Ballot Bites the Bullet: Pakistan�s Desperate Tactics in Kashmir

Four seemingly orchestrated events on 05 December 2014 shattered the peaceful atmosphere in Kashmir Valley and were a clear sign of the desperation of the militant handlers from Pakistan who are increasingly becoming worried about India’s quest to restore peace and normalcy in Kashmir valley. The recovery of weapons bearing Pakistan Ordnance Factory marking and army issue survival rations give credence to the Pakistan Army’s involvement in training and equipping the terrorists besides facilitating their movement under heavy firing, both on the Line of Control (LoC) and the International Border (IB). Having re-asserted its position within Pakistan post-Nawaz Sharif’s posturing, Imran Khan’s and Tahri-ul-Qadri’s seige and TTP activities, Pakistan Army’s focus has been on escalating the border situation with India by engaging Indian posts on the LoC as well as on the IB with an aim to create an atmosphere of uncertainty and wean away the attention from its troubled internal security state. Escalation of firing incidents along the LoC and IB are newsworthy headlines and tend to court media attention the world over. This can be the reason as there have been over 95 incidents and over 424 ceasefire violations [1] in the last six months. The dwindling numbers of terrorists present in the valley, a figure of around 200 [2], may also be a precursor for desperate tactics of such nature. The 05 December incidents seemed to be immediate fallout of two successful rounds of polling which had seen over 71% and 75% voter turnout with an endeavour to underscore Indian efforts and re-focus the world attention on Kashmir. Given the average Kashmiri youth’s disenchantment with terrorism and his quest for a prosperity and peaceful life, the next rounds of polling on 09, 14 and 20 December will witness very high levels of polling.

The attack on Mohra camp showed that despite maintaining a very high degree of vigilance, terrorists may, at times have the initiative due to the timing of the attack. The quick reaction and resolute action by the troops led to elimination of all six terrorists though precious lives were lost. The use of terrorist organisations and personalities like Saeed Hafiz affords Pakistan Army the extravagance of providing readymade human fodder to fuel their terrorist pipeline to Kashmir. The brunt of the escalation has been borne by the Indian soldier who has relentlessly countered every attempt of infiltration or faced the attacks on his post. As per the SOP [3] on engaging suspected terrorists, a soldier is supposed to fire, only when fired upon or in an ambush kind of situation to save his own life. For the soldier on the ground, he is working in a hostile environment, battling an indifferent population and everyday provides a period of uncertainty where he takes split second decisions. The November 2014 Budgam incident, in which two boys died and three were injured when they were fired upon after failing to stop at an army check post is likely to add a note of caution in the minds of soldiers operating in similar conditions. It may be prudent to earmark and promulgate stop zones around static pickets and check-posts. Any crossing of the laid down zones would result in expected fire from the sentries.

India’s options for a dialogue with Pakistan have been limited since the foreign secretary level talks were called off in August due to engagement of with the Separatist leaders by the Pakistan High Commission. The belligerent actions of Pakistan Army since have led to unnecessary escalation in tensions as well as war of words. A major dilemma for India is that the political establishment in Pakistan does not have any say in the foreign policy especially against India. Thus the only entity which can affect any outcome or resolution is the Pakistan Army and with whom talks are not possible without bypassing the structured protocols. In such an environment, back door diplomacy or any other exertion is not likely to yield any positive output. This stalemate does not mean that Indian options are compromised. There is a need to have a methodical course of action. The first step would be to preserve a political consensus [4] within the country in condemning such acts of violence. Secondly, the separatist leaders cannot have an unchecked agenda, either in meeting the Pakistani officials within India or in their actions against the state machinery. Most importantly, India has to look at means to bestow a befitting reply to incessant Pakistani attempts to escalate violence by carrying out selective elimination of terrorist leaders across the border and maintaining the right of hot pursuit [5] in destruction of terrorist launch pads in POK.

The writer is Senior Fellow at CLAWS. Views expressed are personal.