February 26, 2009
1492
By Centre for Land Warfare Studies |
General Opening Remarks Brig Gurmeet Kanwal, Director CLAWS, opened the proceedings with a quote by Winston Churchill stating that China was a mystery wrapped inside an enigma. Although China is opening up, many facets still remain clouded in secrecy—a backdrop against which, the latest 2008 Chinese White Paper on National Defence needs to be viewed. China has been through a doctrinal transformation from ‘limited war under high tech conditions’ to conditions of ‘limited war under informationisation’. Although, the latest paper provides more information than the previously published White Papers, there still is considerable opacity in Chinese declarations, starting with the hidden defence budget figures. Brig Kanwal stressed that the basic aim of the round-table was to discuss the significant aspects in the latest Chinese White Paper on National Defence. Chair’s Remarks Dr Mohan Guruswamy stated that India knows that China aspires to be a regional as well as world player by 2030 and from an Indian point of view we still do not know how to deal with China. Citing the axis between Pakistan and China, he stressed the need for a similar relationship between the US and India, given the fact that there are numerous areas of shared and converging interests. However, the fact that China is also the largest trading partner of the US and India with its huge economy and foreign currency reserves cannot be ignored entirely. This calls for pursuing an engagement policy. Dr Monika Chansoria Dr Monika Chansoria, Research Fellow, CLAWS, made the first presentation outlining the significant aspects of the 2008 Chinese White Paper on National Defence. The People’s Republic of China has come out with its Sixth White Paper on National Defence coming thus far from an initially sketchy outline in 1998. The latest White Paper provides previously unreleased information and reflects new changes to the previous editions. For instance, the current edition includes developments in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Army, Navy, Air Force and the Second Artillery Force organised by separate chapters rather than grouped into the same chapter like previous editions. Maintaining that integrated joint operations are the way of the future, the PLA has established an army equipment system with high mobility and three-dimensional assault, a naval equipment system with integrated sea-air capabilities for offshore defensive operations, an air force equipment system with integrated air-land capabilities for both offensive and defensive operations, a surface-to-surface missile equipment system for the Second Artillery Force with both nuclear and conventional missiles, and an electronic information equipment system featuring systems integration and joint development. Although China “is still confronted with long-term, complicated and diverse security threats and challenges,” the Chinese leadership believes that “China’s security situation has improved steadily.” The White Paper also carries a word of caution in that China is facing “the superiority of the developed countries in economy, science and technology, as well as military affairs.” More importantly, China “also faces strategic maneuvers and containment from the outside.” China continues to reiterate that its defence policy is purely defensive in nature, although it contradicts itself to state that it implements a “military strategy of active defence.” China has formulated a military strategic guideline of active defence for the 21st century. This active defence guideline includes four components: winning local wars in conditions of informationisation; emphasising the prevention and deterrence of crises and wars; enhancing the capabilities to counter various security threats; and setting up a logistical mechanism of military mobilisation and civilian-based economy, science, technology, information and transportation mobilisation. China also has strategised plans to “lay a solid foundation” in its endeavour towards “national defence and armed forces building,” complete mechanisation process and make significant progress towards informationisation by 2020. Training has been given particular emphasis in augmenting the overall fighting capabilities of the forces. Logistics reform is yet another highlighted area in which up-gradation of the logistics support and deepening the logistics reform has been identified as important objectives. The leadership clearly sees the crucial importance of this in achieving tri-service integration and jointness in their operations. The 2008 White Paper has laid added emphasis on the navy. It says, “in line with the off-shore defence strategy, the navy takes informationisation as the orientation and strategic priority of its modernisation drive and is endeavouring to build a strong navy”. Thus, increased number of Chinese naval vessels plying in the Indian Ocean and using Pakistan’s Gwadar deep-sea port, built by the Chinese, could be in waiting. In addition, a port or berthing facilities in Myanmar could be a reality in the near future. Significantly, the new Chinese naval base in Sanya on the Hainan Island could house a large fleet of surface warships and also serve as an underground base for submarines. In efforts to attain strategic outreach, this location indeed is critical as it will let China extend greater influence in the South China Sea area, allowing it greater access to the critical Straits of Malacca and enable larger naval presence closer to important sea lanes. Most importantly, the White Paper underlines that Beijing’s threat perception in the Taiwan Strait has been greatly reduced. The White Paper, however, explicitly said that China’s military capabilities would continue to grow even as the Taiwan issue thaws, verifying that a Chinese national security strategy looking beyond Taiwan is taking shape. While not pointing a finger at the United States, it has indirectly condemned the United States as its major adversary. China publicly warns the US for its arms sales to Taiwan and claims that this will cause “serious harm to Sino-US relations as well as peace and stability across the Taiwan Straits.” In addition to the United States, Beijing lists separatist forces such as those supporting “Taiwan independence,” “East Turkistan independence” and “Tibet independence” as threats to China’s “unity and security.” The White Paper claims that Beijing has succeeded in thwarting “Taiwan independence” from seeking “de jure Taiwanese independence.” Therefore, while China reiterates that it is separatism—in Taiwan, East Turkistan and Tibet—that are key challenges, its concepts of warfare and capability up-gradation go well beyond meeting these challenges—thus reaffirming the Chinese intention of becoming a global power by the middle of the century. Foreign Delegate The second speaker of the afternoon highlighted the developments, reassurances and remaining uncertainties in the 2008 White Paper. This paper has been nearly three weeks late in comparison to the earlier editions and comes in with a broader change in China’s research capabilities of conducting military operations other than war (MOOTW) such as UN Peacekeeping Operations and anti-piracy missions etc. The paper is more externally focussed. A strategic shift can be seen in that there is equal emphasis on land forces that are being considered at par with the Air Force and Navy for the first time. The border forces are essentially internally focussed. Significantly, the PLA Air Force has undergone key transformation and is fast developing capabilities for both offensive and defensive operations—initially it did not have this strategy. However, there are many uncertainties as well. China has chosen not to comment on the ASAT test of January 2007. There is an asymmetry vis-à-vis PRC’s national budget with both the figures quoted by them and further no breakup of the defence budget among the services of the PLA. The data provided by the PRC is rather unambiguous and it does not go into sufficient details. The White Paper fails to accept military alliances and states that it would ‘oppose’ any future military alliance. Interestingly, the 2008 Paper thrice mentions ‘mine warfare.’ Conclusion During the discussion, views were expressed that the Chinese decision-making process is underdeveloped. There is lack of central coordination and absence of a national defensive mechanism. The existent and fast-developing rail and road links in Tibet are of concern to India, since China suffers an air power disadvantage in this region. The unresolved boundary dispute between India and China is an interminable issue that should be resolved since as the economic growth widens with time, it would become more complex to resolve the issue. The Chinese State Council has no actual control over the PLA, which has seen a huge leap in terms of transformation from the Jiang Zemin era to that of Hu Jintao. Clearly, the PRC have left the concept of ‘People’s War’ and have moved on to ‘high tech war’ with a strategy of active defence. |
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