Pakistan Taliban. In such an eventuality, the Pakistan military might cut a deal with the Taliban which could pose additional problems for India.

Lt Gen R K Sawhney, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)

The most important prerequisite for sound planning of a campaign is to have a clear aim. This has not been realised by the Americans in Afghanistan. There is a lot of ambiguity concerning this vital aspect amongst the different sections of the American establishment.

General McChrystal has rightly warned the US Congress that while it was unrealistic to expect an unconditional surrender, the Taliban must be so degraded that they are unable to do what they wish to do. Right now, the Taliban have no interest in seeking a compromise because they think they can regain control of Afghanistan on the battlefield. It would hence be more realistic on the part of the US to think in terms of the Indian experience in countering insurgency through disruption and degradation rather than defeat. Reinforcements must be sent in to fight the Taliban to a standstill, thereby creating the space for the development of Afghan security forces, governance and some sort of political system.

As an ally, the role of Pakistan is important but its proximity to the Afghan Taliban is an inhibiting factor. Pakistan will have to be forced or persuaded to sever ties with Afghan Taliban. Pakistan’s concerns in Afghanistan are:
• Cannot let the Afghan Taliban be defeated.
• Need to keep India out of the loop.
• Need to retain influence in Pakistan.
Pakistan will have to realise that restoring Taliban to power in Kabul will unleash another civil war in Afghanistan. They also need to spell out their legitimate concerns in Afghanistan.

Expenditure and efforts must be spent on nation-building which will act as a force multiplier to counterinsurgency operations. The notion that the US and its allies or the regional/international communities should not aim at concerted efforts to build governance and economic development in a country like Afghanistan is dangerously misguided.

One of the most important fallouts of the Presidential elections in Afghanistan is the emergence of Abdullah Abdullah as a credible opposition leader. The next parliamentary election is due in June 2010. The Independent Election Commission (IEC) has decreed that parliamentary elections must go ahead on May 22, 2010. The next international meet on Afghanistan on 23 January 2010 assumes importance wherein the US along with the international community would gather to deliberate on security, aid, capacity of the government, development assistance and elimination of poppy cultivation as well as putting in place a regional solution to supporting Afghanistan.

Mr Shakti Sinha, IAS

In the recent rejection by the Wolesi Jirga of 17 out of 24 ministerial candidates presented to it, one sees no adherence to democratic norms. People in Afghanistan want democracy. The Presidential elections consisted of two parts. The first was the run up to the elections where the Electoral Control Commission saw and reported many frauds but was prevented from releasing the report until President Karzai allowed a second round. The President represents legitimacy in Afghanistan. Two years ago, Karzai was ineffective, unpopular and almost over. It is extremely important in Afghanistan to be seen neither as anti-American nor as a puppet of the Americans.

In Afghanistan, federalism is a bad word. The state-society interface has been such that Afghanistan’s kings negotiated for local autonomy to function until 1880. From 1880 until the Soviet occupation, government in Afghanistan was centralised and this system worked. This is because Afghanistan functions on the basis of ‘qawm’ or networks, whether within the family or in larger society. This allows them legitimacy. However, where there is a difference between the formal and the informal system, there is a collapse of the system entirely.

Maj Gen G D Bakshi, SM, VSM (Retd)

The situation in Afghanistan today is the result of two extreme episodes of hubris. In 2001, the Taliban presented concentrated targets and was decimated by the US Air Force. This ridiculously easy victory in turn led to hubris in the Pentagon. Lt Gen Tommy Franks decided to keep the US footprint in Afghanistan very small (just 10,000 men) supported by massive airpower. Overtime, airpower has caused significant collateral damage that alienated the population. This tiny US military footprint has now bred a long term disaster. The use of warlords seriously undercut the legitimacy of the Afghan Government of President Karzai. America now diverted attention and resources away to Iraq. The Taliban found the force to space ratio ridiculously low in Afghanistan and simply seeped right back in.

The Quetta Shura led by Mullah Omar was ensconced by the ISI in the city of Quetta itself. It targeted Kandahar. The Haqqani Shura based in Waziristan targeted Khost, Paktia and Paktika provinces. The Hizb-e-Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar made NWFP its base for targeting the Afghan provinces of Nangrahar, Nuristan and Kunar. The ISI simply revived the Narcotics Empire of the Golden Crescent to pay for this insurgency. 9% of Afghan population had been killed, 33% had fled to other countries as refugees and 11% were internally displaced. Most of the cultivable areas were strewn with mines. The entire labour intensive traditional system of Afghan agriculture thus broke down and the Afghans had reverted to poppy cultivation, which is not manpower intensive. This opium economy has been fuelling the Taliban War since then.

