Myths and Realities

In all our discussions on the relative military strengths of India and China, we forget the contribution of the erstwhile Soviet Union, now Russia. This unique relationship merits closer scrutiny and debate.

 

Both China and India were heavily dependent on Soviet equipment and platforms. China acquired large quantities of Soviet products in the 1950s. India followed suit in the late 1960s and continued up to the collapse of the Soviet Union. To operationalize these assets and to absorb technology, large numbers of military personnel were deputed by India and China for training in the Soviet Union. Since knowledge of Russian language was a precondition to training, the first six months to a year was set aside for the purpose.

 

Ironically, this period was not merely used for language proficiency but also to acquaint the trainees with Soviet ideology and culture. This was particularly relevant to the Indians, as they were perceived to have been brought up on a western “diet”. The Indians who were trained in UK or Europe were kept under close observation and not allowed to mix freely with the common person on the streets.

 

The Chinese, on the other hand, were natural allies at that point in time with strong ideological convergence and insulated from western influences. Consequently, there was a constant conflict of interests between Indian military officers and the Soviet instructors. This was exacerbated by efforts to isolate Indian men from their officers and to subvert the authority of the officer who was accused of practising colonial methods of leadership. 

 

Before their relations with the Soviets began to sour, the Chinese in the mid 1950s busied themselves in imbibing all the strategic doctrines, tactical publications and procedures. In any case, they had no access to any other source for these inputs. To this day, Chinese strategic articulations including syntaxes bear a striking resemblance to that of the Soviets. 

Transfer of technology and indigenization was accorded high priority and the Chinese military-industrial complex was born. In hindsight, the decades spent in isolation from the erstwhile Soviet Union turned out to be a blessing in disguise since it accelerated the indigenous growth of the Chinese Military Industrial Complex. 

 

The Indian military personnel had a distinct advantage. They were reasonably conversant with western technology, mainly British and European. They had access to the Allied tactical publications, which were the cornerstone of NATO operations. Given the fluency in English, an Indian was able to, with ease, establish relative merits and demerits of complex tactical and strategic issues. Having had the exposure to both the east and the west, he could, if so inclined, get a rare insight into the Western strategic concepts and the Soviet response to them during the cold war. Predictably, a whole generation of Indian officers grew up either supporting the Soviet philosophy or challenging it. It helped to put things into perspective and to evolve suitable changes to our own operational and strategic doctrines. Modification of equipment to suit Indian conditions soon followed.

 

Today, China and India still rely on Russian equipment; though both have opted to induct western origin systems when necessary. We have similar ships and aircraft. But Russia and China share a common threat and hence have begun to evolve common strategies. China has the economic clout and capacity to keep Russia constructively engaged for the foreseeable future. Their national interests are converging. Where does India fit in?

 

Is it a mere coincidence that the latest Chinese ships built in China resemble the Indian ‘Talwar’ class ships built in Russia in accordance with Indian Navy Staff Requirements? Why are Indian orders for frigates, the nuclear submarine on lease and the now infamous Gorshkov being delayed inordinately with huge cost overruns? How is it that the scrapped hull of an aircraft carrier bought by the Chinese ostensibly to convert her into a floating hotel is now taking shape as an operational Aircraft Carrier? 

 

All this would be difficult, if not impossible, without the direct participation of Russian technologists and artisans who have got to be present in large numbers in China. Thus stripped of vital key manpower in her own shipbuilding yards, and in order to earn vital foreign exchange elsewhere, is Russia really such a difficult puzzle to solve---the puzzle of inexplicable delays and cost overruns in respect of Indian naval projects on order in Russia?

 

Is a little out-of-the-box thinking in order here, at least for a ‘reality’ check? Talk about national interests being 'uber alles': here is a good example!

 

 

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies)