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April 23, 2013 |  | By Raveen Janu | ||
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In 1996, the existing Army Radio Engineering Network (AREN), the backbone of its communication grid was sought to be replaced by the Indian Army on an urgent and critical basis. Now, seventeen years down the line, not much has been achieved on this front. The Army’s modernisation plan has been affected by lack of progress on the Tactical Communication System (TCS).The TCS was borne out of the realisation in the early 2000s that AREN had to be replaced and an upgrade would not be sufficient as was envisaged earlier. Since 2002, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has vacillated numerous times on the categorisation of the TCS project under the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) between Make (High-Tech Systems) and Make (Strategic, Complex and Security Sensitive Systems).The difference arises from the fact that private sector participation is allowed in the former category and not in the latter. The reason to classify the project as Make (Strategic, Complex and Security Sensitive Systems) was attributed to the secrecy of the “frequency hopping algorithm” contained in a tiny microchip. The frequency hopping algorithm provides anti-jamming and electronic counter measures (ECM) functionality. Tactical communications networks need to be multi-hop wireless networks in which switches and endpoints are mobile nodes. In a tactical environment, system performance degrades when switching nodes and/or communication links fail to operate, narrow band electronic jamming is widespread and bandwidth is at a premium. Fast and adaptive algorithms for performance analysis are desirable for optimising the network. Further, tactical networks commonly use preemptive algorithms to achieve low blocking probabilities for high-priority connections when the loss of equipment or electronic warfare in the battlefield is considerable. Under unfavorable conditions, Adaptive Channel Hopping (ACH) algorithm lets sensors switch to a new operating channel. ACH reduces the channel scanning and selection latency by ordering available channels using link quality indicator measurements and mathematical weights. A lot of research on the hopping algorithms is being done internationally in the public domain and details such as configuring the programme etc are country specific and sensitive in nature. The two crucial characteristics which a robust and survivable TCS should have are:
• The mobility of nodes and switches as compared to the static nature of cellular network infrastructure.
• The ability to hop frequency bands and nodes to provide seamless connectivity and ECMs during times of conflict.
There is no doubt about the criticality of the TCS project but what needs to be understood is the feasibility, timeliness and capability of various players to deliver. In one aspect the complexity of TCS for the Army is higher as compared to other services due to the heterogeneity of sensors, types of nodes from soldier to HQ level and the sheer numbers involved.
Tactical networks serve the trinity of voice, data and video communications and need to be versatile and reliable. Legacy and Internet Protocol (IP) based systems need to talk to each other and to eliminate ‘disconnects’. However, a lack of international standards in communication architecture poses hurdles, especially with the legacy radio systems that were not designed to connect to broad-reaching IP-based networks. If we look at the advanced countries of the world the work on military communication is already in full swing (JTRS in USA and Contact Programme in France). Till date, the success of these major programmes have a few things in common such as participation and contribution of private sector, use of Commercial off the Shelf Technology(COTS), time bound closure of procurement procedures keeping in mind the criticality of the project and electronics manufacturing and IT delivery self-sufficiency.
There is a requirement to deliver on the timelines specified in order to provide the soldier with the much needed equipment enhancement. Challenges are of spectrum, bandwidth, manufacturing and laws of physics. The effectiveness of other big ticket modernisation programmes also depends on the successful implementation of TCS such as the F-INSAS.
The modern communication equipment that is required at the tactical level is as under:
• High Frequency (HF) radio (2-30MHz) – Though prone to unpredictability and unreliability, its key contribution is its beyond-line-of-sight application by refracting signals off the ionosphere for a fraction of the cost of a SATCOM signal which is finite and overburdened.
• Very HF radio (30-300MHz) - Man-portable tactical internet relies on VHF Combat Net Radios (CNR), particularly at the section/squad level. VHF offers a sizeable frequency range for high-quality signals. Limitation is line of sight (range 8 km) and horizontal integration.
• Ultra HF radio (300-3000MHz)-The gap of horizontal integration is addressed by the recent advent of smaller, handheld UHF Personal Role Radios (PRR) carried by soldiers. Allows soldiers to bypass traditional shouts and hand signals.
India needs to invest in electronics designing and manufacturing to complement the mature software base of our country. Private sector participation is crucial and they have demonstrated their capabilities and have played pivotal roles in some of India’s most secret defence projects. Larsen & Toubro built a considerable portion of India’s nuclear submarine, INS Arihant. Another private company, Tata Power, which built crucial command systems for the Arihant, also designed the core of the top secret Samyukta Electronic Warfare System. The two algorithms for frequency hopping and encryption can be devised by Centre for Artificial Intelligence and Robotics (CAIR) lab of DRDO as they are of sensitive nature. The application of Micro-electromechanical Systems (MEMS) can address weight and powers issues which are standard but important components of the complex system. Indigenous production of high-capacity, autonomous, distributed switches ready to provide full service just minutes after power-up is crucial to the TCS programme. Keeping in mind future upgrades to the system a Software-Defined Platform able to service various waveforms on a single equipment needs to be developed. As the complexity of the separation process (SIGINT and ELINT) depends on the complexity of the transmission methods (e.g., hopping) state of art algorithms for frequency hopping and encryption need to be devised. International studies have shown that preemption algorithms are the best way to utilise limited resources in a battlefield and to compensate for the loss of equipment; this aspect also needs to be included in the TCS. Use of COTS technology can be highly beneficial as it lowers cost and reduces soldier familiarisation time through existing commercial technology.
The latest news on TCS project is that two agencies- Bharat Electronics (BEL) and a consortium of L&T, Tata Power SED and HCL Infosys Ltd. has been selected by the government. This is the first project under the 'Buy Indian, Make Indian' clause introduced in the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) 2011. The key feature of this type of contract is that the Government will pay 80 per cent of the development cost while 20 per cent will be funded by the industry. For TCS, both the selected parties will make the prototype system and the best bidder will then execute the whole project. The TCS project is being executed by the Corps of Signals and provides an opportunity for the Army to monitor the progress of a project which is so crucial to its operational preparedness and force multiplication endeavour. Even Pakistan, which made USD 76 million purchase in 2005 of RF-5800H-MP Harris radios, possesses state of art TCS equipment. Decisive victory on any future battlefield will be that much more difficult to achieve without robust and survivable communications, both in the strategic and tactical domain.
Raveen Janu is an Associate Fellow at Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS)
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