Pathankot Attack: Connecting the Dots

The unsuccessful attack on Pathankot Air Base on 02 Jan 2016 is another indicator of the desperation of the Pakistan Army to utilize so-called Non State actors for creating an uncertain security situation in India. Having consistently failed in its persistent attempts to internationalise the Kashmir issue and supporting insurgency in the region, it has during the last two years, followed the methodology of targeting army installations in Northern India, especially in Jammu Region and Punjab. Ironically, it seems that the terrorist handlers in Pakistan are trying to replicate the model faced by their own troops when attacked by TTP cadres; be it the attack on Mehram Air Base, Karachi Airport, numerous attacks on its army locations and so on. The biggest and stark difference between the two has been the response of the Indian Soldier where terrorists have been eliminated though sadly, with own casualties. Nevertheless, it is a reality that such attacks have the potential to create an atmosphere of unease amongst the local population and remedial actions have to be taken swiftly and with ruthless precision.

The timings of the attack clearly indicate the efforts of the Pakistani Army to forestall any attempt to improve relations between both the countries. Barely a week has passed since the impromptu visit of the Indian Prime Minister to Pakistan. Should this be the response, the moot question concerns India’s future response strategy. Three possible options need critical analysis; first, should India continue to make concessions to a rogue neighbour who has regularly taken advantage of India’s positive intentions in the past and taken refuge behind ill-conceived statements expressing its inability to control terrorist organizations operating from its soil; second, should Indian policy makers endeavour to engage the Pakistani Army directly, the most logical course being  direct talks between two armies who understand each other rather than engagements between MEA officials and their Pakistani counterparts who wield almost no authority; and third,should India exercise the last resort of Hot Pursuit or target terrorist camps operating from PoK. Other Indian options are using a number of asymmetric means at its disposal like withdrawing MFN status and thus weakening Pakistan’s economy.

There is also an urgent need to re-energise and strengthen response mechanisms for quick reaction ability. The first focus has to be greater synergy between the Army, Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) and state police forces for joint action in such scenarios. The National Counter Terrorism Centre has to become a reality for seamless flow for information in real time frame. The stationing of a NSG Team and availability of intelligence warning should have been communicated to all. Also, the act of the official vehicle of the Gurdaspur SP being hijacked should have led to quick appreciation that an untoward incident was likely and dissemination of this crucial information would have definitely led to greater alertness and quick elimination of terrorists and may have reduced casualties. The movement of the terrorists not detected for a long period indicates laxity on part of the state police as well as the BSF. It is apparent that the terrorists were able to slip through and enter the fence along IB. This aspect does not bode well for the BSF. It needs to be ensured that there is no leakage of men or material through the fence. Adequate checks and procedural updates are necessary to avoid repetition of such an incident.

Also, the following areas need close coordination as an immediate measure. The first step should be an institutionalized mechanism for conduct of joint security reviews at state levels by incorporating local army formation commanders as the nearest army units are the first responders in any such eventuality. Regular meetings will lead to greater coordination and quick response. The second step is about inter-agency coordination. In the current case, the Punjab Police wanted to conduct its own operation, presence of NSG and requisitioning the Army led to further fog in the combat zone. All operations must have singular control of the local field commander bereft of any turf loyalties for precise conduct as well as minimal casualties. In this case the local army field commander was the logical choice due to vast experience of the army units. The third essential coordination element is quick passage of information to each other rather than only in their own hierarchical chain. This can be achieved by having compatible communication equipment.  In many an occasion, it has been observed that information flow is via the higher headquarters, thus delaying response time. Another area requiring greater higher level control is the media inputs given by various functionaries. As the operations were underway, there were multiple updates, with number of serving officials of police as well as CAPFs giving their inputs, but were not connected to the operation in any manner. This aspect needs to be curbed with appropriate directions from higher headquarters.

The follow up attack on the Indian Consulate in Mazar- Sharif adequately highlighted the complexity of the strategy of the Pakistani Army to minimize/eliminate any chances of both countries moving towards improving relations with each other. With this mindset, any positive steps by India will not provide any tangible benefits. It is for Indian policy makers to strengthen the internal security grid with structured coordination between various security agencies and adopt a firm approach while dealing with Pakistan.

The Author is former Senior Fellow CLAWS. Views expressed are personal