Emerging situation in Sri Lanka and Options for India

General:
Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) organised a seminar on ‘Emerging situation in Sri Lanka and Options for India’ on 17 December 2008 at CLAWS Conference Room, New Delhi. Maj Gen Ashok Mehta (Retd) chaired the seminar as well as presented his views on the military situation in Sri Lanka. Mr MR Narayan Swamy, News Editor, IANS and Dr N Manoharan, Senior Fellow, CLAWS were other presenters. This seminar was attended by various members of the research community.

‘Military Situation’: Maj Gen Ashok Mehta (Retd)
Gen Mehta began by highlighting certain aspects of the ongoing ‘Eelam War IV’ so as to better understand the present military situation:
•    The present regime under President Mahinda Rajapakse has been able to market this war as part of the global ‘war on terror’ rather than an ethnic conflict. The government has been calling the present military push as “humanitarian operations to liberate Tamils from the Tigers”.
•    The government has made a clear distinction between the LTTE and Tamils. It also has been claiming that India is supporting Sri Lanka’s war.
•    The Sri Lankan government’s plan is to defeat the LTTE militarily and then talk about peace. The government wants to proceed in the following order: demilitarise, democratise, development and then devolution.

The present military confrontation started in July 2006 with Mavilaru crisis. After liberating Mavilaru, the Sri Lankan forces gradually started capturing rest of the areas in the east. After capturing the entire east in July 2007 the forces proceeded to the west to clear the coastal areas of Mannar and Kilinochchi districts.  The strategic stronghold of Pooneryn fell in November 2008 and the forces presently are within “kissing distance” of Kilinochchi, the political and administrative capital of the LTTE. It is only a matter of time before Kilinochchi falls.

Compared to the past, present military operations are huge involving many divisions and task forces. There has been a complete revamp of the war strategy and tactics. The priority of government forces is not only territory, but also attrition. A huge imbalance of forces between the two antagonists is evident. Appreciably, the government has shown strong political will as never before. There is a unique synchronisation of political and military leadership that has contributed to high motivation of security forces.

There are many reasons for the present weak position of the LTTE. The split with Karuna in 2004 was the starting point. The arms flow got choked with increasing patrolling of high seas by the Sri Lankan navy with the help of neighbouring countries. As a result, LTTE’s stock of anti-aircraft missiles dried-up leading to indiscriminate SLAF bombing. Due to series of bans by important countries like Canada, EU and US the fund raising capability of the Tigers has come down substantially. The propaganda machinery of the LTTE has been weakened. Most importantly, many of the LTTE commanders lost their lives due to deep penetration attacks by the army or by aerial bombardments by SLAF.

‘Political Situation and Prospects for Peace’: N Manoharan
The Political situation in Sri Lanka is volatile. The political energy of the current regime is fully concentrated on ‘War for Peace Programme’. There is a realignment of political forces based on rhetoric like “Patriotism”, “Unity, Sovereignty, and Territorial Integrity”. Informal power structures outside the Constitution have weakened the democratic institutions. Island-wide Emergency has been in place since August 2005. The economy is not in good shape as developmental resources have been diverted towards war.

The aim of the present government is to defeat the LTTE militarily and then offer a political package. The final devolution would be based on the report to be submitted by the All Party Representative Committee set up in 2006. In the interim, the government wants to emulate ‘Eastern Model’ in the north as well: after liberating north from the LTTE, conduct provincial council elections and constitute provincial government based on 13th Amendment to the Constitution. The present provincial government in the east, however, is not empowered enough to take care of even meagre developmental aspects of the province. Despite an elected government in place, the security forces could not control cacophonous violence and killing that continues in the east. The interim and final solution as envisaged by the Rajapakse government, therefore, is unsustainable.

A sustainable solution should follow a three-stage formula. Firstly, a ceasefire should be declared to pave way for negotiations. At the same time, the provisions of ceasefire agreement should not be in favour of the LTTE as was the case with previous agreements. Secondly, an interim arrangement should be in place basically to take care of relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction. The interim understanding would also act as a good confidence building measure between the two antagonists. Simultaneously, both parties should work for a final solution that meets the sentiments of minorities, that is acceptable to all communities and is based on consensus among all political parties of Sri Lanka.

