July 18, 2009
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By Centre for Land Warfare Studies |
The Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), in association with the Centre for Air Power Studies (CAPS), the National Maritime Foundation (NMF), the Centre for Joint Warfare Studies (CENJOWS) and the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), organised a guest lecture by Air Cmde Jasjit Singh on the ‘Management of National Security’ on 18 July 2009. Admiral Arun Prakash (Retd), former Chief of Naval Staff and Chairman, National Maritime Foundation (NMF), chaired the proceedings. Marshal of the Air Force Arjan Singh, Air Chief Marshal O P Mehra (Retd), Mr K Subrahmanyam shared their experiences. While Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd), Director, CLAWS, welcomed the gathering, Air Vice Marshal Kapil Kak (Retd), Additional Director, CAPS, gave the concluding remarks. The event that held at Gulmohar Hall of the India Habitat Centre was attended by a large number of officers and members of the strategic community. Introductory Remarks: Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd) On behalf of the Directors of all the five think tanks, Brig Gurmeet Kanwal welcomed everyone. He mentioned that this is the first joint event of the five institutions and the large gathering signifies the importance of the subject and eminence of the speaker. We could not have found a better speaker on the subject of ‘Management of National Security’. The month of July also marks the 10th anniversary of the Kargil conflict. It would be appropriate to honour the memory of men who laid down their lives during the conflict by observing a minute’s silence. Chairperson’s Remarks: Admiral Arun Prakash (Retd) It is an honour to preside over this rare event put together for the first time by all the five think tanks. We will have a unique opportunity to hear Air Cmde Jasjit Singh speak on ‘Management of National Security’. He is one of the high priests of strategic thinking. In India, there is a yawning gap between the political establishment and the armed forces. As result, rarely have military mobilisations, battles or even wars been underpinned by political aims, implicit or explicit. Therefore, the main challenge confronting the Indian strategic thinker is to continue to toil in educating the strategic elite. Air Cmde Jasjit has been working in this field for over two decades. His well considered and objective views on a wide range of strategic issues have guided, shaped and influenced the thinking of a whole generation of Indians. He has always had the courage and conviction to put forth his views frankly. His accomplishments in national security deliberations in an environment where there are discernable efforts to keep the armed forces out of national security policy are laudable. The nation recognised his services by honouring him with Padma Bhushan. Guest Lecture: Air Cmde Jasjit Singh (Retd) Especially since the end of Cold War, the general definition of ‘security’ has expanded. Almost everything now comes under security. The first thing, therefore, is to ask ourselves what we are trying to secure. There is an internationally accepted definition of National Security: protection of core values, and protection and sustaining of vital national interests. I’m going to confine myself to these two aspects. Military power is the ultimate instrument available to the state. If its salience is reduced one has to find a magic formula to find security otherwise. Although the military has been downgraded in India over a period of time, we rely on the same instrument to keep domestic safety and security. This is a strange paradox. India has moved from a very poor to an increasingly affluent country, although in sections. We are transforming from a very stratified, rigid society into a more egalitarian system. How did this happen? What are the Core Values of India? If our Core Values are threatened, then India’s security is threatened. The Preamble of our Constitution lists them down. That is why our armed forces talk of defending the Constitution. But, do we have consensus on our Core Values which were enshrined in the Constitution in 1950? We should have a debate on these issues, especially in think tanks. Our Core Values like liberty, equality, fraternity etc. boil down to one single idea i.e. every human being is equal. What are our vital interests? They are obviously sovereignty, integrity and prosperity of more than a billion people. Military is the ultimate instrument to protect vital interests like sovereignty and territorial integrity. Nuclear weapons complicate India’s security in many ways; complications to which we have not been able to find an answer. This is not to say that we should not have nuclear weapons. But, nuclear disarmament, if it is global, is in India’s security interests. We must, therefore, work rigorously for a comprehensive nuclear disarmament. Right assessment of strategic landscape in which it exists is important for any country. The world was never bipolar. Bipolarity during the Cold War was confined to Euro-Atlantic barring few countries in East Asia. Immediately after the Cold War, it was opined that it was unipolar, but not the whole