September 24, 2010
1740
By Centre for Land Warfare Studies |
General A CLAWS Fellows’ Seminar on “China: Military Modernisation and Strategy,” was organised at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) on 24 September 2010. The seminar was chaired by Air Cmde Jasjit Singh, AVSM, VrC, VM (Retd), Director, Centre for Air Power Studies. Dr. Monika Chansoria, Senior Fellow, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, presented her two-year project study to be culminated as a book on the subject. The discussants were Maj Gen Sheru Thapliyal, SM (Retd) and Prof Srikanth Kondapalli, Chinese Studies, JNU. Opening Remarks: Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd), Director CLAWS China is displaying a great degree of belligerence that was not visible a decade ago. This can be attributed to the modernisation of China’s PLA. There was a quantitative gap between China and India till recently and now this gap is becoming a qualitative gap as well. Given the infrastructure development in Tibet, a minor border incident has the potential to escalate into a larger conflict. And with China’s robust military modernisation campaign and double-digit defence budget growth, India is likely to be placed in a position of military disadvantage. Air Cmde Jasjit Singh, AVSM, VrC, VM (Retd) Military modernisation cannot be seen in isolation from economic modernisation, and both go hand-in-hand. This aspect needs to seep in the decision-making process. The emerging international environment today forms a strategic triangle of which the two obvious participants are the US and China; empirically speaking, India should be the third power forming this triangle. What we need to look into is where China is heading especially in light of the fact that as a nation, China has been far ahead of India since the past decades. It was in 1996 that the Chinese government passed a law that reunification was the sacred duty of the PLA. We need to question whether that duty ends with Taiwan, or does it go any further? Arunachal Pradesh is well-entrenched in the Chinese thinking and strategy and India should not be complacent about that. In this regard, India also needs to increasingly focus upon logistics infrastructure in the border areas. This has been visible in the official Defence White Papers which have spelt out the strategy of active border wars. In today’s date, the Indian Air Force will prevail over the PLA Air Force given that even though PLAAF stands way ahead, however, in terms of professional capability of its personnel, the IAF holds the edge. Dr Monika Chansoria A facet that stands opposed to vociferous Chinese claims of a ‘peaceful rise’ is the robust military modernisation that the PLA has undertaken since the past decades. The entire debate centering on China’s ‘peaceful rise’ is meant for public consumption. Beijing has chosen to undertake swift and robust modernisation of the PLA by planning to make up for its poor hardware capabilities while at the same time enhancing abilities to wage asymmetric warfare in the space, cyber-space and information warfare domains. The post-1991 Gulf War period witnessed the Chinese leadership take note of the rapidly changing nature of modern warfare. As a response, the leadership of the PLA set upon a path of reform aimed at building a more professional force in a corporate and institutional sense, and a more capable force in the operational sense. The Chinese White Paper on national defence issued in 2004, stated that the objective of the PLA was to win local wars under the conditions of informationisation. The 2010 Annual Pentagon Report on the Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China underlines this Chinese emphasis on the concept of informationisation which would enable integrated joint operations that require integration of the entire PLA with common information systems. The primary obstacles acknowledged by the Chinese military leadership in realisation of integrated joint operations at the moment include: In an effort to rectify this existential paucity, the PLA reportedly is undergoing robust training for integrated joint operations on future battlefields. In line with the strategic requirements of high mobility operations and three-dimensional assault, the PLA has been moving from regional defence to trans-regional mobility. The units are becoming small, modular and multi-functional in organisation through appropriate downsizing and structural reform. While accelerating the development of aviation, light mechanised and information counter-measure forces, it is giving priority to the development of tactical missiles, surface-to-air missiles and special operations forces, so as to increase its capabilities for land-air integrated operations, long-distance manoeuvres, rapid assault and special operations. The PLA has chosen to justify pre-emptive military action at the operational and tactical level under the guise of a ‘defensive posture’ at the strategic level. The Chinese doctrinal concept of “active defence” (jiji fangyu) thus, could be interpreted