Maoist Threat: Internal and External Linkages

India’s security challenge from left wing extremism (LWE) is largely internal, but increasingly, credible proof is emerging of Maoists’ links with a variety of internal and external actors. Post 2004, with the merger of the two largest Maoist groups, People's War (PW) and the Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI), to form the CPI (M), the Maoist threat to the Union of India became more pronounced. With the Maoists forming linkages with external and internal terrorist organisations, the security concerns assume added dimensions. These linkages need to be addressed with urgency and neutralised, as they aim to destabilise India.

In South Asia, Maoists are coordinating their activities through an international organisation termed CCOMPOSA (Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organization of South Asia). Formed on 1 July 2001, CCOMPOSA is an umbrella organisation of various South Asian Maoist parties and movements, aimed at coordinating their activities in South Asia and in fulfilling bilateral and multilateral commitments to deepen relations between Maoist forces. Besides India Maoist parties, the communist parties from Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bhutan are associated with CCOMPOSA. This organisation interacts with the Revolutionary International Movement (RIM), in their coordination office located in London to support the Global Communist Movement. 

The success of Nepalese Maoists is upheld as a benchmark by the Indian Maoists. Both Indian and Nepalese Maoists synergise their activities, taking shelter in hideouts on either sides of the border, exchanging arms, providing training sites and sanctuaries to each other cadres. Indications also exist of the formation of Indo-Nepal Joint Committee to coordinate their activities across borders in South Asia. The post-modernist phase has triggered the need for modern weaponry and explosives. The international network works as a web of arms smugglers with the Indo-Nepal border being the ideal route. International networks also provide support through other means. As an example, the International Communism Seminar organised by Workers Party of Belgium had been carrying the agenda of Nepalese Maoists[i]. This gives credence to reports that Maoists are endeavoring to form a network with countries not only in Asia but those in Europe and America. The Compact Revolutionary Zone thus planned aims to synchronize revolutionary activities.

The links of ISI with CPI (M) also extend to terror groups based in Pakistan like LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammad, the Bangladesh based militant groups Harkat ul Islami and India based terror groups like Indian Mujahedeen (IM) and Students Islamic Movement in India (SIMI)[ii]. The activities of these organisations are quite extensive in Indo-Nepal, and Indo-Bangladesh borders. These external linkages have assisted Maoists in fund raising through drug trafficking and counterfeit currency for arms procurement and training. The spurt in fake currency since 2006 remains an alarming concern. Fake Currency which principally originates in Pakistan is smuggled through different routes like UAE, Nepal, and Bangladesh.

In India’s North East, the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) has assisted Maoists in buying sophisticated weapons. ULFA is known to have linkages with Pakistan’s ISI, operating from Dhaka. This gives Pakistan’s intelligence agencies a link to Indian Maoist groups. Other insurgent groups which have established relations with the Maoists include National Social Council of Nagaland (IM), People’s Liberation Army, Revolutionary People’s Front, Kamatpur Liberation Organisation and Gorkha Liberation Tiger Force. Chinese small arms find their way to the ‘Red Corridor’ through these groups.

Conflict Resolution

CPI (M) has made inroads in India’s tribal heartland, largely because of a governance vacuum in these extremely underdeveloped areas. As a long term strategy, governance and the fruits of economic development must percolate to these areas to wean away the population from the Maoists. Alex Menon, the erstwhile district collector of Sukma, who had been abducted by the Maoists, advocates a negotiation strategy where all stakeholders are involved in the reconciliatory process between Maoists and the government. He quotes the case of Andhra Pradesh in 2004, when stakeholders agreed to socio-economic aspect of the Maoists and a ceasefire took place within six months. Menon believes that in recent cases, stakeholders have not been involved in the process of conflict resolution thereby leading to an incoherent exclusive round of talks[iii]. We also need to see how the tribal relate with the Maoists. Mr. Menon’s dialogue with the tribal reveals that Maoism helps them get rid of middlemen who commercially exploit them as well as lower level government functionaries like the patwaris, forest guards, and the police who are perceived to be instruments of harassment. The police force continues to have an authoritative imperialist image that needs to be altered. The government has often lowered the self-esteem of tribal by labeling them as ‘poor’.  The idea of ‘development’ must be redefined in their world.  The yearning for an identity is deprived when the land and forest rights remain undefined. Implementing the provisions of Article 244 would go a long way in reducing grievances.

Breaking External Linkages  

General Nanavatty in his book ‘Internal Armed Conflict in India: Forging a Joint Civil-Military Approach’ opines that Indian government needs to address the problem at both political and military level[iv]. Rightly apprehensive of a tit-for-tat response like that of creating counter insurgencies in other countries to rupture the external links, his focus is more on effective border management. Border surveillance strategies need to be put in place to check arm flows, drug trafficking, flow of counterfeit currency, infiltration of militants etc. The strengthening of local police forces will pay rich dividends. So will improving the intelligence setup at state level, especially with reference to collecting, sharing and using actionable intelligence. Cooperation with our neighbours on an institutional basis to tackle such groups need to be pursued at the diplomatic level. This could include intelligence sharing, cooperation between border guarding forces and coordinated measures to tackle financial assets of hostile groups. However, the battle with the Maoists remains ideological and must be tackled on democratic lines.  The alternative model offered by Maoists is an obsolete and discredited model of development. The answer to totalitarianism lies in ensuring justice and development to the poorest and most deprived sections of our society through the democratic process.

The author is an intern at CLAWS. Views expressed are personal.