It is Sukma Again

Yes, ’n’ how many deaths will it take till he knows
That too many people have died?

                                                                  -Bob Dylan

Maoist guerillas struck again this week, killing 14 personnel of CRPF, in an ambush near Kasalpara village in Sukma District of Chhattisgarh. This has been their biggest attack so far this year. It came just a few days after Chief Minister Raman Singh claimed that the day was not far when his state would become ‘Naxal free’. While it is a fact that Naxals have been on the back foot for quite some time, to dismiss their capability to strike at a time of their choosing, especially in their stronghold, would be a mistake. Such a strike cannot be a deed of a local unit, and has to be a trap laid under directions of the Maoist Central Committee that masterminded the attack. The Maoists were probably aware of the movement of security forces in the area, thereby planning their ambush with deadly precision. The attack was carried out in the same area where the guerillas had shot at an Air Force helicopter last month.  

There is a crucial factor that sets this insurgency apart from any other in the past. It is the tactics used by the Maoists, which are utterly contrary to guerilla warfare. These Maoists have not been operating in tiny bands, carrying out hit and run harassment attacks. They stalk large bodies of troops, subject to the gained information, until they reach a pre-designated killing ground, and then overwhelm the troops with much larger numbers and firepower. In the said case, the Maoists had been waiting for the troops in an area where there are hillocks in a ‘U’ shaped formation, with single and common entry or exit. The killing ground was chosen judiciously, resources mobilized systematically and strike sprung with sufficient numerical advantage to pulverize the encircled defenders. For the state forces, countering the said innovation requires sound logistic backup and contingency planning, unlike the seeming adhocism wherein neither reserves were employed nor were casualties evacuated in a desired and decisive manner. It is here that support from Air Force could play a crucial role in terms of pre-positioning helicopter based reserves and supplies in vicinity, in appropriate state of readiness. Once we are able to turn things in our favour, the guerillas can be forced to react and commit mistakes - which of late have become characteristic of state forces.

Based on media reports, it does not require ‘rocket science’ to point out tactical errors on part of the sub-units and their local commanders who are in the line of fire. While pointing out and commenting on such tactical errors may be easy, ground commanders are still the best people to take decisions and get the same executed by their sub units in crises situations. However, certain macro level issues surface that are flagged in succeeding paragraphs.

Distressing as they may be, there was nothing new in the incident. Dozens of comparable attacks across the Maoist belt have preceded the latest incident, with police, special force and paramilitary contingents routinely isolated and ambushed or overrun by Maoist cadres and militia. Yet, a historical amnesia, a near-complete absence of institutional memory, appears to afflict the Indian security establishment, despite the country's vast experience in counter-insurgency campaigns. The result is, the state continues to throw small contingents of men into areas of Maoist dominance, with little backup or possibility of reinforcement, poor linkages, and difficult terrain, in the apparent conviction that superior training and individual fighting skills are sufficient to prevail in any situation; in case they are possessed by the troops.

Such attack cannot be prevented until the state police is strengthened. The much talked about ‘Andhra model’ was not all about central forces and Greyhounds only. The state had over the years, invested a lot in building its police, which ultimately helped in chasing the Naxals away. No quantum of central and specialised troops can be successful in an unfamiliar terrain and negligible intelligence. A case in point is with respect to induction of NSG commandos post ‘Jehanabad jail break’ incident. After futile series of operations carried out, this elite force was finally withdrawn, with MHA declaring, "deploying paramilitary forces won't help, since local police are unable to gather any workable evidence on Naxals operating in as many as 36 districts out of total 42 districts (of Bihar)."

Notwithstanding the above, irrational deployments continue, in the absence of 'workable evidence', in other theatres. Indeed, without the comprehensive transformation of the state police, any central force would achieve little, beyond random and probably inaccurate 'kills' – even as it would have become a preferred and extraordinarily vulnerable target of retaliatory attacks by the Maoists. The lesson of the 'Andhra Pradesh model', crudely put, is that you cannot have a first class counter-insurgency response in a third class Police force. The capacities of the entire force must be raised, before elite units can secure tangible and lasting results[i].

