Pakistan�s Dilemma of Engaging India�s New Order

The shift in India’s image from a ‘Status Quo’ state to a state, which is exhibiting resolve in every field, is indeed causing anxiety for the Pakistan hierarchy in ways to engage this new Indian order. It is a well-known fact that Pakistan Military and ISI are the two actual power circles in Pakistan and the Pakistan Government is only there to lend a democratic outlook to Pakistan. All these three power circles of Pakistan in their own way have tried to unsettle the new Indian Government in their own ways.

The effort was started by Pakistan’s ISI by orchestrating the attack on Indian Consulate in Herat in Afghanistan on 23 May 2014, even before the new Indian Government assumed office. Afghan President, Hamid Karzai was vocal in clearly stating that Lashkar-e- Tayaba (LET) carried out the attack, which is a ISI sponsored terrorist organization. The purpose of attack in Herat was audaciously evil i.e. to hold the Indian Diplomats as hostages while the Indian new Government was being sworn in with an aim to destabilize the new Indian order and thus push them on the back foot, knowing fully well that if permitted to stabilize, the new Indian Government may not take the regular non-sense instigated by Pakistan from time to time.

It is a well recognized fact that whenever Pakistan politicians are in a state of crisis, or are in the need of re-establishing their credentials back home, they try and walk the presumably right steps by playing the Kashmir card. The same was evident when Bilawal Bhutto tried to stir the emotions in Pakistan by shouting slogans of taking Kashmir back from India. The democratic face of Pakistan, the Nawaz Sharif Government, was groping in the dark for ways to engage the new Indian Government, when the ‘Blitzkrieg’ launched by the duo of Quadri and Imran Khan compounded the insecurity of Nawaz Sharif. As the only way out, Nawaz Sharif, had to fall back to the Pakistan Military for bailing him out of this seemingly non-retrievable situation. Washington Post had put out a report that, in return for Pakistan Military’s intervention when Nawaz Sharif was facing a soft coup in August 2014, he had agreed to permit Pakistan Military to control aspects of the country’s security and foreign policy.

Towing the line as dictated by the Pakistan Military, Nawaz Sharif in his address to the UN General Assembly in New York in Sep 2014, brought in the Kashmir issue in much harsher, stronger and more elaborate way than any of his previous UN addresses. He devoted far too much time in his address to the Kashmir issue making all kinds of unsubstantiated accusations which included Human Rights violations by Indian Security Forces, suffering of women in Kashmir, India avoiding talks on Kashmir since last 60 years, the long standing demand of Pakistan for plebiscite in Kashmir and to top it all, he stressed that there should be no new permanent seats in UN Security Council, basically to checkmate India’s claim for permanent membership of UNSC. Nawaz Sharif was aware that UN is the article of faith for Pakistan and he was sure of getting maximum brownie points by raising his voice on Kashmir in this forum or in other words he ticked on the right boxes in his speech for his survival.

Encashing on the rhetoric on Kashmir raised by Nawaz Sharif in the UNGA, the Pakistan Military in violation of the existing cease fire, decided to press on the initiative by activating the Line of Control (LoC) and the International Border (IB) with India and thus attempt to internationalize the Kashmir issue. As a follow-up, the Pakistan’s Foreign Affairs Adviser, Sartaz Aziz wrote to UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon, demanding an international intervention by the UN in J&K. However the complete effort of Pakistan backfired as away from the precedents of cease fire violations, where the responses from Indian side were always calibrated as per the initiation by Pakistan and the situation used to be stabilized by resorting to a flag meetings at the earliest, the Indian Government gave a free hand to the Indian Forces to retaliate and declined the flag meetings till all firing from Pakistan side was stopped. To top it all the Pakistan’s efforts to internationalize the Kashmir issue by seeking UN intervention failed to draw any response from the world body, which reiterated that New Delhi and Islamabad needed to resolve all differences bilaterally through dialogue.

No writing on Pakistan can be considered complete without mentioning the view of US on the subject. It is evident from recent engagements that US looks at India in a much broader strategic context and not only in its China containment policy in the region, whereas the relationship of US with Pakistan is that of a spoilt brat, who if left alone to fend for himself is likely to land in trouble.

To bring out the Indian perspective on the issue, it seems that Pakistan failed to read the mood of the new Indian Government, which was written large on the wall when the Foreign Secretary level talks were called off, when the Pakistani Ambassador decided to meet the Huriyat leaders, with a clear message from the Indian Government that you either talk to them or talk to us. What Pakistan has to realize is that the window for them to talk to India is closing and closing fast. India may not be a regional power as yet but geographically, economically and militarily India is a significant power in the region. However at the end of the day, India has to negotiate with Pakistan to resolve this long-standing issue. The best way forward can be to keep the door open for negotiations, however the same can only be within the specific red lines drawn by the Indian Government. However miracles should not be expected, as fundamentally Pakistan may not be in a position to resolve the issue completely due to its internal dynamics. Pakistan Military remains at the center stage in Pakistan and will never want a complete resolution of the Kashmir problem with India, because if it happens, how do they justify approximately 25% of Pakistan’s budget coming to the Military as also the need of the Military to be centrally in charge in Pakistan. Hence with one party to the conflict not being very keen on resolution, this problem in all forms is there to stay for sometime and India has to learn to live with it.

The author is Senior Fellow at CLAWS. Views expressed are personal.