China India Territorial Dispute: Moving Towards Resolution

General

The Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) organised a seminar on “China-India Territorial Dispute: Moving towards Resolution” on 09 April 2008.  The seminar was chaired by Amb Kanwal Sibal, former Foreign Secretary. The panel for the session comprised Dr. Mohan Guruswamy, Director, Centre for Policy Alternatives, Maj Gen Sheru Thapliyal (Retd) and Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd.) Director, CLAWS.  A large number of serving and retired officers and members of the strategic community attended the seminar. The salient aspects and issues articulated/discussed during the seminar are given in succeeding paragraphs.
 

Objectives of the Seminar
The objectives of the seminar were: -
(a)     To generate better understanding of the issues and concerns regarding the India-China territorial and boundary dispute.
(b)     To examine the present status of the India-China territorial dispute.
(c)     To identify and recommend possible options for resolving the dispute.

Overview
• Reports of frequent incursions by the Chinese into the Indian territory have appeared in the media with increasing frequency.
• Negotiations for the settlement of the dispute have not made much headway.
• The recent developments in Tibet may have repercussions on the progress of talks to settle the dispute.
• In the public perception, China has been slow and unresponsive towards settling the dispute.

China's Strategic Outlook and the Boundary Question
The presentation by Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd), Director, CLAWS, was aimed at an objective analysis of the issues related to the India-China territorial and boundary dispute; China’s strategic outlook towards India and Implications of the same for India. The points that were highlighted /discussed during the presentation were as follows:
• China has land borders with a large number of countries and had border disputes with almost all these countries. It has resolved its border disputes with all countries, except India and Bhutan.
• India-China relations in the economic field have been improving steadily; however, the border issue continues to linger on.  The poor security relationship has the potential to act as a spoiler.
• China continues to claim the entire Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh which is more than 90,000 sq km.  In Ladakh (Aksai Chin), China is in occupation of 38,000 sq km of Indian Territory.  Besides this, the Shaksgam Valley (5,180 sq km) has been illegally ceded by Pakistan to China in March 1963. The Karakoram highway has been built through this valley by China.
• Despite the Border Peace and Tranquillity Agreement (BPTA) of 1993, Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) in the Military Field of 1996, many meetings of the Joint Working Group and talks between political interlocutors, even the Line of Actual Control (LAC) is yet to be demarcated/ delineated.
• The number of Chinese incursions across the line of actual (LAC) has been increasing of late and India is forced to commit additional resources to safeguard the borders with China. Patrol face-offs are common and could lead to an armed clash. Hence, a border conflict between India and China, though improbable, cannot be ruled out.
• India seeks early resolution of the dispute as this would result in India having to defend only one front with Pakistan.  India would then have an option of “downsizing” its forces so that more investments could be made on military modernisation.
• Resolution of the border dispute could also open up the option of joint projects with China to harness about 75,000 MW of hydroelectric power from the Brahmaputra River.
• China continues to drag its feet and insists that the territorial dispute with India should be left for future generations to resolve.  Continuation of the dispute enables Pakistan to destabilise India through a “Proxy War” without fear of a major military retaliation from India. Prolonging the dispute gives China added leverage against India.
• By transferring nuclear and ballistic missile technology (M-9, M-11) to Pakistan and covertly supporting North Korea’s missile technology transfers to Pakistan, China has changed the geo-strategic equation in South Asia irrevocably.
• Through military links with India’s neighbours and a “string of pearls” hasing strategy in the India Ocean, China is engaged in the strategic encirclement of India.
• Some analysts have argued that perhaps China wishes to confine India to the backwaters of the Indian Ocean and reduce India to the status of a subaltern state.
• China refuses to discuss nuclear CBMs with India.
• The present military gap between India and China is quantitative rather than qualitative.
• India needs to invest more in modernising its armed forces. (Defence budget: < 2.0% of GDP)
• China’s improved logistics infrastructure in Tibet (e.g. rail link to Lhasa and new airfields) has provided it the capability to concentrate additional divisions in Tibet for possible multi-pronged offensive operations into India in the case of a conflict in future. 
• India still enjoys a relative edge in battlefield air support due to a more modern Air Force, sea-level airfields and a shorter approach to targets inside Tibet.
• India has adequate defensive capability but lacks an offensive punch against China.
• India needs to upgrade and acquire offensive capability for trans-LAC operations; enhance ground, air, and helicopter firepower; invest in modern ISR technologies for border management and upgrade military infrastructure in border areas.
• India should continue to seek an early solution to the territorial dispute with China.
• In the long run India should aim at matching China’s strategic challenge through viable nuclear and conventional deterrence and robust economic growth.
• China and India are strategic competitors in Asia. Chinese strategic encirclement of India, refusal to engage India on the nuclear issue and intransigence on the territorial and boundary dispute could eventually lead to conflict between the two countries.

