Shouldn�t the Army Be Called In Immediately For Counter Terrorism Operations

The National Security Advisor did well to move the NSG team to Pathankot on New Year’s Day 2016 when he came to know about the presence of trans-border terrorists in the area. The terrorists were ‘lying doggo’ on that day and contact was eventually made with them at the Pathankot Air Base only the next morning, well after the arrival of the NSG. To that extent, in this particular case, the possible ‘last responder’ in the case of a terrorist attack on a military installation, the NSG, was in position to respond even before the designated ‘first responder’, i.e the installation’s own security personnel. This was an opportunity provided by the peculiar circumstances of this episode, which could have been taken advantage of to achieve the tactical aim of such operations, “Kill or capture them fast, with minimum or no casualties to own personnel or civilians.”

However, this was not to be. In actual fact, the responses were somewhat skewed which, avoidably, not only led to casualties but also prolonged the operations. So, what is that that should have been an ideal response or Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) in case of such a terror attack? In the first instance, the Punjab Police should have also informed the local military authorities, i.e the Division Commander or Sub Area Commander of the Army and also the Station Commander of the Air Force, the moment they came to know about the presence of terrorists. The military units and the personnel in the area would all have been alerted. I do not believe this was done immediately.

The Army formation/Sub area Commander, who has maximum access to well trained military units, would have taken charge and activated his Station mutual aid security scheme, which they would have rehearsed many times before, in concert with the Air Force Base. The Special Forces (SF) unit would have been placed on ‘standby’ or sidestepped immediately as the next line of response. Surveillance resources, physical, technical and cyber, would have been activated to gain early information about the terrorists.

In case of a military installation like an Air Force base, the Air Force assets would have been secured by the Army columns/units as part of the mutual aid scheme. The NSG team, on arrival, should have been placed under command the Army formation Commander and thereon would have been ready for taking on the terrorists. The DSC personnel should have been alerted in time. All unarmed personnel and families should have been secured by the Army.

It is obvious that all this was not done. Shortfalls in Command and control, not bringing in the Army units/SF into the Air Force Base a timely manner, not alerting the DSC about the presence of terrorists within the base and incorrect tasking of resources became the bane of this operation and thus resulted in avoidable casualties and delay in completion of operations. Both these outcomes put a question mark on the success of an operation which overall was executed quite well.

In case of a cross-border terror strike in a civil area like Mumbai 26/11, a major fault of the State government on the other hand, at that time was in not immediately requisitioning the military authorities (as per Section 127 to 130 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC)). Such an action would have enabled the Army to mobilise its nearby resources to respond immediately. Had the Army Sub Area Commander of Mumbai been placed in command of the operations immediately, he could have optimised the counter terrorism response effectively, with back up from resources of the Army’s Southern Command, including its Special Forces. In  the event, precious hours were lost in mobilising the NSG from Delhi, within which time the maximum damage had already been done in terms of killing of innocent civilians by the terrorists. The Army would also need enabling legal provisions when they are temporarily activated ‘in aid to civil authorities’ to protect their officers and men, from frivolous or ‘motivated’ court cases thereafter. To an extent the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA) 1967 provides that cover. The Army too needs to optimise its counter terrorism response in terms of resources, drills and training. Most importantly mock drills must be conducted by the Army, Police and NSG on a regular basis to check out the response mechanisms and plug the gaps. Remember, the terrorist and his cross-border handlers measure success by the number of casualties that are perpetrated, the ‘strategic’ assets they destroy and the prolonged publicity of their strike. Speedy operations, which result in quick isolation and killing of the terrorists, while preventing casualties to own troops and civilians, must be achieved successfully each and every time. There can be no half-way measure, otherwise the results will be disastrous as they happened at Mumbai or sub-optimal, as they occurred at Pathankot. The Army also needs to be mandated, requisitioned and legally enabled to conduct counter terrorist operations in the peace stations where they are alternately stationed.

Views expressed by the Author are personal. The Author is the Former Vice Chief of Army Staff.