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US President Barack Obama’s recent tour to Asia was one of reassurance of its commitments to alliance partners in East Asia and Southeast Asia amidst a sea of strategic reverberations in the region. Commencing the tour with a visit to Japan, Obama sought to set a conciliatory tone with the Japanese leadership under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. The visit was in the backdrop of the internal debate in Japan, including sections within the conservative ruling Liberal Democratic Party, in which, the role of the US in the very bitterly escalating Senkaku Island dispute going on between Japan and China was beginning to be questioned.
The subtle tension between Washington and Tokyo came to surface when the US government expressed “disappointment” following a visit by Abe to the Yasukuni Shrine in December 2013—marking his first visit there as Prime Minister. Was this rare show of disapproval by Washington a crafty move to appease China given that Beijing accuses Japan of wartime belligerence and strongly objects visits to Yasukuni shrine, which honours convicted Class A war criminals from World War II? Indeed, it is clear that there is a strong undercurrent that Japan’s unfair denigration for its wartime past is a prime factor for Abe to cater and thereby, consolidate, his conservative support base at home.
The purported idea that Washington was prioritising its equations with China over Japan has not gone down well with the Abe administration and the Obama visit appeared to be aimed at quashing any such thought or belief. The Abe administration reportedly clarified that the security alliance with the US stands as a counter to offensive Chinese posturing regarding its claim over the Senkaku Islands. China’s uncoordinated declaration of an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea has upped the ante in this bitterly contested and explosive zone under Japan’s administrative control, in addition to the greater part of the East China Sea, including sections of Taiwan and South Korea — thereby infuriating the region. Obama categorically stated that the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea were covered by the Japan-US Security Treaty obligations applicable to the Senkakus with Washington ready to oppose any unilateral move to assert territorial or maritime claim or change the status quo by intimidation, coercion, or force.
While Obama did manage to find success in reassuring Japan of the American commitment to its treaty alliance and by doing so stitching one end of the direction of the strategic Asian pivot, his pitch for new trade agreements could not be sealed despite heavy behind the scene activity to negotiate for a multination Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). In order to make the ‘Asian rebalance’ a reality, the economic pillar will have to come through effectively and simultaneously.
Another sticking point in the US-Japan alliance comes in the form of stationing of US marines on Japan’s Okinawa prefecture, which hosts around 65 percent of total US forces in Japan. Although the US military bases in Okinawa serve as a linchpin for the US-Japanese military alliance, this continuing presence is deeply resented by the locals thereby spurring strong local opposition in the Okinawa prefecture. While both nations are required to devise a broader framework for the sustainability of US forces in Japan, the continuing post-war presence of US troops, particularly in Okinawa will have to be handled more carefully. In fact, at a 2 + 2 meeting in early October 2013, Washington agreed deploy reconnaissance drones to Japan, and also pledged up to $3.1 billion to relocate five thousand US marines from Okinawa to Guam.
The April 2014 meeting between Obama and Abe not just reaffirmed the US-Japan joint engagement and cooperation, but more significantly underlines trilateral diplomatic, economic, and security coordination. Shared commitment to security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region along with third nation partners is a cornerstone of this vision. An instance is the trilateral cooperation among the US, Japan and the Republic of Korea reiterated at The Hague summit. Moreover, the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) between the United States, Japan and Australia too focuses on coordination on key issues pertaining to regional stability. Besides, the United States and Japan also have a trilateral dialogue with India on a wide range of regional and global issues, particularly in the domain of maritime security in the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific, with the sixth iteration of the trilateral meeting scheduled to take place in New Delhi in the coming months.
In retrospect, the original US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty signed in 1951 outlined a security arrangement for Japan in light of its pacifist constitution and the alliance has been the keystone of the US security role in Asia since. In the backdrop of the strategic turmoil currently gripping East Asia, the quest to seek a rules-based international order will be a tall order for future US-Japan cooperation given the enveloping and perilous ‘China factor’.
Dr Monika Chansoria is a Senior Fellow at CLAWS. Views expressed are personal.
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