Given the inability of both antagonists to settle the issue on their own, a third party should be involved. A ‘consortium of peace’ consisting of various state and non-state parties could be an ideal catalyst. The members of the consortium should be those states, institutions, parties and individuals that could exercise maximum and effective leverage on not only principal actors, but also spoilers. The consortium should be able to lay down clear guidelines on the process, settlement and implementation of the final settlement. The consortium should also provide counter guarantee to the agreement. Such an arrangement, if explored, may be able to help to resolve the crisis.

‘Options for India’: M R Narayan Swamy
Situation in Sri Lanka has become extremely complex. International actors have failed to bring a solution. The split in the LTTE has created much more uncertainty, especially in the east. LTTE contributed a lot towards creating a problem for the Muslims in the east. Over a period of time, this has radicalised Sri Lankan Muslims. Pakistan has tried to exploit this disenchantment to serve its interests. China has also made use of the crisis to gain a foothold on the island. This is a worrying factor for India. The Sri Lankan government has been using the China and Pakistan cards to divert India’s attention from the core issue.

India’s position on the ethnic question is clear: no separate state for Tamils, but any negotiated settlement should meet the sentiments of minorities. The LTTE has read this stand of India as “anti-Tamil and pro-Sinhala”. The LTTE’s outlook towards India has been dominated by this. However, due to recent military reverses, the Tigers are making various attempts to drag India into the conflict in their favour through political linkages in Tamil Nadu. Tamil National Alliance (TNA) MPs are being sent to India in small groups to establish contacts and canvass with all political parties of the country. But, this strategy is not working. In Tamil Nadu, only fringe groups like MDMK and PMK are raising voices in favour of the LTTE. The Tamil Nadu Chief Minister, M Karunanidhi, has sympathy for Sri Lankan Tamils, but not for the LTTE. India also views LTTE as an entity to be destroyed. The Tigers’ networking with various Indian militant groups is seen as a security threat by New Delhi. The LTTE is not going to accept anything less than a separate state. Therefore, the LTTE cannot be brought around by India. Norway also tried it unsuccessfully. The Sri Lankan government will also listen to India only if that suits its interests. Overall, not many options are available for India as long as the two antagonists are determined to fight. It is also incorrect to think that the ethnic issue can be resolved by defeating the LTTE militarily.

DISCUSSION
The following points came-up during the lively discussion that followed the three presentations:
•    Even if all the LTTE controlled areas are captured, Prabhakaran will not leave the island. He would prefer death to capture. If the Tiger chief dies, that will make a substantial difference to the militant group. There may be a smooth succession after Prabhakaran, but the LTTE will become a classic guerrilla organisation and may not be able to regain strength.

•    It will take quite some time for the government forces to capture all of the LTTE controlled areas. In particular, taking over Mullaitivu is not going to be that easy given the nature of terrain.

•    Ever since 9/11 LTTE has been cornered internationally. The Sri Lankan government also made use of this to weave ‘international safety net’ against the LTTE. The present military reverses confronted by the LTTE are not just because of Sri Lankan government’s superior strategy, but mainly because of international isolation of the LTTE.

•    The LTTE appears to be down but not out. Even if the Tigers are defeated the conflict will continue. Unless a negotiated settlement is in place the issue is not going to come to an end. As long as the original grievances of the Tamils exist, armed component of the ethnic issue will remain. Unfortunately, political settlement is not in sight.

•    There was a good opportunity for solving the issue in 2002 when the peace talks were on. The opportunity was lost mainly because of the LTTE. The Tigers could have been more flexible.

•    India has not studied the LTTE in detail.  As a result, we went wrong on many occasions. Voices from Tamil Nadu in favour of the Sri Lankan Tamils are for electoral politics and not for real. At the popular level there is no sympathy for the LTTE. The main concern for the Indian security establishment is that the LTTE may infiltrate into India in the garb of refugees.

•    India is in a delicate situation vis-à-vis the ethnic issue. New Delhi is not in a position to prevail on the Sri Lankan government except to express displeasure on human rights violations. Both antagonists want India’s involvement, but only in their favour. With hindsight it is clear that we should have kept our communications with the LTTE open to exercise at least some leverage.

Conclusion:
The present situation in the island state remains complex. Military victory over LTTE will bring only limited benefits for Sri Lanka as long as the political and social aspects of the conflict are not addressed. In the present context, India’s options are limited. However, New Delhi should push both the antagonists for peace with the help of the international community.