Chinese Leadership Backs Beijing�s Space Mission Shenzhou-10

The Chinese leadership recently met with the participating astronauts and scientists following the success of the Shenzhou-10 space mission on July 26, 2013. Chinese President - Xi Jinping, Premier - Li Keqiang, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress - Zhang Dejiang, Chairman of the Chinese People's Consultative Conference - Yu Zhengsheng and members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Central Committee - Liu Yunshan, Wang Qishan and Zhang Gaoli met with astronauts Nie Haisheng, Zhang Xiaoguang and Wang Yaping and their team working on the Shenzhou-10 mission at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing—thereby providing full political backing to China’s ongoing space and military endeavours.

The Shenzhou-10 mission remains to be of particular significance for China as its investment in the realm of both space and counter-space efforts shall most likely have an impact on regional strategic equations. The Shenzhou-10 mission was carried out from June 11-26, 2013 during which the Shenzhou-10 docked with the orbiting space lab module Tiangong-1 twice. Recall that the Tiangong-1 was sent into space in September 2011 and later docked initially with the Shenzhou-8 unmanned spacecraft in November 2011 and with the Shenzhou-9 manned spacecraft in June 2012. Manual docking represents a major breakthrough in China’s space rendezvous, with Beijing appearing resolute to eventually command expertise in areas such as navigation and deep space missions.

Spending 12 days in the Tiangong-1, the astronauts conducted experiments and tests while assessing the performance of the docking system. The mission marks China’s manned space programme’s entry into space station construction given that this mission launched the first formal application of the manned space transportation system. President Xi Jinping described it as “… the perfect finish of the first phase of the second step of China’s manned space programme.” Xi here is referring to China’s Project 921 scheduled for implementation in three distinct phases, which is currently in its second phase (beginning 2007) aimed to develop advanced techniques for spaceflight including manoeuvring and docking.

On behalf of the Central Committee of the CCP, the State Council and the Central Military Commission, Vice Premier Zhang Gaoli stated, “… the complete success of Tiangong-1 and Shenzhou-10 mission has further consolidated China’s space rendezvous and docking expertise.” With the Chinese leadership now accepting that “space technology has reached an advanced level”—Beijing’s space and counter-space capabilities mirror the rise of Chinese military and technological power.

It is a well-accepted fact that triumphs in future wars shall critically hinge upon information superiority, which is being interpreted as a primary component of victory by the People’s Liberation Army. There is a growing sense of assertion within and outside the PLA ranks, including among Chinese analysts, that the control of space is essential for control of the terrestrial domains. Domination in the space dominion enhances battlefield awareness and superiority and improves precision strike capabilities.

China’s space programme represents a major investment, aimed at enabling Beijing to utilise space in expanding its national power. China has acknowledged that its space industry has developed rapidly and is an important part of Beijing’s overall development strategy. While terming the next five years as crucial for “deepening reform and opening-up” and “accelerating the transformation of the country’s pattern of economic development”, China admits that space activities play an increasingly important role in its economic and social development.

The advancements in space technologies have become critical to the successful conduct of military operations as they empower Beijing to use its armed forces more effectively. Leading Chinese analysts have averred that in essence, China will follow the same principles for space militarisation and space weapons as it did with its nuclear weapons. This primarily means that Beijing is likely to develop anti-satellite and space weapons capable of effectively taking on an enemy’s space system, in order to constitute a reliable and credible defence strategy.

China’s military space capabilities cannot be understood outside the context of its current military strategy, which today is summarised by the phrase “active defence”. PLA’s Senior Colonel, Yao Yunzhu, predicts that “outer space is going to be weaponised in our lifetime”. The PLA comprehends that holding hegemony in space will enhance an ability that will impact upon ground mobility and air, sea and space combat.

China is also likely to push for co-ordinated and sustainable development of its space industry, including creation of a comprehensive plan for construction of space infrastructure and promotion of its satellites and satellite applications industry, besides conducting space science research, and finally, build its own space station around 2020. More importantly, it will enhance the reliability and adaptability of launch vehicles in service, as well as development of new-generation heavy launch vehicles and their upper stages.

Notwithstanding the strides embarked upon by Beijing in bringing its space mission to fruition, there is considerable opacity regarding the military applications of China’s space programme and counter-space activities. This, consequently, makes for a complex scenario wherein it is difficult to discern whether military space assets are intended for offensive or defensive purposes. China needs to be far more explicit and unequivocal in terms of the goals that it has set for itself in this regard and ultimately protect the long-term sustainability of outer space activities and prevent potential conflict escalation in the space environs.

The author is a Senior Fellow at CLAWS

Views expressed are personal