world was part of it. The future world is going to be poly-centric in which old and new centres of power and asymmetry of power within each group and between groups will be evident. International centres of powers are shifting from West to East. Nehru observed this way back in the 1940s. In the mid-18th Century, India and China together accounted for nearly 60 percent of world’s manufacturing industrial output. Industrial revolution in Europe changed this. Now there is a power shift as India and China are rising. China has, from the beginning, consolidated its core and extended its periphery. Now, it is in the process of consolidating its periphery and further extending its influence to outer periphery like Africa and Latin America. The goal is to become one of the frontline empires of the world. To complete its rise, China needs a period of peace. Three countries – US, China and India – are going to be the security drivers of the future world. To look at defence aspect of security is important. What will be nature of future wars? How are we going to win that war? Unfortunately, there is disjunction between different ministries. A decade ago I was part of the Task Force to look at national security and provide to the government a blue print. We asked the experts why we need a National Security Council. All came to three basic conclusions: no long-term planning was being undertaken on security, there was no reliable national intelligence system, and decisions taken are not coordinated and not monitored. The Task Force, therefore, in its report recommended creating a system to address these three basic lacunae. We found that none of the key Indian ministries looked at the future except the Ministry of External Affairs that too was not effective most of the times. In defence, there is a Perspective Planning Directorate, but that is within the Services rather than as a division of MoD. Home Ministry does not have a long term projection on terrorism. Ongoing crises take away all the energies of the Government of India. What we need urgently is a Strategic Planning Division for every key ministry. For this purpose, demand for National Security Council (NSC) started to grow in this country ever since the 1980s. Finally in 1990, the government set up a NSC, but allowed it to lapse in a year. In 1998, a Task Force was set up to look into the issue. The Task Force made some recommendations, but, what was finally set up was a NSC similar to that of 1990. We do not have an exclusive body for National Intelligence Assessment. The time has come for the government to set up fresh body to review the NSC system. Major issues should be seriously looked at. Thinking can take place in think tanks. But think tanks can only provide inputs and the policy must be made only in respective ministries. If the think tanks are taken seriously by respective ministries for policy inputs, then the NSC can function in a more synergetic manner. There is a need to create independent think tanks. New Delhi requires at least a minimum of 30 think tanks. We inherited many things from the British including the management of Defence. In UK and US, each service has a minister/secretary. What is the state of India’s higher defence organisation? It is difficult to put it on a chart. We do not have a Cabinet Committee on Defence. For various reasons, there was opposition and apprehension to creation of an integrated ministry of defence. Now, it is going to be far more difficult if we try to set it up mainly because of tensions in civil-military relations and incompatability of cadre upgrades in services and their civilian counterparts. Therefore, without necessary reforms in the system the CDS will not work. It is difficult to accept that there is no jointness in the Services. All three Services fought jointly as and when required. There is a severe shortage of weapons and equipment in Services. Yet, we are sending back crores of rupees unspent to the Exchequer. Despite being professional and efficient, our armed forces will win future wars at a heavy cost due to lack of proper long-term defence planning. The right kind of victory is defeating the enemy strategy, which was in fact done by all the great military leaders in history. But there is a decline of Indian military power and strategy. India’s national deterrence has failed although our nuclear deterrence is credible. Pakistan’s covert military strategy using irregulars starting from 1947 is very evident. We have space to apply force – punitive force with the intention of changing policies not in Islamabad, but in Rawalpindi. It may take time, but we have to do it. There is desire for a deep strike strategy. As a concept it is brilliant. Butt, what is lacking is sufficient political will. Pakistan has been strengthening its air force since the Kargil debacle. That has its own implications. Admiral Arun Prakash (Retd) The thinking that the military has lost its salience is based on the belief that guns and butter are mutually exclusive. This is not true. We cannot have development unless we are fully secured. Although we are a nuclear power, we have failed to create a functional command and control system to make it truly effective. We have to get our act together to attain great power status. What we need is a permanent Chiefs of Staff Committee. In the present arrangement, the tenures are very short for them to understand the entire scope of things. The main aspect is to coordinate not to control. The advice of Services on defence matters is not utilised properly. There is a distinct gap between the political leadership and the men in uniform. It is about time to constitute a multi-party body of parliamentarians to look into reforms in the national security management. Discussion • In the first innings of the UPA government we saw a decline in security both in Pakistan and north-eastern fronts. Politico-underground nexus that exists in states like Assam and Manipur has negated whatever the Army has been doing. There is a softening of stance vis-à-vis Pakistan. Also two-thirds of our country is under the influence of Naxals. However, there is severe shortage of policemen to meet these threats all over the country. • Naxalism is a major internal security issue; it a threat to our sovereignty. We need to go into the root causes instead of addressing it just as a law and order issue. It came to the fore because there is a gap between the rich and the poor. There is a deadly combination between motivation and availability of weapons and information. While there is a law and order component, what is urgently required is an equitable socio-economic development. The difference between the Army on the one hand and the paramilitary and state forces on the other is the method of recruitment and initial training. The paramilitary forces can outsource their training to the Indian Army. In the next 10 years India will add another 100 million to its population. We have to find suitable employment for them in addition to the backlog that exists today. Naxals are reacting to inequity and disparities. We have to reverse that process. However, the system that is responsible for addressing this is not functioning properly. • Setting up of commissions or committees is a means to stall an issue. Delay in or failure of implementation of committee reports is yet another issue. Many of our national security ills will be taken care if the Group of Ministers Report on security is implemented in full. • The failure of deterrence – conventional or nuclear – lies in our organisational deficiencies. Our planning is adrift. Defence modernisation is standstill. Our defence management lacks coherence. National security is being jeopardised due to our lack of action. • We have to educate the decision makers on vital issues of national interest. Our deliberations are not going to the right quarters. The media can play a positive role, but they see the armed forces as a source of sensational news. We need perhaps to focus on parliamentarians and reach out to them. Intellectual power of the nation is important, but it has not been harnessed adequately. • There is a need to open government archives for the benefit of scholarly research. India has unfortunately not opened its archives since independence. At the same time, there is no other country whose defence is more transparent than India. But the information is available in various forms. We have to meticulously look for it. • Neighbourhood policy of India has been taken over by the Intelligence agencies. We appear to follow a strategy of ambiguity that helps only politicians and bureaucrats. It is convenient for the politicians to work with bureaucrats and police rather than with the armed forces. This is something we have to overcome in due course. Nowhere do all three Service Chiefs get together of their own. They have to fight for their own turfs. Also very little coordination exists between various departments and ministries of the government. Marshal of the Air Force Arjan Singh Air Cmde Jasjit Singh and K Subrahmanyam have done a great service in educating the public and the armed forces. Each Service still does not know much about the other. Despite various joint-Services institutions, inter-Services cooperation is missing. We cannot blame the system; we must also blame ourselves. We cannot change the system, but can reform ourselves. Air Chief Marshal O P Mehra (Retd) More than anybody else, we need to educate bureaucrats on defence matters. I hope Jasjit Singh will continue his endeavors in association with other think tanks in encouraging joint thinking. K Subrahmanyam Jasjit Singh became the Director of IDSA and continued for 14 years. He brought up IDSA during its turbulent and adolescent years. During my tenure only three outstanding scholars emerged from IDSA who made a mark in strategic studies. But during his period, several renowned experts emerged. This was a unique achievement. Air Vice Marshal Kapil Kak (Retd) All of us have benefited immensely from Air Cmde Jasjit’s talk. He has a rare combination of a bird’s eye view and a worm’s eye view. This makes his conceptualisation of issues brilliant. As a real strategist, he always thinks out of the box and comes out with scintillating insights. He is one of the few who advocates disarmament in India’s national interest. (Report compiled by Dr N Manoharan, Senior Fellow, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi) |
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