Operation Surya Hope

It was a disaster waiting to happen. And strike it did with cataclysmic ferocity, on a wet and windy day on 16 June, leaving over a hundred thousand people stranded in narrow valleys with base altitude of about 10,000 feet. The hapless pilgrims found themselves in an extremely hostile environment, cut off from the rest of the world without food, water and shelter. Surrounding the valleys were majestic snowcapped peaks touching heights of over 20,000 feet.

Millions of devotees each year undertake the holy pilgrimage circuit of the ‘Char Dham’ comprising of Gangotri, Yamunotri, Badrinath and Kedarnath along with Hemkund Sahib in Uttarakhand. This year was no different. However, very heavy rains along with cloudbursts on June 16 caused the rivers to swell and in a short span of time, led to unimaginable death and destruction.

The area affected by floods covered an area of about 40,000 square km in Uttarakashi, Chamoli, Rudraprayag, Bageshwar and Pithoragarh districts of Uttarakhand and 7 districts of Uttar Pradesh. However, it was in Uttarakhand that the elements wreaked havoc, the worst affected places being Badrinath, Kedarnath, Gangotri, Gaurikund, Hemkund and Jyotirmath – the very area of the ‘Char Dham’ pilgrimage.These holy sites were located in three narrow valleys, and the national highways that traversed through them, viz NH 58, 87, 108, 109,119 and 124 crossed through very formidable terrain (see map below).

  Fig: Coloured lines indicate extensively damaged highways.

In the Gangotri Valley, there was extensive damage to NH 108 between Uttarkashi and Gangotri. In the Central Sector, landslides blocked NH 58 between Srinagar and Rudraprayag. Beyond Rudraprayag, NH 109 to the West led to the Kedarnath Valley and further Eastwards, NH 58 led on to Badrinath, the latter axis further bifurcating to Hemkund Sahib.In the Kedarnath Valley, landslides had washed away many stretches of NH 109, the damage being extensive at GauriKund. In the Badrinath Valley, many stretches remained blocked between Govindghat and Badrinath. In addition, the overflowing rivers washed away most of the bridges, effectively isolating the hapless stranded pilgrims. In this situation, when hope was all but lost, the Indian Army launched perhaps the most extensive rescue operation in the nation’s history, and in the next two weeks, successfully evacuated pilgrims, some from the most inaccessible of places, despite inclement weather conditions. The rescue operation, led by the Commander in Chief of the Indian Army’s Central Command, Lt Gen Anil Chait, was aptly termed ‘Operation Surya Hope’, to provide succor, hope, humanitarian assistance and logistic needs in Badrinath, Hemkund and Kedarnath regions.

Even before the civil administration could comprehend the magnitude of the disaster, the Army swung into action. On 17 June, the Area Commander at Bareilly, a three star General, ordered the move of his headquarter to Dehradun and within a day was fully functional to coordinate the rescue operation. Simultaneously, unit commanders moved forward with their troops to the inaccessible valleys and they too were in location by 18 June to begin and oversee the largest humanitarian mission undertaken by the Army since Independence.As a first step, the Army immediately established kiosks at Harsil, Uttarkashi, Rudraprayag, Joshimath, Govindghat, Hanuman Chetti and Dharchula to provide information, medical aid, food and water to stranded and hungry pilgrims. Simultaneously, the Army launched a dozen reconnaissance parties to inaccessible areas to obtain firsthand information of the situation. In addition, the Army established a dozen medical aid posts at Rudraprayag, Joshimath, Govindghat and Dharchula to provide immediate life saving medical assistance along with an emergency medical helpline to provide medical advice to the stranded pilgrims.

While the print and visual media documented the relief operations in detail, what has not caught the attention of the public is the comprehensive and meticulous planning that went into the execution of ‘Surya Hope’. The initial phase was devoted to concentration of troops in the affected valleys for evacuation support, carrying out reconnaissance and air evacuation of isolated pockets. Alongside, the stranded pilgrims were concentrated at specific points where food, water, shelter and medical assistance was provided prior to dedicated air evacuation. The army also inducted soldiers by helicopters and stationed them at intervals of 2 km to enable them to contact isolated people. In an act of great sensitivity, a large number of satellite phones inducted into the area enabled many stranded pilgrims to get in touch with their families.