Historical Background
The presentation by Dr. Mohan Guruswamy, Director, Centre for Policy Alternatives, was an objective analysis of the historical status of Tibet and the India-China border. It gave an understanding of the historical perspective along the Indo-Chinese border. 
• In 1642, the 5th Dalai Lama became the spiritual and temporal ruler of Tibet. The Ming Emperor “recognized” him as an independent sovereign.
• In 1786, the Gurkhas attacked Tibet. The Dalai Lama appealed to the Qing Emperor for military assistance. The Gurkhas were driven away but the Manchu troops remained. The Tibetans agreed to the “Golden Urn” formula that gave the Emperor a say in choosing the Dalai Lama. The Chinese now interpret this as a right to have a say in the choice of the next Dalai Lama. They have already chosen a Panchen Lama.
• 1826: Annexation of Assam from Burma. Treaty of Yandabo.
• 1835: Darjeeling annexed from Sikkim.
• 1865: WH Johnson incorporated the Aksai Chin into J&K and became Commissioner of Ladakh.
• In 1876, the 13th Dalai Lama, Thupten Gyatso, took charge and began to assert Tibetan sovereignty. In 1876, the Chinese signed the Chefoo Convention giving Britain the “right” to send a mission of exploration into Tibet. The Tibetans repudiate this. The Tibetans refused to have anything to do with the British.
• 1886: First foray out of Brahmaputra Valley. Expedition into the Lohit valley.
• 1888: Tibetan troops expelled from Sikkim.
• 1889: Capt Younghusband met Russian Col Grombchevsky in Yarkand. Maj Gen Sir John Ardagh endorsed the Johnson Line.
• 1899:  McCartney-MacDonald line excluding Aksai Chin was drawn.
• In 1904, Col Younghusband’s expedition entered Lhasa. Limited “resistance” was offered by the Tibetans. Amban accompanies the British from Xigase. The Dalai Lama went to Mongolia and thence to Peking.
• In 1907, Russia and Britain agreed that it was in their interest to leave Tibet “in that state of isolation from which, till recently, she has shown no intention to depart.”
• In 1909, Thupten Gyatso returned to Lhasa with 2000 Chinese troops at his heels. In 1910 the Dalai Lama fled to India. China invaded Tibet. 13th Dalai Lama fleed to India, Amban returned to Lhasa.
• 1911: Tibetans expel Chinese via Nathu-la. Tibet becomes ‘independent’.
• 1913 : Tibet declared independence. Chinese troops take refuge in India.
• 1913: Simla Conference. McMahon line drawn. Amban initials under protest.
• By 1918, Lhasa regained control over Chamdo and Western Kham.
• 1935: At the insistence of Sir Olaf Caroe, ICS, McMahon line was notified.
• 1940-41: Russians in Sinkiang supported Gen Sheng Shi Tsai. Britain reasserted Johnson line.
• 1944: JP Mills, ICS, established British Indian administration in NEFA, except Tawang.
• 1947: Dalai Lama government sent note to India laying claim to few NEFA districts.
• In 1949, the PLA “liberated” China and the following year it occupied Chamdo. In 1951 the PLA presented the Tibetans with the “Seventeen Point Agreement” which affirmed China’s sovereignty over Tibet. The agreement was ratified by the authorities in Lhasa.
• 1951: China annexed Tibet again.
• In 1951, Maj Relangnao Khating of the IFAS raised the Indian tricolor in Tawang, which though South of the McMahon line, was not being administered by the NEFA government.
• In 1959, the Dalai Lama fled to India and set up the Tibetan Government-in-exile.
• The Border Issue became a territorial Issue once again when China laid claim over Tibet, Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh.
• Chinese claim that, “For more than 700 years the central government of China has continuously exercised sovereignty over Tibet and Tibet has never been an independent state (PRC official White Paper, 1992), are quite obviously untrue.
• Tibetans claims that, “At the time of invasion by troops of the Peoples Liberation Army of China in 1949, Tibet was an independent state. The military invasion constituted an aggression on a sovereign state and a violation of international law,”  (Tibetan Government-in-Exile, 1993).
• In January 1913, Mongolia and Tibet signed a treaty at Urga declaring themselves free and independent. The Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa. The Chinese garrison was forced to leave Tibet and sent out through Nathu-la. The Dalai Lama proclaimed “We are a small, religious and independent nation” and condemned “the Chinese intention of colonising Tibet under the patron-priest relationship.”
• There is no history of Chinese possession of Arunachal; it has only been claimed in some maps.
• Population composition of Arunachal different. 65% tribal, 35% immigrants from Assam and Nagaland. Few Tibetans. 36% Animist. 37% Hindu. 13% Buddhist.
• The Himalayas are India’s natural boundary.
• Ever increasing Tibetanisation of Himalayan monasteries has been going on.
• The recent Amb. Sun Yuxi statement on Tawang should not to be seen in isolation.
• The Chinese are no longer talking about a as-is-where-is settlement.

India–China border Impasse: Is there a way Out?
The presentation by Maj Gen Sheru Thapliyal (Retd.) examined the territorial dispute in detail and suggested option for the resolution of the dispute.
• The reasons for the present India-China border problem could be traced back to the British unwillingness/ inability to settle the border question with China. The continuation of the problem could be attributed to the Chinese aim to keep the border issue alive in order to keep India permanently anxious and unbalanced. It wants to keep India confined to South Asia hemmed in by a strategic encirclement. • In the Western sector the dispute is in four separate areas, namely: Shaksgam Valley, west of Karakoram pass illegally ceded to china by Pakistan in 1963; Aksai Chin, east of Karakoram pass.  (The Chinese have constructed their         Xinjiang–Tibet road through it, called the Western highway.)   and, the area between Aksai chin and Demchok and, lastly, the Demchok area.
• In the Middle sector the Chinese claim 303 sq km (HP), and 1818 sq km (Uttaranchal).  The disputed areas in this sector are, namely: the Shipkila in HP, Jadhang and Barahoti in Uttarakhand.   The aim of the dispute in this sector is only to maintain pressure on India.
• In the Eastern sector the Chinese claim 90650 sq km.  Chinese claim line runs along the foot hills. Actual dispute is in four pockets : Khenzmane and Tawang in Western Kameng, Longju in Subansiri district and Rima in Walong sector.
• In the Western sector, the Aksai Chin provides depth to China’s Western highway. The control over the passes, Kongkala, Marsmikla, Jara la and Changla would preclude any projected Indian offensive towards Rudok in the area between Aksai Chin and Demchok. Besides, the control of Demchok funnel would forestall any Indian offensive towards Tashigong to interdict the Western highway.
• In the eastern sector, the Chinese have shown reluctance to accept McMahon line negotiated by Tibet when it was independent. They intend to pressurise India into conceding the de-facto Chinese occupation of Aksai Chin.
• India interest lies in the early resolution of the boundary dispute once and for all and in the unequivocal acknowledgement on the part of China of the status of Sikkim as part of India.
• India would prefer that settlement should result in proper demarcation of the border and that the East-West swap must not be seen as compromising India’s principled stand.
• Solution requires out-of-the-box thinking and pragmatism. India should come up with an offer that the Chinese cannot refuse.
• India must keep the Shaksgam Valley issue alive unlike at present when it has been put in deep freeze.  
• There should be a quid pro quo between India’s claim on Tawang and Chinese claim on Longju and Rima perceived by China to be north of Mc Mahon line
• Since the Chinese appear to be allergic to the term “McMahon line”, this term could be dropped and agreed boundary called India-China border
• India must create leverages to bring Chinese to the negotiating table.
 

Options for Resolution:-
o One option for the resolution of the territorial dispute could be to delineate the boundary in Aksai Chin along Mc Cartney–McDonald line thus ceding 23000 sq km to China and retaining 15000 sq km in lieu of China foregoing its claims on Arunachal Pradesh. This will give back to India nearly 15000 sq km of territory out of nearly 38000 sq km occupied by Chinese at present and would put the ball firmly in China’s court, showing extreme reasonableness on the part of India to the world.  This would also lead to easing of tensions, better border management and troop reduction.
o The second option for the resolution of the territorial dispute could be to concede the Chinese claim up to their present claim line in the West in lieu of Chinese foregoing their claims on Arunachal Pradesh and giving Chumbi Valley to India. This would ensure contiguity between Sikkim and Bhutan and would leave the strategic Chumbi valley to India.
• Exercising any of the above options would require a bold initiative on the part of the Indian government.
• However, timing for any solution that is offered by india is very important as the Chinese does not share the urgency to resolve the problem. This is so because they are shielded from internal debate. By offering a possible solution India should not place itself in a disadvantageous position as the resolution to the border problem is linked to the Tibet issue.
• China wants to assert full control over Tibet and speak to India from a position of strength. Also, if India and China are to move ahead in resolving differences, both will need to re-evaluate their relations with Pakistan. This is because the arming of Pakistan with nuclear and missile capability by China has been the worst blow to India.
• Two additional options were also offered by the participants: -
o Give and take large areas of land both in the West and in the East. This option would not be acceptable to either side.
o Resolve the issue on a as-is-where-is basis. In this option there is a need to determine exactly where each side is on the ground.
• As things stand presently, it is not likely that the US wishes to use India as leverage against China. India’s political system would be ultimately responsible to deal effectively with China.
• A counter view was also raised that India should not seek to resolve the problems with China in an early time frame.  India should utilise the time gained to build capabilities that would then be advantageous when the territorial dispute is taken up seriously for resolution.
 

Conclusion
The general consensus that emerged during the seminar was that the territorial dispute should be resolved on priority basis.  The demarcation of the LAC should be undertaken as soon as possible as this will serve as the most effective CBM.  China wants to keep the issue alive as it gives it leverage on other issues.  It would like India to come back again and again to seek its goodwill on a number of international issues.  The present Tibetan issue might further stall the border talks.
A general understanding that emerged was that the option of large give and take is not possible. A solution could be reached on as-is-where-is-basis.  However, that too requires clarity on the actual positions and claims and identification of the disputed areas.  It also requires broad based political consensus which is lacking at present. 

(Report compiled by Col Ravi Tuteja, Dy Director, CLAWS and Amit Kumar Singh, Research Fellow, CLAWS)