Left Wing Extremism (LWE) in India

The resurgence and spread of LWE signifies that our country is at war with itself. There is huge economic disparity due to deprivation and exploitation. As a result there is much unrest and one of the manifestations is LWE. It arose first in 1967, but was crushed in the 1970s. It was reincarnated in the 1990s with more rigour due to the state’s flawed policies to meet the rising expectations of the people. Presently nearly 20 states of India are affected by LWE.

 

Three broad strategies of Maoists are: ‘Strategic Defence’, ‘Strategic Equilibrium’ and ‘Strategic Offence’. Their ideology comprises abhorrence of capitalism, skepticism of democracy and belief in proletariat governance. Their objective is to establish a revolutionary government by firstly establishing ‘secret cells’, then declare ‘liberated zones’ in rural and tribal areas, and gradually capture power centres in the urban areas. 

 

To tackle this, responses of various states have not been adequate due to blurred vision of the security problematique. They lack sufficient will and resources to address the problem. Instead of seeing it only as a law and order problem, what is urgently required is suitable socio-economic antidotes. Most importantly, key apprehensions of tribals should be addressed. The Centre should help all those affected states to establish a counter-insurgency grid for better coordination. Special and dedicated force like ‘Greyhounds’ is necessary for all affected states. The police must be better trained, equipped and motivated. It is vital to target and eliminate Naxal leadership rather than focusing on sympathisers and supporters. If state efficiency is enforced, the problem will be resolved gradually over a period of time.

 

Session I: ‘Genesis and Present Situation and Response of States’

Chairperson: Maj Gen GD Bakshi AVSM, VSM (Retd.)

Speakers: 

Mr EN Rammohan, Former DG, BSF

Dr N Manoharan, Senior Fellow, CLAWS

Mr Prakash Singh, Former DGP (Uttar Pradesh) and former DG BSF 

 

EN Rammohan: ‘Genesis of Maoist Extremism and Underlying Causes’

If root causes are addressed insurgencies automatically wither away. Naxalism is not an exception. It is, therefore, important to understand the causal factors of resurgence of LWE in India. Two major root causes stand out: lack of land reforms and deprivation of forest produce from the tribals.

 

The state of Andhra Pradesh became the hub of Naxal resurgence mainly because of prevailing caste equations. The upper caste owned lands tilled by the lower caste and the under privileged. Improper implementation of ‘Land Ceiling Act’ and prolonged discrimination of the underprivileged became a perfect breeding ground for Naxal ideology. There is no Naxal problem in the state of Kerala because land reforms have been completed there. Similarly, deprivation of minor forest produce to the tribals of Central India led to much resentment among them. Here again traders belonging to upper castes exploit tribals. Therefore, it is not surprising to see that most of the Naxals in Central India are tribals. Unfortunately, both Central and state governments are not taking necessary corrective measures.  

 

N Manoharan: ‘Present Situation and Response of States of Andhra Pradesh, Chhatisgarh and Jharkhand’

 

Of 20 states identified as Naxal-affected, three states are taken for analyses: Andhra Pradesh, Chhatisgarh and Jharkhand. Andhra Pradesh was once a hub of Naxal resurgence. The present situation, however, is far better. Naxals are present in just four districts on the Andhra Pradesh-Chhatisgarh-Orissa border. At the same time, they possess capacity to strike important targets. Mass mobilisation continues, but on a lower scale. Situation in Chhatisgarh is grim. It is now the hub of LWE in the country. Almost all districts are affected by the problem. Since the local police are not in a position to tackle the situation, Central paramilitary forces are deployed. There is also a local resistance movement in the name of ‘Salwa Judum’ that has actually increased the level of violence in the state. Out of 24 districts in Jharkhand, 14 are identified as ‘highly affected’, four ‘moderately affected’ and five ‘marginally affected’.  Mass mobilisation by the Maoists has increased tremendously, especially after incidents in Nandigram and Singur. Despite factionalism among Maoists groups in the state, their dominance is conspicuous in day-to-day governance. The most worrying aspect is collusion between Naxals and mainstream political parties. Central paramilitary forces are deployed in Jharkhand as well.