In addition, we need to differentiate between tactics and strategy. A special force battalion here, a few more CRPF personnel there, or a few drones or helicopters, cannot be equated with a long term decisive blow. These win individual battles, but this conflict is a long haul; demanding focus on each affected state’s police forces. Ground level intelligence matters most and state’s own police personnel have the advantage of familiarity with terrain and local life, with minimum scope of alienation of local population. Normal tendency of ill-disciplined security forces after suffering a setback such as this is to unleash heavy-handedness on to the locals, more likely by forces not belonging to the region. There have been media reports that the villagers of Kasalpara fear backlash by CRPF troops, who earlier too were accused of a similar behavior under the pretext of carrying out combing operations[ii]. This has to be guarded against and can only be ensured by the commanders at the tactical level.          

As brought out, claims were repeatedly being made by various agencies with respect to the ‘Maoists on a back foot’ for sometimes in the past - owing to surrender, apprehension & killings of cadres. Their space was constantly shrinking- a similar rhetoric, ran as a prelude to the Darbha ambush of May 2013, which resulted in killing of political workers to include Mahendra Karma and (later) VC Shukla. Much as official stand may lead one to believe, this cannot be seen as an act of desperation by guerillas. Treating this incident as an act of desperation would be an exercise in complacency. Delving deep into the strategy behind it shall be the key to any success government agencies hope to achieve. The main reason why the fight against the Maoists has not been able to go beyond a certain level is repeated failures to address issues that lie at the heart of the conflict. Inspite of decades of sustained security operations, a tangible change in the developmental and political landscape is yet to usher in – as also, there seems to be no blueprint in sight[iii]. For example - ‘draft national policy on tribals’ prepared by the Ministry of Tribal Affairs in 2004, remains a draft, with no resolve towards conversion.

The times call not for further retributive violence, but for a deeper reflection on the discontent among, and dispossession of, the tribals of central India, who are in all respects the most desperately disadvantaged of the Republic’s citizens[iv]. While acknowledgement has dawned on ‘root cause’ aspects of the challenge, ‘law and order’ measures remain the dominant component of the approach towards conflict resolution. As the recent sterilization related tragedy in Chhattisgarh showed, the poor and marginalized have very little to thank the government for. These people are caught between the devil and the deep sea. Former DGP, Vishwaranjan and many others say that development cannot take place because of Naxalites. And if and when they are gone, will the government be able to ensure the same? With the current government’s thrust on the industry and core sector, Chhattisgarh and other affected states may well see a rapid increase in activities such as mining. That will only add to the misery of the tribals, with their land and forests and water resources suffering further damage. Development is no doubt necessary, but care should be taken to ensure that mining activities are carried out with enough sensitivity to the needs and concerns of the people living there, and not in callous disregard of their interests[v]. 

Another issue that warrants focus on part of the government is will to take up issues in a result-oriented, time-bound manner. A glaring example, typical of our lack of seriousness, is the deployment of drones in the area. NTRO operates a fleet of 12 Israeli-made ‘Searcher’ tactical drones for surveillance of the vast forest tracts on Andhra-Odisha-Chhattisgarh border, the Maoist stronghold and location of the attack under reference. This expensive investment has however not led to success in detecting hundreds-strong Maoist presence in the sub-region. The major problem as per NTRO is that the fleet operates out of Begumpet air base in Hyderabad, pushing the drones to extremities of their range by the time they reach south Chhattisgarh, leaving them with little hover time to gather imagery. After lots of negotiations, an agreement was reached in 2012 to move the fleet to Bhillai, somewhat closer to the area of interest. However till March 2014, the relocation had not seen light of the day[vi].

In the end, the security forces have to look within, to improve their overall standards, in a holistic manner. Surfacing intra-organisational fissures in security forces tasked for national security will be most unfortunate and to the advantage of the guerillas. Flagging issues by a CRPF trooper, Sujoy Mandal, in a letter to the Home Ministes[vii] certainly indicates to general ill-health, which should be nipped in the bud, by not merely addressing the symptoms.

Remembering the dead, the newly dead – has become a performance art in our country. And hope it doesn’t take more to make us realize- that too many people have died!

The author is Senior Fellow at CLAWS. Views expressed are personal.