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October 20, 2014 | ![]() | By Monish Gulati | ||
Nestled in the “Defense and Homeland Security Cooperation” section of the Joint Statement during the visit of Prime Minister to USA of September 30, 2014 was a declaration that “the leaders committed to pursue provision of US-made mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles to India.” The indication of India’s continuing interest in acquiring US mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles came on the back of two other news reports; United Arab Emirates (UAE) requested for a possible sale of 4,569 MRAPs worth $ 2.5b and the US decision to provide 160 MRAPs to Pakistan for an estimated cost of $198 million. Given the surging global demand for the MRAPs, Pentagon must be rueing its decision to shred “excess” MRAPs as a part of its drawdown from Afghanistan; and to “militarise” US state police departments by providing surplus military MRAPs(amongst other equipment) which was one of the contributing factors for the anti-racial riots in Ferguson, Missouri. This article looks at how MRAPs have become so desirable an operational asset. MRAPs MRAPs are as iconic as UAVs and are regarded as the symbols of US Global War on Terror, especially in the theatres of Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2007, four years into the second invasion of Iraq, the US Department of Defence (DoD) initiated a major procurement initiative to replace all up-armoured high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) in Iraq with the MRAP family of vehicles. The MRAP was designed as an interim solution to the need to increase the soldier survivability rate over that of the HMMWV and are customized for counter-insurgency rather than conventional warfare. In January 2008, at a ceremony in Taji, Iraq marked the beginning of a programme to refurbish and transfer more than 4,244 up-armoured Humvees from US inventory to the Iraqi army by the end of 2008, and to reach more than 8,000 by the end of 2009. Today some of these HMMWVs probably provide mobility and protection to IS militants in Iraq and Syria. Troop protection from improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and their increasing use and lethality in asymmetric conflicts is the key driver of the demand for MRAPs. The V-shaped hull of MRAP has made possible a survivability rate of 94 percent (as compared to the HMMWV’s survivability rate of 78 percent) against IEDs. MRAPs have been credited with saving thousands of lives, 40,000 to be exact, in Iraq and Afghanistan according to Pentagon’s Joint Program Office for Mine-Resistant Protected Vehicles. More than 25,000 MRAPs of various designs have been fielded by the US forces. However, the $45 billion MRAP program has come under fire for its high cost. There is no common MRAP vehicle design, as there are several US vendors, each with its own vehicle; and at times with distinct protection and mobility configurations tailored to the operational environment of different theatres. MRAPs can be separated into three categories according to weight and size. Like all vehicles of their type and class the design of an MRAP represents a compromise between mobility, firepower and protection. In the case of the MRAP, protection has been the dominant factor while firepower and mobility have been downplayed. The MRAP requires only a 25-degree angle to begin to roll over. Their height and width does not make them well suited for urban environment with low-hanging wires and narrow streets. To fix that problem, the US Army had distributed overhead wire mitigation kits (which include wooden boards and PVC pipes) that direct wires up and over the vehicle. 72 percent of the world's bridges cannot hold the MRAP. Therefore theatre specific designs are likely to be of only limited use in an operational role other than that for which they were designed. This is what the US found out when MRAPs shipped from Iraq had to evolve for the rougher Afghan terrain. Some early generation MRAPs shipped from Iraq were probably never used in Afghanistan. This saw the induction of the lighter MRAP All-Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV), which still weighted more than 12 tons. When it came to equipping the Afghan Army (ANA) the US chose to outfit them with lighter tactical vehicles, the Mobile Strike Force Vehicles (MSFV), as that are a better fit for the country’s rudimentary road networks. The MSFV is derived from the combat-proven M1117 Armoured Security Vehicle (ASV) and are configured with enhanced survivability capability, which increases blast protection to MRAP levels. Drawdown from Afghanistan The US has been apprehensive about leaving MRAPs in Afghanistan, noting that the stock is far larger than what the ANA would be able to maintain and efficiently employ. Therefore the US military has labelled about 2,000 of its roughly 11,000 MRAPs in Afghanistan, as "excess defence articles (EDA)”. About 8,000 MRAPs will be shipped to the US and US military bases in Kuwait and elsewhere. The cost of shipping an MRAP back to the US and fixing it up is about $250,000 to $300,000 per vehicle. Not surprisingly, US was literally shredding these excess MRAPs as it did not want to bear the cost of transporting them back; Gen Dunford has since put a halt to this dismantling programme. Also influencing the decision was the notion that US defence industry would suffer if the Pentagon unloaded tons of used equipment on the market at vastly reduced prices. The US government is working to sell as many as 2,000 of its MRAPs in Afghanistan provided the foreign buyers pay to ship the trucks out of the country themselves. Twenty countries (including India and Pakistan) have expressed an interest. US military MRAPs in Afghanistan were also being used by ISAF partner countries for operations, some of which expressed interest in the EDAs. Croatia received 30 Navistar Maxxpro MRAPs vehicles from the United States in April 2014. The vehicles were delivered free of charge under the EDA programme, and form the first batch of a total of 212 military vehicles Croatia will receive under the EDA system. Pakistan’s Pitch Pakistan feels that the MRAPs could help its forces reduce their casualty rate of more than 20,000 dead or injured troops since 2001. Pakistan stepped up its current efforts to find more advanced counterterrorism equipment after Major General Sanaullah was killed by a roadside bomb near the Afghan border in September 2013. The US Congress approval for the 160 MRAP EDAs is expected soon. The 160 MaxxPro MRAPs made by US manufacturer Navistar, would be a mix of new builds and some from US Army prepositioned stocks in Kuwait. Navistar's MaxxPro MRAP the International MaxxPro variant can survive in nuclear, biological and chemical environments. The MaxxPro has number of mission variants. Navistar has a civilian product line up and MaxxPro is based on their civilian products. So it would not be a difficult matter to maintain these vehicles in Pakistan. The 160 US MRAPs would be split among the branches of the Pakistani armed forces and specific army and air force units have been identified and vetted. The Pakistani armed forces already have 22 MRAPs; 20 MaxxPro’s along with two “haulers” to move them under a now-cancelled State Department program known as the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund. China Poly Group Corporation CS/VP3 is a 15-tonne gross weight 4x4 vehicle mine-protected vehicle with stick of 10. In late 2012, Pakistan reportedly entered into a contract for an undisclosed number of these vehicles. The CS/VP3 appears mostly as an export item; as the Chinese People’s Liberation Army does not seem to have at present any requirement for MRAPs. Also a local MPV designed by Heavy Industries Taxila is still under development. It remains to be seen how and when India gets its MRAPs; as EDAs, direct buys or joint production. Till then will make do with the Casspirs and await the effect of the new defence production policy on the efforts of Mahindra & Mahindra, Ashok Leyland and the Tatas to give India its own indigenous MRAP. The author is a Senior Fellow and Associate Director (Strategic Affairs), Society for Policy Studies, New Delhi. Views expressed are personal. | ||||||||
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Monish Gulati |