 

Response to LWE in Andhra Pradesh has been satisfactory, but not up to the mark in Chhatisgarh and Jharkhand.  Of the three broad categories of responses – military, political and socio-economic – Andhra Pradesh has done well on military response. The counter-strategies of the state government were based on coherent assessment of Maoists ideology, tactics and strategies. Its special forces – Greyhounds – operated within the ‘enveloping environment’ of AP police. There was adequate police modernisation and continuous upgradation of technical, technological and operational capabilities. The state intelligence and the police effectively used the ceasefire period to penetrate the rank and file of the Naxals and successfully neutralised the Maoist leadership. Good surrender package also enabled numerous Naxals to join the political mainstream. Chhatisgarh and Jharkhand, however, are yet to fully comprehend the nature and intensity of the threat and formulate a suitable response. In both the states, police modernisation is poor. The forces are not trained adequately to take on highly motivated and heavily armed Maoists. Initiatives are on to raise new reserve battalions by recruiting tribal youth from Naxal-affected areas. Introduction of electronic surveillance systems is also on cards. However, the response should be balanced instead of ‘security-centric’. Since the Naxals are now unified, inter-state coordination on intelligence sharing and ‘hot pursuit’ is vital in tackling them. The states also have to apply right political antidote for the Maoist ideology at the grassroots level. A single-door political dialogue by the Centre can be opened with the Maoists instead of each state negotiating separately. The Centre should also make sure that the pangs of globalisation/industrialisation do not affect the tribals.

 

Prakash Singh: ‘National Strategy to Combat Left Wing Extremism Effectively’

 

LWE is spread over large geographical area. The Maoists are now unified and their potential to inflict violence has increased manifold. They have a wide-ranging nexus with other militant groups both inside and outside India. To combat LWE effectively, an appropriate national strategy should have a comprehensive approach. At the administrative level, better coordination among the Naxal-affected states and with the Centre is important. There are presently bodies like ‘Task Force on Naxalism’, ‘Empowered Group of Ministers’, ‘Inter-ministerial Group’, and ‘Standing Committee of Chief Ministers’ to take care of coordination. Yet, seriousness is lacking. The Centre should consider setting-up a ‘Backward Regions Fund’ especially for the development of tribal areas. 

 

At the military front, all the affected states should set-up special forces to deal with Naxals. The Centre should consider providing aerial cover to military operations. To weaken Maoists militarily, a desired option is a coordinated joint strike operation on the model of ‘Operation Steeple Chase’. All the affected states must share intelligence amongst themselves on Naxal activities. Resistance movements like ‘Salwa Judum’ should be encouraged as they are spontaneous movements. Maoists see such movements as biggest threat to their existence and therefore target members of these resistance groups. The Central and state governments must bestow full rights over minor forest produce to the tribals by amending the ‘Forest Rights Act’ accordingly. The governments should consider inviting Maoists for dialogue without any preconditions.

 

· Any anti-Naxal operation should be conducted with a human face. Otherwise, there is a danger of backfire and aggravation.

 

· ‘Operation Steeple Chase II’ is worth considering, but for a short period of time. Army should not be involved for long in such operations.

 

· Naxals will become financially self-sustaining over a period of time since the budgets for Naxals are increasing. It is, therefore, important to stifle their fund flows.

 

· Intellectual component (leadership) for Naxals comes from urban areas, whereas the foot soldiers are from deprived sections. It is an undesirable phase if the leadership shifts to the latter group.

 

· LWE is a heartland problem. It was perhaps neglected because of absence of external dimension. It is about time that the LWE is taken-up as a national issue.

 

· There is much resistance to development of Naxal-affected areas from Maoists. This aspect of ‘anti-developemnt’ attitude of Maoists should be exploited by the government to mobilise popular support against LWE.

 

· There is a huge communications gap among various organs of the government on tackling LWE. This should be addressed on priority basis for better coordination.

 

· Since India’s economic growth is not filtering below, new development models should be explored.

 

· Expanding Territorial Army is better way of sucking in the emerging youth bulge in the country. This will also provide enough manpower to handle increasing insecurity in the country.

 

Lt Gen Gautam Banerjee, COS, HQ Central Command: ‘Summing-up’

 

India’s democracy is not an ideal one. Governance is missing in the heart of India. Unemployment offers a good recruiting ground for Naxals. Yet another problem is exploitation of resources in the tribal areas by outsiders. There is neither coordinated strategy nor equipment to fight Naxals. It is the Centre’s responsibility to rectify these anomalies. The main issue, however, is that concerned authorities are disclaiming presence of LWE. Instead of encouraging local resistance movements, ‘Salwa Judum’ in Chhatisgarh was undermined due to vested interests.

 

 

 

Session II: ‘Implications for Indian Security and Strategy to Counter LWE Effectively’

 

Chairperson: Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd.), Director, CLAWS

Speakers:

Maj Gen GD Bakshi (Retd.)

Mr Vikram Singh, DGP, Uttar Pradesh

Brig Rahul Bhonsle (Retd.)

 

Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd.) made an opening presentation on understanding the emergency contours of LWE. He highlighted the root causes, the nature of violence, the organisation, the quantum of funds available and the help provided by the Centre to the state governments. He concluded that better coordination between the Centre and the states is necessary to formulate cohesive strategies to fight LWE.

 

GD Bakshi: ‘Implications of LWE for Indian Security’

India faces no existential threat from outside the country; threat, however, is internal in the form of LWE which has emerged as a ‘third front threat’. Increasing ‘youth bulge’ in the coming years is one of the major challenges confronted by India. Growth has, unfortunately, not been inclusive in our country. Eighty-five per cent of tribals inhabit Central India and LWE is primarily a tribal insurgency although leadership is from urban areas. The major cause for LWE in Central India is exploitation of tribals and political marginalisation. This apart, tribals have been left in isolation for centuries, except to tap resources in those areas. As a consequence of India’s unsustainable development model nearly 24 million tribals have so far been displaced in Central India alone. All these led contributed to resurgence of LWE. 

 

Tribals make ideal guerillas; they know the terrain well, are physically tough and know the art of survival in jungles; as they work in mines, they are experts in handling dynamite. Tribals are also dexterous in group attacks. ‘Sadbhawana model’ as in J&K is suggested to win hearts and minds of tribals. On the other hand, there is a need to raise Greyhound type of Special Forces. Local people should be recruited and trained for this purpose. In addition, more CRPF battalions can be raised with young age profile, but tailor-made for counterinsurgency operations. Presently, military operations are urgently required in eight core districts that are worst affected. There is also pressing need to strengthen armories and laying IED-proof roads.

 

Vikram Singh: ‘LWE: UP Perspective’

The state of Uttar Pradesh is also affected by Naxalism despite being fertile. The main reason is rampant exploitation of the underprivileged. Maoists use this to propagate that the state is an “instrument of exploitation”. Through ‘Jan Adalats’, they conduct summary trials. Police informers are prime targets. Naxal violence, however, has of late come down in the state. Not a single encounter has been recorded in the last one year. We recognise that ‘fake encounters’ do more harm than good. We have given more priority to human rights aspect of the issue. We have also implemented with success ‘community policing’ and vocational training to the surrendered Naxals. Redressal of grievances at the local level has improved to a greater extent. 

 

More significantly, we act symbiotically with other states and Central paramilitary forces. Overall, we are not defensive on LWE. However, in the long run, we need to have a Special Force to take on Maoists in case they intensify their operations. In such a force, due importance needs to be given to both experience and youthfulness. However, lack of resources has been one of the major constraints confronted by the state police. 

 

Rahul Bhonsle: ‘Impact of Maoist Revolution in Nepal on India’

‘Revolution’ in Nepal is not yet complete. There is difference of opinion among the higher leadership of Nepalese Maoists on “democratic transformation”. Integration of ‘People’s Liberation Army’ (PLA) of Maoists with Royal Nepal Army (RNA) is yet another problem confronted by the interim government. Currently, state power is very limited in Nepal. Indian Maoists have many similarities with their Nepali counterparts. Nepali Maoists, in fact, drew inspiration from Indian Naxals. 

 

Part of CCOMPOSA (Coordinating Committee of Maoist Parties and Organisations of South Asia), Indian and Nepalese Maoists have excellent network and share common grounds. Leadership of Nepali Maoists attended the 9th Congress of Indian Maoists held in January 2007. Maoists of Nepal have called for “new relations” with India after coming to power through the ballot. At the same time, they continue to share bonds with the Indian Maoists. This is a dangerous trend, which would facilitate “Extended Revolutionary Zone” from Pashupati to Tirupati as planned by the Naxals. 

 

· Younger population is an asset, but only as long as we can create adequate jobs for everyone. This may not be a possibility as it involves creation of one billion jobs in the next 10 years.

 

· Naxals have links with other Indian militant groups. But it is dangerous if they have links with Islamic militants patronised by the ISI. Countering such an ‘alliance of evil’ would be strenuous. 

 

· Unfortunately, CPMFs in Jharkhand and Chhatisgarh are used mostly for VIP security rather than for operations against Naxals. Such an unhealthy trend may demoralise well trained security personnel.

 

· Interrogation of surrendered/captured Naxals revealed that retired/serving army jawans are involved in training of Maoists. They, however, may be involved out of threat and not due to ideological reasons.

 

· Army will be asked to deploy if situation goes out of control. But, as of now chances of army involvement are low. The affected states are not keen for army’s role. Even if the army is involved, it may not be possible for it to sanitise all the Naxal areas.

 

The two-day conference was well attended and generated immense interest as the younger officers were not fully aware of the larger implications of LWE. It is necessary to sensitise the environment to this emerging challenge. 

 

(Report prepared by N Manoharan Senior Fellow, CLAWS)