June 08, 2009
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By Centre for Land Warfare Studies |
The Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) organised a round table discussion on 'Post-LTTE Sri Lanka: The Way Ahead’ at the CLAWS Conference Room on 8 June 2009. The discussion was chaired by Mr P R Chari, Research Professor, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies. The panellists who made presentations were Maj Gen Ashok Mehta (Retd.), Mr Nitin Gokhale (Defence Editor, NDTV), Mr M R Narayan Swamy (News Editor, IANS), Mr Rajesh Sundaram (Headlines Today), Dr N Manoharan (Senior Fellow, CLAWS) and Prof P Sahadevan (Jawaharlal Nehru University). The round-table was attended by a select gathering of officers and members of the strategic community. Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd), Director, CLAWS, welcomed the participants and pointed out that recent counter-insurgency efforts, both in Sri Lanka and north-west Pakistan, have relied on excessive use of military force and we need to consider whether this is an emerging trend. He also expressed his hope that the Sri Lankan government will put in requisite effort to win the peace, now that the war against the LTTE had been won. Opening Remarks: P R Chari What has happened in Sri Lanka is an epochal event. The Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa achieved this victory despite immense pressure from the international community to exercise restraint, especially on human rights violations. He fought his own war and tried to bring a Sri Lankan solution to a Sri Lankan problem. What can be learnt from the Sri Lankan experience? What are the lessons the recently concluded military operations offer? Can we make liberal use of air power for counter-insurgency operations? What should be India’s new policy towards Sri Lanka? Should we act as advisors? Should we be participatory or continue with a ‘hands-off’ approach? How should India accommodate Tamil Nadu politics in the present context? The round-table is an extremely timely one in looking for answers to these questions in addition to many others. Military Lessons from Eelam War IV: Ashok Mehta How the Eelam War IV was won is a fascinating story. Presently, full details of the war are not available. It was indeed a spectacular military victory, but achieved at a tremendous human cost. The victory was a result of perfect integration of political, military and diplomatic resources. The last such comprehensive military victory over insurgency was achieved in Malaya. The Sri Lankan government demonstrated that since LTTE was never interested in a negotiated settlement, use of force was the only available option. The government successfully exploited the global ‘war on terror’ to its advantage, calling the war a humanitarian operation. The main military lesson that flows from Sri Lanka is application of force at the right place at the right time. There was unprecedented politico-military resolve on the part of the Rajapakse regime. Unlike in the past the military had all the resources it needed. The operation took place in three phases: Mavilaru crisis (2006), fall of Kilinochchi (January 2009), and final operations that ended on 19 May 2009. There was a conscious switch in military strategy, the government forces adopting guerrilla warfare mode. On the other hand, the LTTE naively adhered to conventional fighting. Innovative tactics like use of ‘deep penetration units’ were resorted to by the Sri Lankan military, which unbelievably transformed into a formidable force over a period of time. Countries like China and Pakistan actively aided Sri Lanka’s offensive against the LTTE. Armaments flooded Sri Lanka from all over the world. Air power was used effectively to break the infrastructure and resolve of the Tigers. Crippling of ‘Sea Tigers’, especially with the assistance of the Indian Navy, incapacitated the LTTE further. Initially, ‘strategy of attrition’ was pursued; later liberation of territory was completed. The veil of secrecy was thrown on military operations by severe restrictions on media coverage. Lessons from Sri Lanka cannot be blindly templated elsewhere, however. Military Operations and the Media: Nitin Gokhale All along the LTTE had used the media successfully and the IPKF and the Sri Lankan military had lagged behind in ‘psy war’. The Tigers also used the Tamil diaspora effectively. However, this time the Sri Lankan military adopted the same strategy. Colombo was tough on the media by placing blanket restrictions on access to battle zones. Local media was the first victim. Next, NGOs were expelled from the north-east as the government suspected them of being major sources of information for the Western media. Visa procedures for journalists were tightened. In short, a firewall was created on war reporting. Simultaneously, the government set-up an organisation called Media Centre for National Security (MCNS) for single point communications with the media. No operational details were shared except in a controlled manner. This was a good move, which India should adopt in a crisis situation like 26/11. However, what is not worth emulating is the way the media was intimidated and controlled. During the period of operations, 14 journalists were killed; 20 fled the country; many were silenced by threats. At the same time, all pro-LTTE media, websites and blogs were barred. Simultaneously, the government catered for information hungry media through an information-rich website. But, only the government perspective was available. The way ahead will be a challenge for the Sri Lanka media. There is a clear divide in the media as a result of the conflict. This should be bridged. Also, the government for its own good has to learn to tolerate dissent. It should throw open all Tamil-dominated areas to the media at least in a phased manner. A war-like situation cannot be allowed to remain forever. Way Ahead for Political Resolution: M R Narayan Swamy The LTTE has now been decimated. The defeat was mainly due to Prabhakaran’s authoritarian way of functioning. Unfortunately, the Tigers never acted as a political force. They either silenced or subjugated other Tamil political voices. LTTE mistakenly thought that Eelam was possible and obdurately pursued it. However, the Tamil community gained nothing