So far Afghanistan has received some US$ 82 billion worth aid from all countries (US$ 32 billion from USA, US$ 50 billion from Japan, EU countries, India, China, et al). It will need up to US$ 8 billion per year (US$ 4 billion for military assistance and US$ 4 billion for economic aid) for the next one or two decades.  In 2007 the Afghan government’s revenue was US$ 890 million whereas its expenditure on the ANA/Police alone was over US$ 2 billion. As such Afghanistan will need extensive military/economic aid for the next two decades.

The ISI has consciously tried to subsume Afghan nationalism by promoting the Salafi ideology of Jihad via the Taliban, to make national frontiers irrelevant. It has been its constant endeavor to gain strategic depth in Afghanistan. The Taliban insurgency has made the Durand Line irrelevant. If the Taliban insurgency triumphs, Pakistan could gain control of the Pashtun areas of Afghanistan and expand territorially to gain the notional strategic depth.

From the Indian security point of view, the best case scenario is the stabilisation of the current relatively modernist state in Afghanistan. The worst case scenario would be a takeover of the whole or the Pashtun parts of Afghanistan by the hardcore Taliban-Al Qaeda combine. This could pose a serious threat to Indian and regional security. Emergence of a Pakhtun Khwa that straddles the Durand Line could lead to the splintering of Pakistan with unpredictable consequences for regional and global security. The prime concern would be the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. Politically, Afghanistan needs a more inclusive system that delegates more power to its Provincial Assemblies and elected Governors. India should subtly encourage such an evolution that is more suited for a diverse and multi ethnic society like Afghanistan.

Discussion

Distinction between the moderate and extremist types of Taliban - There is considerable opinion that the Taliban can be lured or bought, which is usually said of the more moderate versions of the Taliban but there is a hardcore Taliban that cannot be lured or bought. Again, the ethnic question comes in because the Pashtun cause is where Islam equals the Pakhtunwali, where the Taliban conflate Pakhtunwali to Islam and where allies in Pakistan are also Pashtun.

The Afghanistan-Pakistan-India trade route – Pakistan blocks India-Afghan trade across its territory primarily to use it as a bargaining chip over Kashmir. The sentiment in Pakistan is very strongly against promoting India-Afghan trade across its territory without a quid pro quo on Kashmir.

The scope for a regional solution and roles by different regional actors – The Sunni influence of Afghanistan is worrisome for Iran, as it has a minority Sunni population on its border. Iran could play an important role but the role of Russia is limited. President Obama touted a contact group which would include major countries involved in Afghanistan and its neighboring countries. But this group might see friction between Pakistan and India on each other’s roles there.

Troop deployment by India in Afghanistan – It might not be wise for India to deploy troops in Afghanistan. In terms of material and human cost as also in terms of logistic support such a step would be counter-productive. Pakistani opposition to the idea would also need to be factored. As such, India should continue with civilian assistance as being done now. A US withdrawal prior to the enabling of Afghan forces to take on the Taliban, may lead to civil war with ethnic dimensions where the Taliban will represent the Pashtuns and other ethnic groups will be looking to the region for support. India could reconsider her options then but presently should continue to remain focused on providing aid and other non military assistance.

Chairperson’s Closing Remarks

Ambassador G. Parthasarathy:

There is no such thing as a non-state actor, especially in the context of South Asia, where all actors are state-abetted. US insistence on the term is a mistake in American diplomacy. The encouragement and support of Pakistan’s ISI is inimical to Indian interests on Indian and foreign territory. The costs of terrorism should be made clear to Pakistan’s military establishment. More than 21% of the Pakistan Army is Pashtun; the question to be asked is – can you bomb the homes of 21% of your own? The Pakistan army is worried about Pashtun sub-nationalism and is thus subsuming it in Islamic radicalism, giving it the name of jihad. Thus, the danger then becomes one of foreigners against Islam, as opposed to non-Pashtuns against Pashtuns.

(Compiled by Swapna Kona Nayudu, Associate Fellow, CLAWS)