Air transport was the obvious solution to evacuate the thousands stranded across the various damaged routes; the sheer numbers requiring evacuation however called for using other options alongside. Consequently, in Badrinath, the Army created an air bridge where helicopters ferried people across the riverbanks. The Indian Air Force too played a sterling role, through air operations code named ‘Operation Rahat’ and used the larger MI 17 helicopters to good effect evacuating large numbers. They also created an air bridge at Dharasu with the C-130s that brought in fuel and essential supplies and took back stranded people. Combat techniques were adapted to the situation in hand.The Army constructed temporary bridges and set up helipads in crucial areas to provide alternate routes to stranded people. In Kedarnath and Badrinath, troops skilled in mountain operations, equipped with specialised equipment were heli-dropped to evacuate pilgrims. On the Gangotri Axis, the Army used the ‘staging area concept’ moving people across landslides by foot and in between using vehicles where the road could still be used. The stretch across landslides had the men in olive green positioned on the dangerous slopes with safety ropes, to assist the stranded men, women, children, the aged and the sick, all of whom had already faced and endured unbearable hardship. The troops put themselves at risk, but the safety of the stranded pilgrims was paramount. It was the exceptional standards of discipline and training that made them accomplish the impossible, displaying in the process extraordinary dedication and commitment. Humanity and empathy remained the constant feature of the evacuation effort causing many of the hapless pilgrims to exclaim that indeed, they had seen the hand of God, and that hand donned the olive green.The strength of the Army personnel involved in rescue operations, which initially stood at about 5,000 personnel, swelled to over 10,000 people before the operations were completed.

Air assets proved to be a game changer but flying in the narrow valley floors was at the best of times a risky proposition and in inclement weather, a very serious hazard. Yet the Army and the Air Force persisted in this venture, as the mission to evacuate the stranded was paramount. The Google earth image below gives an idea of the narrow valleys and high mountain peaks. Constantly covered in thick mist and fog, the aircrew had but brief moments to fly in and out of the valleys.

While the Army deployed over 15 Cheetah and Dhruv helicopters, the Air Force pressed 45 air assets into service, both fixed wing and rotary, its MI 17 helicopters forming the backbone of the rescue effort. The Air Force also tactically deployed the multi role C-130J Hercules at Dharasu. The C-130’s were most useful, establishing air bridges and transporting fuel that kept the choppers air borne for forward operations. Amid the gushing rivers and the thundering clouds, the sound of rotors was a beacon of hope for many. It meant help was on the way. It meant they were rescued. In all, about 60 helicopters undertook nearly 3000 sorties. In the restricted space in which they operated, the sheer coordination of this effort was by itself a most noteworthy event.And this was accomplished without air traffic control! Indeed, every single pilot who flew those missions was aware of the risks involved. The bravery and skill of the men and women who flew those missions will undoubtedly be etched into folklore.

Despite the fervour of the rescue operations, the animals trapped in the region also received attention. Mules are widely used in these mountain passes for transporting pilgrims. Though the Naini Tal High Court had limited the number of mules on the Gaurikund-Kedarnath route to 4,500, the numbers on the ground were closer to 12,000 mules. The Army inserted medical teams to treat the injured animals and launched special missions, along with animal welfare groups to free the stranded animals despite the inclement weather conditions, displaying once again, professionalism and determination of the highest order.

As operations ended, the Army and Air Force, assisted by two battalions from the ITBP and some personnel from National Disaster Management Authority had achieved the impossible. The successful evacuation of over hundred thousand pilgrims in the face of overwhelming odds will remain the stuff of legends. Innumerable acts of heroism took place on these lonely wind swept heights, where officers and men of the Indian Army put their lives at stake to rescue their fellow citizens. It is a saga that should be recorded for posterity – a story of incredible sacrifice, valour, pluck, fortitude and determination. It is also a story of front line leadership, exemplified in most dramatic fashion by the Army Commander himself, leading on foot, a group of pilgrims to safety.

On a different note, we must never forget why the nation allowed such a tragedy to take place. Over a thousand people died and nearly 5000 are still missing. The missing have now been declared dead, though their bodies have not been located. The death tally in the final analysis may well cross the 10,000-figure mark. In addition, the destruction caused to nearly 4000 villages in the region remains catastrophic. The arduous task of rebuilding shattered homes and lives will not be easy but needs similar dedication and devotion by the civil administration as displayed by the Armed Forces.

Finally, The National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) tasked with this responsibility under the Disaster Management Act, 2005, stumbled in their response. This should invite serious introspection and corrective measures forthwith. In essence, the NDMA should act as a node for information collection, collation and dissemination in real time with total accountability for acts of commission and omission. Perhaps, we need to consider giving this mandate to the Armed Forces, who by leadership, training, discipline and ethos are best suited for such roles. The nation has paid a heavy price for neglect. We cannot allow this to happen again.

The author is a Research Intern at CLAWS

Views expressed are personal