Collapse of the Iraqi Army- Some Lessons

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) that the US recruited and raised till 2011  had numbered nearly 350,000 soldiers and police, trained in state-of-the-art training centers under experienced US instructors and  their employment supervised by suitably oriented Ministries of Defence (Army) and Interior (Police). The US-trained Iraqi Special Operations Forces, which conducted counterterrorism missions alongside their US counterparts, were even considered the best in the Arab world. Yet four ISF northern divisions were overrun with astounding rapidity against a militant force carrying out an astute mix of conventional and irregular action. The Islamist militants were estimated to be 10,000 fighters, of which about 5,000-6,000 were from Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and the rest, about 4,000, were allied Iraqi Sunni groups.

The disintegration of the ISF and the success of the ISIS provides a wide range of lessons including those for US global counter-terrorism strategy and “nation-building”. These lessons range from the folly of US nation-building approach in assuming that a military force raised and trained from scratch as a bulwark against terrorism, can be effective without addressing existing socio-religious fault-lines and deficits in political consensus; to the question of “how much is good (and safe) enough,” when determining the nature and quantum of military support to such a country during nation-building assistance. This article examines some of these lessons at a time when strategists back home in India have been prescribing more active measures to ensure regional  peace and security and on the other hand, US, the architect of the ISF, has been recalibrating its strategy to address  current global hotspots based on its perceived success in Iraq, amongst other reasons. The collapse of the ISF not only puts on shaky ground, this US framework for security intervention but also points to the possibility of it destabilising the entire region. This is even as US is looking to provide arms to Ukraine to manage the crisis there and spend half a billion dollars on training the moderate Syrian rebels to tackle the Syrian problem.

The Situation

The rapid advance of the ISIS and its allies is reported to be the outcome of over two years of strategising by the terrorist group. At present the ISIS militants have declared the rise of a caliphate and are consolidating their gains as they look to isolate Baghdad, extend their hold on Euphrates River valley towns, securing access routes between their bases in Syria and the territories held in Iraq, and pressuring other Sunni groups to fight alongside them. Recent assessments by Western officials and military experts indicate that about a quarter of Iraq’s military forces are “combat ineffective,” its air force virtually non-existent, morale among troops low and its leadership suffering from widespread corruption. Removing the ISIS from an increasing swath of territory it holds between Aleppo and Baghdad will take a lot more than airstrikes or a change of government in Iraq. The challenge is expected to be steep in the short to mid-term as a number of key supporting factors, including significant fresh international military involvement in Iraq, are unlikely to materialise.

Collapse of the ISF

US officials in their assessment of the current situation in Iraq found that five of the Iraqi Army’s 14 divisions were “combat ineffective,” including the two that were overrun in Mosul. Around 60 of 243 Iraqi army combat battalions cannot be accounted for, and all of their equipment is lost. Remnants of disintegrated units and personnel who were on leave at time of the ISIS offensive have been assembled at a military base at Taji, north of Baghdad, to be reconstitute back together as cohesive fighting units against an acute morale deficit . According to some analysts Maliki’s sectarian mindset has led to degeneration of the ISF into just another Shiite-led, Shiite-dominated militia. Even more worrying is a report released by US intelligence, which partly attributes the ISIS success to bribing of ISF commanders to stay away from the war and also pass on crucial information. Failure of the operational logistics based on US recommended contractors system has also been cited as a reason.

But the greatest challenge in reconstituting these units appears to come from the fact that reinforcements are being drawn from hundreds of thousands of untrained Shiite volunteers, though a small number of trained Shiite militia are also available. The militias, though limited in numerical strength are experienced and highly trained, mostly by the Iranians. There is also a reported tendency to now rely more on militias than reconstituted ISF units.

Lack of airpower is another key issue. Earlier this year, the ISF had just three Cessna aircraft capable of delivering US-made Hellfire missiles; as per recent reports, only two of these aircraft are serviceable and running out of missiles. In the last few days Iraq has acquired second-hand jet fighters (Sukhoi Su-25) from Russia/Belarus and more recently Iran. Russian experts have arrived in Iraq to help the army get 12 new Russian warplanes into the fight. So have the first batch of up to 300 U.S. military advisors being followed by another 300 soon. The military advisors have been attached to the U.S. Embassy to establish assessment teams and a joint operations centre with Iraqi forces.

There is also the issue of lack of faith in the ISF consequent to Maliki’s interference. The US stepped up its surveillance of the region after the clashes with ISIS broke out in Anbar province in December 2013. However one of the reasons it did share sufficient intelligence with the ISF was its lack of faith in ISF’s capability to address the situation appropriately.  Further, as other nations consider whether to support military action in Iraq, their decision will hinge on the quality of Iraqi forces.

Lessons

ISIL has shown that a “transnational jihadist agenda” is a viable notion and by controlling ungoverned spaces and the border crossings between two nations, it can switch forces, reallocate resources and manage operational responses. ISIS by consolidating its hold on gains in north and western Iraq has largely succeeded in erasing the border between their territories in Syria and Iraq. After taking control of Qaim, a checkpoint on the border with Syria, it has the ability to switch large quantities of weapons and men these countries. ISIS was reported as battling with  the Syrian government forces and rival opposition fighters in northern Syria using US-made military vehicles captured from neighbouring Iraq, turning on its head the US policy of arming only “moderate” opposition in Syria. 

ISIS has been able to enhance its equipment profile using seized military equipment. When the militants overran Mosul they captured the second-largest ammunition storage site in Iraq, which one expert described as a “Walmart of ammunition. The militants also captured 52 artillery pieces, including Howitzers, which were abandoned by Iraqi troops as they fled south. Capture of the Baiji Oil Refinery facility, which provides oil for domestic consumption to 11 Iraqi provinces, including Baghdad and using the estimated $425 million seized from Mosul's central bank improves sustenance.

Operational planning includes reinforcements and accordingly ISIS operations so far seem impervious to combat losses, as replenishments were available through fighters from Syria, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Chechnya and Europe, who appear to be drawn by the successes in Iraq and the declaration of the “Islamic Caliphate”. They have also found recruits by freeing prisoners in brazen prison breaks; during the recent assault on Mosul, ISIS released some 2,500 inmates from Badoosh prison. A number of them were Sunni insurgent operatives.

ISIS has conducted its military operations in tandem with a highly effective propaganda campaign and psychological strikes which continued to stroke sectarianism. The Samarra shrine, worshiped by Shiites and who’s bombing in February 2006 set off a vicious cycle of violence, is once again under siege and mortars attack. Any serious damage to Shiite shrines could unleash sectarian forces that would be hard to control and further destabilise the country. ISIS relies on a disenchanted community for support as without Sunni backing, ISIS would crumble.

Conclusion

The ISF was painstakingly designed over nearly a decade and at a cost of more than $25 billion to the US, a key element of its nation building effort in Iraq conceived to provide a secure environment for country’s institutions of democracy to take root. The success of ISF in tacking threats was crucial to justify the rationale of the current US policy of not having “boots on ground” while addressing global hotspots. Retired Lt. General David Barno, formerly a senior U.S. commander in Afghanistan succinctly sums up the implication of ISF collapse “The U.S. military worked incredibly hard in the 2005-2008 timeframe to build the ISF into a professional, national force that represented all Iraqis, and the fact that it is increasingly seen as just another sectarian militia, and one that folded so fast when confronted with Islamic extremists, is a very dangerous development”.