Iran Analysis: A Net Assessment

The Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) organised a round-table on “Iran Analysis: A Net Assessment” on November 25, 2008 at the CLAWS campus. The round-table was attended by a select gathering comprising Iran experts from the Army and Air Force and members of the strategic community. The seminar was chaired by Maj Gen G D Bakshi (Retd). 

 

 

Brig Gurmeet Kanwal, Director CLAWS, opened the proceedings by apprising the audience of the project assigned to CLAWS to undertake a Net Assessment on Iran. CLAWS has formed a task force of three members to undertake this project:

 

· Maj Gen GD Bakshi (Retd)

· Brig Rahul Bhonsle (Retd)

· Dr Monika Chansoria

 

Brig Kanwal stressed that the basic aim of the round-table was to discuss the outline of the task assigned to CLAWS and at the same time fine tune the assessment, which would be crucial in the outcome of the study. This also includes studying Iranian force projections into the future, geopolitics etc.

 

 

Maj Gen GD Bakshi (Retd) started out by giving a brief outline of the Net Assessment. Maj Gen Bakshi said that the team had modified the format of a traditional Net Assessment and was doing an analytical study of the existing patterns and trends vis-à-vis Iran that including the following:

 

· Identification of the key drivers

· Trends

· Understanding both regional and global dynamics

· Discontinuities, wild cards and finally;

· Suggesting alternative future scenarios  

 

 

The discussion that followed the appraisal by the Chair included a range of issues concerning Iran. The ‘Israel factor’ would be crucial to analyse. Iran-China ties and which way they are heading is another significant issue that the study would cover. In addition, the Gulf countries have spent nearly $17 billion dollars in arms purchases in the recent years. Could these figures be seen in connection with Iran’s nuclear pursuit?

 

Regional as well as global dynamics were discussed and the impact of the Barack Obama administration on the future of Iranian-US ties was taken into account. Which way are the US-Iran relations heading? One possible scenario is where the US might be seen to agree to talk to Iran in order to stop the Russians from doing so. Diplomacy is the best option that the US will be keen to exercise. Diplomacy will in all likelihood extend all the way to Iran through Iraq. The Obama administration would want to keep war as the last and final option since the cost of the war with Iran is something that the Americans would not want to bear at least given the rising proportions of the global financial meltdown. Moreover, the Iranians would block the crucial Gulf of Hormuz in such a scenario. In fact, “boots on the ground” policy for Iran is an absolute no-no for the Americans at this point. If it were only naval aviation and cruise missile attacks then probably there would have been no holding back for the US.  

 

Another important issue discussed was whether there was an overt threat to Israel’s existence when it came to the Iranian nuclear programme. The Israelis are keeping a close tab on the nuclear developments in Iran and have been reportedly conducting massive air exercises in the recent past. The American support is obvious given that the Israelis would need to use Iraqi airspace and they are in close dialogue with the Pentagon on the same.

 

The role of the European Union (EU) would be significant since the EU would want to take credit of brokering some sort of negotiated settlement and emerge higher in the world order. India, on the other hand too would want to be a part of the negotiations with Iran just like China had done during the protracted North Korean nuclear crisis. Can India perform the role of an honest broker and gain leverage on both sides in this case?

 

Another important aspect is to do a stake analysis on Iran. This would include understanding India’s stakes in Iran and vice versa. As a matter of fact, Afghanistan and Iran are two key strategic sources that India should be looking towards for natural gas reserves. There was also a discussion on the role of the religious and political institutions within Iran and how they would play out in the future. It seems clear that the aim of the central Iranian leadership is to ensure that Tehran remains the centre of gravity in the Middle East. 

 

The stakes for India are rather high when it comes to Iran. India views Iran as its land window to Afghanistan. Also, India gets almost 60% of its oil from the Gulf; 7.5% of the total imports come from Iran. Energy security is one of the most crucial factors that we need to analyse in detail. Moreover, closer ties with Iran give India the option to engage the Central Asian region for trade purposes. However, it would be extremely difficult for India to compete with China for trade when it comes to Central Asian region since China has easy access to Central Asia through the Xinjiang region. Therefore in terms of distance and travel costs, India stands to lose out. Thus, there is a need to create an alternative land route corridor to the sea via Iran to ensure that India develops influence and at the same time curtails Pakistan’s leverage.

 

The domestic political factor also compels India to engage Iran closely since India has the second highest Muslim Shia population after Iran in the world and this would impact upon the domestic political calculations within India. Clearly, any type of further destabilisation of the Middle East region would not be in India’s favour.

 

In addition, should India hold joint exercises with Iran to gain leverage? A very crucial factor here would be India’s relationship with the US and also with Israel that could be the strongest stumbling block towards the same. Or else, India could undertake service to service cooperation between the two countries. This could include exchange of course vacancies, anti-terrorism exercises like India does in case of China, short capsule courses for the higher command to get a feel of the military personalities, narcotics and crime control training and United Nations training vacancies. Moreover, Iranians cadets could visit IMA, NDA as cadets for training since it used to happen earlier but not anymore. In the field of Air Force, there could be joint exercises and understanding on certain commonalties such as Russian equipment like Mig-29. In fact, till 2003, the Iranians undertook joint naval exercises with the Indian Navy and there could be considerations to renew that. The two navies could hold joint exercises to counter the Somali piracy threat. Another significant reason for India to deal with Iran could be to enhance capability for force projection.

 

 

The CLAWS Net Assessment team took note of the above discussion and would take into account the factors featured above while arriving at conclusions and making recommendations.                 

 

(Report prepared by Dr. Monika Chansoria, Research Fellow, CLAWS)