even after 30 years of armed struggle and loss of over 90,000 lives. LTTE is responsible for the present sorry state of affairs of Tamils, who have been humiliated more than ever before. There are moves to bring a political package on the lines of 13th Amendment of the Constitution. But what is required is 13th Amendment plus. The psyche of leadership in Colombo, however, is dominated by triumphalism. The prevalent view is, since the LTTE has been defeated, the ethnic issue is no more relevant. As a result, the unit of devolution for Tamils has become smaller. There are other problems in the 13th Amendment like land, finance and police. Given these facts, what the Tamils will get will be 13th Amendment minus. Post-LTTE a new equation is emerging on the Tamil side. The Tamil National Alliance (TNA) that won previous parliamentary elections with LTTE’s help will find it difficult to repeat the performance. Some of the dissenters may come back to the Tamil United Liberation Front’s (TULF) fold. Along with other Tamil groups, the Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) and People’s Liberation Organisation for Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), they may form a loose alliance to fight future elections. Yet, Sri Lanka’s Parliament will be dominated by Sinhalese. There are numerous challenges ahead. LTTE: Will it Rise Again?: Rajesh Sundaram Some of the LTTE cadres, who managed to sneak through the cordon weaved by the military during operations, are at large now. Reportedly, 500 LTTE cadres are left, but scattered all over the north-east led by ‘Col’ Ram. In addition, there are unaccounted number of ‘sleeper cells’ in the south waiting to strike. The intelligence wing of LTTE has not been fully neutralised. The Tiger intelligence chief Pottu Amman could possibly have escaped since his death has not been confirmed. Provisionally, LTTE international wing chief, Kumaran Pathmanathan (“KP”), has taken over the leadership of Tigers. He has assured Ram of continued supplies. Simultaneously, he declared that the LTTE would continue to fight for the rights of the Tamils, but through democratic means. He called for Muslims and plantation Tamils to come to the LTTE’s fold. The main issue, however, is that “KP” does not have a charisma like Prabhakaran. Fearing slaughter, those LTTE cadres, who wish to start a fresh life after surrender, are stepping back. The LTTE’s future now depends a lot on the Tamil diaspora. Also fertile grounds for militancy will exist as long as grievances exist. Yet, the Tigers may not be the same as before. Resolving the Humanitarian Crisis: N. Manoharan Resolving the prevailing humanitarian crisis is vital for both military and political reasons. Military success is not complete without tending to humanitarian problems. At the same time, if the humanitarian crisis remains unaddressed, it will be difficult to arrive at a meaningful and lasting political solution for the ethnic issue. About 300,000 people, once trapped in the conflict, are now displaced living in various camps in the north-east. There are severe shortages of essentials like food, medicine, water, clothes and living space in relief camps. Someone or the other is killed or missing in every family. Because of stringent screening procedures to filter out possible LTTE cadres, harassments are prevalent in these camps. Above all, they are “beyond the protection of law”. The Sri Lankan government has put forward a “180-day plan” to resettle all the IDPs. The pace of demining and construction of basic infrastructure, however, is not appreciable. There is also no serious thinking on providing means of livelihood to the resettled IDPs. This is where the international community including India can help Sri Lanka in providing requisite resources, but channelled directly to the beneficiaries. On priority basis, recognising professionalism, experience and resources of humanitarian agencies, Colombo should allow them free access to IDP camps. Suspicion of their links with the LTTE is needless and exaggerated. External Dimension and Strategic Implications: P. Sahadevan: The international component in the Sri Lankan military victory is significant. Things started changing after 9/11. Sri Lanka exploited this effectively by weaving a ‘safety net’ against the LTTE. As a result, as many as 31 important countries proscribed the Tigers. LTTE got isolated and their supply lines got affected. At the same time, Colombo boosted its military supplies. China topped the list of military donors; Pakistan, Israel, Russia, and Ukraine also chipped in. The US initially provided military assistance, but later backed out citing human rights violations. On its part, India granted non-lethal military armaments. Partly due to pressure from the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora, some Western countries turned critical of Sri Lankan military operations citing human rights violations. The legitimacy of Sri Lanka’s offensive was questioned since they lacked the moral ground in dealing with the ethnic issue. They even went to the extent of taking up the issue at the United Nations. Sri Lanka, however, overcame this with the help of countries like China, India, Pakistan and Russia. Nevertheless, Colombo should open itself for enquiry on human rights abuses instead of talking of “inviolable sovereignty”. Sovereignty is not a blank cheque, but carries more responsibilities. The military victory that was achieved was through huge human costs. This is not a good example to emulate. India should have taken a firmer moral stand on the military approach by the Rajapakse regime. Instead, it tilted towards the Sri Lankan state without even taking into consideration sentiments in Tamil Nadu. India did not gain much by adopting such a stance. The Sinhalese may not be of much help to India strategically. They are likely to tilt more towards China. Discussion The following salient points came to the fore during the general discussion: • Defence Cooperation Agreement between India and Sri Lanka did not take-off mainly because of the former’s vacillation. It, however, lost its relevance in the post-LTTE situation. (Report compiled by Dr N Manoharan, Senior Fellow, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi) |
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