US Military Experience in Iraq

General

Capt Barret Bradstreet of the US Marine Corps delivered a talk on his experiences in Iraq and reflections on ‘the origins and future course of ideas and practices of Counterinsurgency by American forces’ at the CLAWS campus on 24 August 2010. Lt Gen VG Patankar, PVSM, UYSM, VSM (Retd), former GOC 15 Corps chaired the session. Maj Gen Dhruv Katoch, SM, VSM (Retd), Additional Director, CLAWS welcomed the participants to the discussion on a subject which the Indian Army has been engaged in for many decades.

Presentation by Capt Barret Bradstreet:

Initially, intellectuals in the United States did not come to grip with the nature of the conflict in Iraq. The debate was centered around institutional frameworks and specific resources required for Counterinsurgency operations (CI ops). US Military forces did not require a major switch in training, equipping profile or extensive knowledge of local language, etc to carry out operations and success could be achieved by limiting mishaps and errors. Both in Iraq and Afghanistan, local partners need to carry a heavy burden.

Ops in Iraq – 2004.  In 2004, the US forces had carried out operations in Anbar Province operating in divisional strength. Three Regimental Combat teams were deployed in the towns of Kamadi, Fallujah and Hadith. The bulk of the battalion strength was deployed outside the town, with one platoon in population centres stationed with the local police. In 2005, this pattern was changed where companies were co-located with police and army units in population centres to facilitate the rebuilding of Fallujah. Deep interaction with local units was the key to success. The ‘Hilla Sword’ units proved particularly effective in Iraq. Night operations carried out in Iraq proved equally effective. In Southern Iraq and especially Fallujah, the solution to IED/road side bombs lay in scattering the units. Earlier, main units located outside the towns were exposed to IED attacks while moving in to the towns, in response to a situation.

For a long time, the right balance between operations and civic action was not achieved. Massive infrastructure projects like building big border outposts and police stations were undertaken. But the civic work undertaken by both Marines and army companies with better oversights and no corruption were more effective with the civil population. In effect, the best practice is to eliminate the worst practices.

Debate over the US CI Doctrine. The United States Counterinsurgency doctrine was shelved for more than 20 years. There was an effort to purge the intellectual memory of the Vietnam war. The US Army Field Manual on Counterinsurgency has been written by several military scholars and scholars at Harvard and Princeton and is an attempt to close the doctrinal gap. One line of argument raging in the US is that Counterinsurgency is not especially complicated; it consists of stopping counter-productive process. Some of the basic paradoxes in COIN operations are:

o Sometimes, the more you protect your force, the less secure you may be.
o Sometimes, the more force is used, the less effective it is.
o The more successful you are, the less force you can use – and the more risk you must accept.
o Sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction.
o Some of the best weapons for COIN do not shoot.
o The host nation doing something tolerably is normally better than us doing it well.
o If a tactic works this week, it might not work next week. If it works in this province, it might not work in the next.
o Tactical success guarantees nothing.
o Many important decisions are not made by generals.

The critics advocate that involvement in Counterinsurgency operations distracts the US from grand strategic involvements. They forward the moral argument for the US not to intervene in the political affairs of other countries.

In Afghanistan, the US Forces were facing a completely different situation as the demographic profile is more rural and there are impediments such as drug trafficking, increasing influence of the Taliban over the population and differences with neighbouring countries. At the tactical level, the solution may lie in effective small team actions.

Discussion

• In Counterinsurgency, the approach should be to fight for winning the soul of the population. In Iraq, different sectarian affiliations of the population complicated matters. The botched-up operation in Fallujah in 2004 had caused tremendous destruction and civilian casualty.

• American forces operating overseas are governed by the Uniform code of Military Justice. Then there are lawyers on the staff of battalions. Hostile intent and hostile action has to be clearly defined for the use of deadly force.

• Although it is desirable to achieve an end-state but troops on the ground do not face any change in their situation by strategic decisions made at the higher levels. As General Mattis puts it, “It is important Marines, to stay in your lanes”, implying that for the soldier it is important to concern himself only with the task, mission and purpose at the squad level.

• There is no silver bullet to overcome challenging situations. This was brought to the fore when Laser destroyers proved ineffective against IEDs. Therefore it is important to avoid the ‘Man on the moon phenomenon” as far as the perception of US technological capabilities is concerned.

• There has to be a concerted balance between preaching and practice. Use of excessive force may lead to collateral damage and prove to be highly counter-productive. Still, there are only a handful of accounts where air power or heavy artillery caused heavy civilian casualties. In Iraq, the rules of air-delivered ordnance were less restrictive in the initial period of the operations.

• It is important to imbibe the lessons from Vietnam and Iraq. Although lessons from Vietnam changed from time to time, the common resolve was to not get involved into another Vietnam type situation.

• Private Military Corporations are a different kettle of fish altogether and are involved in a number of activities. More restrictions and checks need to be brought in on their activities.

Concluding Remarks by the Chairperson

Gen Patankar said that there was tremendous resonance in the situations facing both the US and Indian armies in Counterinsurgency. There are similarities such as the grid pattern of deployment, the concept of having mobile reserves and sallying forth in response to unfolding situations, etc. However, a basic difference lies in the use of minimum force in CI operations by the Indian Army. This earns it more respect and recognition with the local population. At the same time armies use weapons to their maximum effect for the safety of own troops. It is essential to never take a template of one place to another. Every area has its own peculiarities and challenges.

He concluded by reflecting upon the ethos of the Indian Army in Jammu and Kashmir where the troops operate with the adage,’Taqat aur Tehzeeb’, i.e., ‘Use strength against the evil, but do not use it across the board, understand and respect the local customs and traditions’. He also emphasised on the importance of  psychological operations and civic actions such as ‘Op Good Samaritan’ and ‘Op Sadhbhavana’ carried out by the Indian Army in the North East and J&K respectively.

Conclusion

Maj Gen Dhruv Katoch, SM, VSM (Retd), Additional Director, CLAWS wrapped up the proceeding by stating that the last is yet to be heard on the conflict in Sri Lanka and the tribal areas of Pakistan which are being touted as major military successes. Brute and excessive force employed by the armies in these operations may have brought in a military success but the cause of the problem continues to linger. He stated that the participants were enriched by Capt Bradstreet sharing his operational experiences in Iraq.

(Report compiled by Rohit Singh, Research Assistant, CLAWS)