The timings of the twin attacks on 26 Sep 2103, first at Hiranagar police station and then on an army unit located in Samba once again reconfirms the single-minded endeavour of the ISI and Pakistan army to destabilise any efforts at normalisation of relations between India and Pakistan. This dastardly attack coming barely 72 hours before the planned talks between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his counterpart Nawaz Sharif points to the unease within the Pakistani army on Nawaz Sharif’s outreach efforts to improve relations with India.
The internal security situation within Pakistan has deteriorated to such an extent as to pose an existential threat to it. The country is plagued with ethnic, religious and sectarian fault-lines, and creeping radicalisation within society shows no signs of abating. The peaceful transfer of power from one civilian led government to another through elections gave a glimmer of hope that Pakistan would be able to halt and possibly reverse the dangerous slide towards anarchy, but statistics of violence that have taken place since the new government assumed power, belies any such hope. The Taliban groups remain firmly in control in parts of FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the security situation in Baluchistan remains grim, Karachi, the commercial hub of the country remains a tinderbox and the state appears helpless in the face of continuous assaults to its authority. The targeted killings of Shias and the recent massacre of Christians points to growing religious intolerance within the society as also to the helplessness of law enforcement agencies to put a halt to such wanton killings. It is evident that even the Pakistan army, arguably the most potent instrument of the state lacks both the capacity and the will to control the situation.
The Pakistani Army has been unable to pacify the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other umbrella organisations, which has undermined its undisputed authority. Its lack of ability to put down militancy within the country is reflected in Pakistan government overtures to the TTP to come to the negotiating table without any pre conditions. There has been no change of stance to such overtures despite the recent killing of Maj Gen Sanaullah Khan, GOC 17 Infantry Division in Upper Dir district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa on 15 September. This blatant elimination of a top Pakistani commander has demonstrated the growing reach of the militants and the loosening hold of the Pakistan Army over its one time protégés. The precision attack on the GOC could only have been carried out with real time inside information, which is a cause of worry as it points to growing radicalisation within the Pakistan army’s rank and file, and the possibility that some elements within the army are in league with the militants.
To the gloomy security situation is added the worsening state of the Pakistani economy. Improved relations with India can help in providing stability to Pakistan but that could erode the preeminent role of the Pakistan army in the nation’s polity and its very raison d’être would come under question. Attempts at rapprochement between India and Pakistan are hence not viewed favourably by the Pakistan military as it has the potential to strengthen the civilian government at the expense of the military. This perhaps explains why the Pakistan army continues with its anti-India phobia when logic dictates that its primary concern should be to curtail internal violence. The number of cease-fire violations at LOC this year and the attack in Samba and Hiranagar is perhaps an indication of a strategy by the Pakistan army to re-assert its dominance within Pakistan. It has to simultaneously engage the militant organisations within Pakistan as well as involve India in a low intensity conflict while maintaining a hold on the nation’s political establishment.
The attack at Hiranagar and samba could hence be viewed in the overall context of the internal power dynamics in Pakistan. The planning and execution of the attack bore the hallmark of the Pakistan military and the ISI, the purpose being to create an atmosphere of unease suiting their ulterior motive of derailing any accrued benefits from the planned talks. Regardless of the fact that the talks take place or not, the attack has effectively scuttled any possibility of improved relations between the two countries in the near future. It is apparent that the civilian government led by Nawaz Sharif has neither the influence nor the will to impose its authority on the military. We can therefore expect the situation on the LoC to remain heated with ceasefire violations and repeated bids at infiltrating large groups of terrorists to cause mayhem in India. Engaging in anti-India tirade has been a well-established ploy of the Pakistan army to retain its supremacy over the political establishment. The efforts of Nawaz Sharif to normalise relations with India by moving towards granting the MFN status and secretary level talks prior to the present PM level talks has in all likelihood made Pakistani army wary of his intentions. In addition, the imminent drawdown of American troops from Afghanistan makes any change of stance within the Pakistan army highly unlikely.
Diplomatic and political initiatives by India have failed to make any headway towards peaceful co-existence. The recent attack only confirms the proposition that peace initiatives are not likely to fructify unless the Pakistan army is on board. Indian response options should hence be doctrinally evolved encompassing a wider national strategy where the use of force as a tool of deterrence must be co-opted. The time for passivity is over.
The author is a Senior Fellow at CLAWS.
Views expressed are personal
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