Afghanistan: Thinking Beyond the NATO

Introduction
A roundtable on ‘Afghanistan: Thinking Beyond the NATO’ was held on 5 August 2008 at CLAWS. The roundtable was chaired by Lt Gen R K Sawhney (Retd.) and amongst others, Amb. Satish Chandra, Ex Deputy National Security Advisor and Amb Rangachari, India’s former ambassador attended.

In the light of President Karzai’s visit to India, it is important to examine the unrest in the region between Afghanistan and Pakistan with special emphasis on the FATA/NWFP areas. Recent air strikes across the Durand Line have brought attention to the Taliban and Al Qaeda presence in the area. During the time preceding the Taliban’s rule in Afghanistan, there was comprehensive destruction and the middle class was completely destroyed. The refugee crisis and the large number of Internally Displaced Persons led to a disastrous situation. Following that, the Northern Alliance was pushed out to the Northern Areas of Afghanistan by the Taliban, aided by Pakistan’s ISI. The logistics of aiding the Northern Alliance always deterred India from providing anything other than nominal support. It is important to re-examine India’s role in the region as the ISI’s operations spread across the entire region from across the Durand Line as also across the Line of Control (LoC). India’s experience of the ISI’s role in the militant bases in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir can be extrapolated to the Afghan border. The ISI is following a similar modus operandi by encouraging Taliban commanders to launch raids against NATO/ISAF troops from bases within Pakistani territory.

Pak-Afghan Relations
The international coalition of 23 nations has complicated the war, as the caveats were unclear and the national briefs differed widely. While some nations prefer passive roles such as peacekeeping, some others have more proactive mandates with caveats like not fighting narcotics. Additionally, Afghanistan and Pakistan have become synonymous regions due to the porous border and this has caused a conundrum for the ISAF/NATO forces deployed there.

The speakers brought out that historically, the Northern Areas, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and the Pashtun code of honour had been romanticised. Today, these areas have approximately 16 per cent education for men and 3 per cent for women. Additionally, the region has political agents instead of political representatives. The lack of governance leads to the region being an ideal sanctuary for Afghan drugs traders, who have been directing the narcotics trade of the world from Afghanistan. About 90-95 per cent narcotics of the world emanate from Afghanistan, abetted by the ISI’s agents.

The epicentre of terrorism, which lies west of the Indus cannot be controlled or fought by the NATO/ISAF forces, especially given that only the British and the American forces are fighting. Across the NWFP/FATA region and beyond the Durand Line, air strikes are imminent as the US and its allies are frustrated with strikes from across the border. The Pakistan Army is poorly organised and inadequately motivated. It is recouping and retraining under Gen Kiyani. The fighting in the region has been outsourced to the Frontier Corps till next summer when the regular army may be expected to step in again.

India’s Role in Afghanistan
The Pakistani influence is greater than any other influence in the country. But what should be India’s objective in Afghanistan? The area that is today the breeding ground for militancy comprises of tribal areas that have been friends with India. The Awami National Party was India’s friend and that is indicative of how truly secular the region is. The perception of India amongst the Afghan people is good. Most regimes in Afghanistan tend to become inimical to Pakistan and therefore friendly to India. In fact, even during the rule of the Taliban, they didn’t recognize the Durand Line. But the area is a breeding ground for terrorism and extremism at present and India’s objective should be to change this situation.

India’s approach in the next few months to a couple of years would be crucial for India’s foreign policy in the region. It is well known that foreign forces are not liked in Afghanistan. India should not send additional troops as firstly, their logistics would be a major problem and secondly, it would be unwise to garner any ill will that is presently directed towards foreign forces in Afghanistan. Instead, there should be a move to open up towards all sections in Afghanistan where there is a commonality of interests between the two countries.

At the moment, there is a melange, a composite mix of agencies working in Afghanistan. In formulating a strategy, there should be three approaches that India should work on:

The Security Situation
The first is the terrorist question which is not being addressed by Pakistan. Recently, the Americans have begun to speak openly of ISI involvement in the region’s politics and instability. What is needed to counter this nexus is an alliance of neighbouring countries – India, Iran and the ex-CIS states with the support of other international actors.

The Development Question
The second problem is to do with the development of Afghanistan. First of all, the narcotics business has to be dealt with. For years, it has been a pernicious problem. Historically, the involvement of India in rehabilitation or reconstruction has been significant with hydel power projects, roads and the building of schools and hospitals. The Prime Minister has recently announced additional aid, which is an important initiative in reaffirming India’s commitment to the rebuilding of Afghanistan.

The Political Situation
While the issue of a NATO/ISAF pull out is being debated vigorously, the possibility of achieving the continued presence of the Americans is important as it would mean that NATO’s presence would also follow. Senator Barack Obama has stated that the Afghanistan War has to be taken to a successful conclusion, implying instead that emphasis on Iraq was wrong. Having installed President Karzai after disbanding the obscurantist regime of the Taliban, the international coalition must show results on ground. With development will come a more stable security situation and vice versa.

