Pakistan: The Darkness Deepens

The writ of the Pakistani state is eroding at a pace that has raised alarm bells across the world. Pakistan confronts a freedom movement in Baluchistan, violence in Karachi, a raging sectarian conflict across the country, loss of control to the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA, violence spreading to Punjab and a failing economy. To add to its woes, the country stands internationally isolated. The mood of the country is despondent. As per Kamila Hyat, “it appears to drown out hope and keep people moored to the idea that little lies on offer for them in a country that day by day seems to be falling apart”.[i]

In this backdrop, the Government initiated peace talks with the TTP. In a real sense, the Taliban is at war with the Pakistani state. The TTP has openly stated that their leader, Maulana Fazlullah, should head the Pakistani state and bring the whole country under their brand of Sharia. The representatives appointed by the Government to talk to the Talban were sympathetic to the TTP; so much was not expected from the talks. The three core demands of the TTP were unconditional release of prisoners, to include Dr Usman, who was the mastermind of the attack on General Headquarters, withdrawal of troops from FATA and compensation for the losses suffered during drone attacks and military operations. It would have been difficult for the Pakistan Government to accede to these demands.  As per Ayaz Amir, “…We are striving for peace by revealing our exhaustion and lack of spine. The peace of exhaustion only leads to concessions. How much is the state of Pakistan willing to concede?[ii]The TTP however took the decision out of their hands by beheading 23 FC prisoners held by them in Afghanistan, forcing a breakdown of talks.

The Pakistan military responded to the Taliban brutality in like fashion, by carrying out air strikes and artillery bombardment of suspected TTP hideouts in FATA. The military claimed success in such operations, but such claims are questionable. High speed aircraft fitted with precision munitions can take on point static targets, but would achieve little if tasked to engage small bands of militant groups. Helicopter gunships have better capability in this regard, but their approaching sound would give adequate time for the militants to disperse and hide. In all likelihood, the strikes would have caused a huge amount of collateral damage, without in any appreciable manner denting the sway of the TTP. Civilians have already started moving out of the area. If war erupts in North Waziristan, then this trickle is likely to become a flood, further adding to Pakistan’s woes.

The Pakistan military earlier carried out military operations in FATA between 2001 and 2010 with limited impact. Operation Al Mizan in 2004 took place in South Waziristan in 2004, Operation SherDilin 2008 in Bajaur, Operation Rah-e-Rast in 2009 in Swat, and Operation Rah-e-Nijat in 2009 and 2010 in South Waziristan. Numerous militant groups however continue to operate in the area, which now also includes the Al Qaida. Other groups, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad, remain entrenched in other areas of Pakistan. Some of these groups pose a grave threat to the Pakistani state, as the growing number of terrorist attacks in Pakistani cities demonstrates. Reasons for Pakistan’s inability to curb terrorist groups in the above period, as per a RAND study,[iii]were:

• Pakistan’s inability to develop an effective population-centric counterinsurgency strategy negates its ability to deal with the militant threat over the long run.
• Pakistan’s support of some militant groups, which it considers as its strategic assets against India, has been counterproductive. Its acquisition of nuclear weapons appears to have emboldened its support to such militant groups by dampening its concerns about Indian retaliation.
• Pakistan’s army and Frontier Corps have demonstrated an uneven ability to clear and hold territory.
• The government’s focus on a war with India has ill equipped it to contend with a growing domestic threat.
•  The government’s inability to provide immediate relief has exacerbated the army’s reliance on scorched-earth policies in such places as South Waziristan, Bajaur, and Swat, which have alienated some locals.

In the above circumstances, the likelihood of the Pakistan Military achieving success in North Waziristan is doubtful. Pakistan’s insistence on talks with the Taliban, despite their earlier experiences on the futility of such a course is a pointer in this direction. Imran Khan, the leader of the PTI, revealed in a talk show that former Army Chief General Kayani put the chances of success against the TTP in a military operation at no more than 40 percent. Though Kayani denied having made such a statement, the fact remains that the Pakistan military will have to contend with serious issues as and when it launches operations into North Waziristan. The Pakistan Army has been radicalised to some extent, and there are some within its ranks who remain sympathetic to the Taliban cause. For those less inclined to take on the Taliban in military operations, a ready excuse is that they “do not wish to fight against their Muslim brothers”. Such pious expressions are distinctly lacking when they take on the same Muslim brothers in Baluchistan or Karachi! There is certainly a lack of will to take on the Taliban. Even if operations are launched, an undue emphasis will be placed on air operations and artillery bombardment before ground troops move in, which will lead to huge collateral damage and a flood of refugees. While the military will eventually succeed in retaking North Waziristan, the victory would be pyrrhic. The militants and their leadership will simply relocate to other parts of FATA or even Afghanistan and the sheer scale of destruction caused by the conflict would further alienate the local population.

There is a lack of capacity in the Pakistan military, as huge numbers of infantry are required to hold on to the ground, which it takes from the militants. In these areas, lack of roads means that the military will have to occupy and secure all existing lines of communications, as also occupy surrounding dominating heights. The resources required are more than what Pakistan is capable of providing, considering its sensitivities on its Eastern flank with India. While it may be able to hold on to such areas for a short period of time, its ability to sustain over longer periods is questionable.

In the long run, Pakistan may be forced to sue for peace with the militant groups. What shape such a peace will take will have to be seen. For Pakistan, the Army is today the final bastion, which is upholding the country together. While force would be required to reclaim lost territory, much more is needed for holistic peace to return. This would encompass building counter-terror and intelligence capacities, reforming the education curriculum and providing good governance amongst other measures. As of now, this appears to be a tall order. On the other hand, the failure of the military in putting down militancy will have dangerous portents for Pakistan and for the region too.

Maj Gen Dhruv C Katoch, (Retd), is Director CLAWS. Views expressed are personal.