as a tactic of employing the weak against the strong. Although stated to be defensive in purpose, the doctrine seeks to take the initiative and stay on the offensive from a conflict’s earliest stages in order to bring hostilities to a swift and more importantly, a favorable conclusion. The concept is in concurrence with the doctrine that puts a premium on surprise, pre-emption, indirect/asymmetrical confrontation and concentrated strikes on the most critical platforms and capabilities of the adversary, particularly its C4I2SR systems, and on high-value psychological targets. The effort is to overwhelm and undermine the adversary’s will to resist during the early stages of conflict. Thus, the focus on anti-access, area-denial strategies, procuring platforms with the capability and intention to deter, prevent or complicate the intervention of the US (and/or others) in a Taiwan-like scenario. From an Indian stand point, the scenario is applicable to a Tibet-like situation. China’s force structure for long-distance air and naval operations is consistent with a limited regional force projection capability. The production of conventional missiles and upgrading the quality and survivability of China’s nuclear arsenal from silo-based to road-mobile and from liquid-fueled to solid-fueled, accentuates PLA’s aim to render its strategic nuclear forces as more survivable and hence provide a far more credible deterrent. Realising the shortcomings in inter-service cooperation and actual experience in joint exercises and combat operations, the Chinese leadership appears to be stressing more upon asymmetric strategies to leverage China’s advantages while exploiting the perceived vulnerabilities of potential opponents, for e.g., the counter-space and cyber warfare programmes. As computer technology increasingly integrates itself into modern military organisations, including the PLA, military planners shall assign it the twin role of being both a target and a weapon. Cyber forces are most likely to be integrated into an overall battle strategy as part of a combined arms campaign. China’s negotiating strategy is to resolve the dispute when the Chinese are in a much stronger position in terms of comprehensive national strength so that they could bargain from a position of strength—an instance is Beijing’s strengthening of its military capabilities and infrastructure development in Tibet. PLA’s larger aim is that of radically boosting rapid military deployment in the border areas with India. Would enhance China’s military capability and enable Chinese coercive diplomacy especially with regards to the border dispute with India. Maj Gen Sheru Thapliyal, SM (Retd) The PLA realised that modernising its military had become inevitable in wake of Gulf War I—which eventually became the catalyst for its military modernisation campaign. China’s thrust areas of modernisation have been the strategic forces, navy and air force with heavy defence budget allocations with every passing year. China’s intent as it formulates its strategy is one in which it envisions a multi-polar world and a uni-polar Asia. India needs to take serious note of its lagging logistics mechanism and infrastructure in the border areas which have been neglected. Significantly, the armed forces have to be made a part of the policy formulation, especially while formulation of India’s China policy. Prof Srikanth Kondapalli The PLA is greatly driven by strategy. There needs to be a wider understanding that Chinese military strategy is not a defensive one but an offensive one. It is a strategy that is tailored in a sense to go well beyond the enemy lines of communications. The concept of ‘informationisation’ that the PLA is greatly emphasizing upon can be related to RMA-based warfare. However, the levels of information warfare platforms in the Chengdu and Lanzhou MR are very low. The campaign strategy of the PLA can be attributed to the lessons learnt from Gulf War I. As the higher ranks of the PLA advocate the military strategy of active defence, there is an understanding that is emerging that the PLA is less likely to enter a conflict unless and until it is absolutely confident of victory. Although, a lot of speculation has been raised regarding the rising Chinese defence budget, it is still too low in order to achieve full-spectrum dominance like the US military. China is focusing a lot on the levels of training including both tactical and technical training, with multiple platforms for training. Another area of focus are the modernisation levels vis-à-vis equipment which will further reflect upon their usage in future battlefield environments as China readies to confront Taiwan, Vietnam, Japan, South China Sea region or South Asia. From an Indian stand point, it is important to note as to how this equipment would be used in terms of future warfare. Another important facet is how China is coping up with all these technological advances despite the US embargoes. (Report prepared by Dr Monika Chansoria, Senior Fellow, CLAWS) |
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