Several speakers were of the view that Pakistan will not let go of its hold in Afghanistan, which they will want to control through the Taliban. Therefore, it is in India’s interest that until the situation is relatively stabilised, the ISAF troops must remain in Afghanistan. At the same time, India must maintain a formal presence in the country, facilitating the coalition’s presence and supporting it with military and other required facilities. The compensatory advantages of such a presence will be immense. It will be a win-win situation for India as it will gather goodwill for the country in Afghanistan. It was pointed out that by 2003, only USD 737 million had been spent on development and reconstruction. But this figure had gone up to USD 7 billion in 2007. However, with Pakistan engineering large-scale suicide attacks (2 in 2003, 137 in 2007), there is a need to eliminate Taliban as a fighting force in Afghanistan.

Strategic Alliances
Despite Uighur terrorism in Xinjiang, it will be difficult for India to find common cause with China as Pakistan has better relations with China. Given the tension between India and Pakistan, it has to be borne in mind that the nuclear retaliatory capabilities of Pakistan have been largely facilitated by China. In such a scenario, a strategic partnership with the US is a natural progression. It is important for India to back NATO and American physical presence in Afghanistan, as the ISI-backed insurgents must be eliminated.

India could also play a more pronounced role by being more articulate about democracy in Afghanistan. Pakistan has become indispensable to the West by claiming that without their support, the religious fundamentalism in the region could get out of hand. India should work towards establishing a liaison office with the NATO/ISAF forces fighting insurgency. India’s counter-insurgency experience would be of value in Afghanistan. India could also play an important role by training the army and not aiming for a military presence. This has happened before where India has sent teams for training to various post-conflict countries and helped create fine forces and professional armies. India could also offer its military facilities to NATO while maintaining the physical presence of paramilitary forces in Afghanistan, for the security of Indian assets and reconstruction activities.

Larger Strategic Context
India should increasingly look for a Greater Central Asian strategy that aims at South Asia-Central Asian cooperation. It is important to construct an effective Indian presence in the region rather than allow a pronounced Pakistani role. In fact, the new thinking in the American establishment seems to allow India strategic space consummate with its influence in South Asia, therefore encouraging alliance building between the two countries. The question of India’s relationship with Iran has also been controversial but the Americans realize that continued animosity with Iran means that no engagement with the region will be positive. This could develop into a rapprochement between Iran and the US, opening up further avenues for cooperation with India. The ‘Musharraf Doctrine’ explicitly states that even if the Kashmir problem were to be solved, the conflict within India and Pakistan will revolve around the 3 Ks – Kashmir, Karachi and Kabul. In such a situation, it is important to build a larger framework of cooperation between India and other countries in the region.

Future Blueprint
India’s course of action in Afghanistan should lay emphasise on traction and specificity. It has to be recognised that there is a Civil War on in Afghanistan. NATO’s presence in Afghanistan is premised on the European pro-democracy agenda. But, there will be no fighting and winning of wars by the NATO, even if their numbers are increased with additional forces, from France, for instance, where President Sarkozy has hinted at a larger force deployment in Afghanistan.

India cannot play the role of a revisionist power, putting its troops in an area where it is known they will be targeted. The policy calculus of our relations with Afghanistan has to change. Indian personnel are all around Kabul, Kandahar, Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat as also working on the reconstruction of roads. The security for these personnel is minimal as paramilitary troops are not adequately equipped, trained or officered. In terms of equipment, weaponry and intelligence, the Taliban is much better and can outdo this force. On India’s part, depending on inadequate force for the protection of its people on Afghan soil demonstrates negligence, especially when Pakistan uses the Taliban and the Al Qaeda as force multipliers and a strategic asset.

Conclusion
Presently, the NATO/ISAF coalition is viewed by the Afghans as, “Whether it is Russia or American, one infidel force is replacing another. We will fight till the occupation forces leave”. Additionally, the mood of the Pakistan army has changed since killings at the hands of the NATO forces. This has affected the unity of the Pak army as a fighting force and has brought to question the composition of the army. It has also raised questions about the ethnic divide and pitched the Punjabi sections against the Pashtun components. Before the balance tilts towards Pakistani involvement, India should assert its presence through a pro-active stance, even if it remains short of a military presence by India.

The logic of having only paramilitary forces in Afghanistan is questionable. The ITBP can at best provide point defence to Indian assets in Afghanistan. This is a passive measure. There is a need for a force that is trained to provide area defence by seeking out the Taliban. This can only be done by the regular army. It may be prudent to send up to a brigade group with a company of Special Forces. However, the wider international ramifications any the operational logistics of such a move need to be carefully analysed.

(Compiled by Swapna Kona Nayudu, Associate Fellow, Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS))