Air Sea Battle Redesignation and the Role of Landpower in Asia Pacific

Abstract: Commenting upon the recent redesignation of Air Sea Battle to JAM-GC this article supports the move by highlighting the vital contributions that landpower can make in the Asia Pacific. Focusing narrowly upon the operational utility (while deliberately ignoring their strategic role) the case is made for the conjunctive use of landpower to gain, retain & exploit access to contested commons.

The recent redesignation of Air/Sea Battle as JAM-GC (Joint Concept for Access & Maneuvre in the Global Commons) has generated a flurry of reactions on the larger underlying question of the role of the Army in the US rebalance to the Asia Pacific. The preponderant thrust of these reactions has been directed towards the Army’s supposed hijacking of the Navy & Air Force’s efforts to draw public support for new platforms to enable them to wage war in anti-access/area denial (A2/D2) environments. It has been argued that the US Army can best serve American national interests by focusing on how to develop & maintain both effective expeditionary & COIN capabilities instead of seeking a role for itself in the Asia Pacific.

This is not a comment on the wisdom of the charge of the U.S Army low keying the retention and development of its hard won COIN capabilities. Neither is it intended to address the army’s role in promoting deterrence & regional stability. It may however be noted that it is in shaping the security environment and preventing conflict that the Army is likely to make the most decisive contribution to American national security. This article addresses the role the Army can play in contributing to the process of sea control, sea denial & its expeditionary capabilities.

Two points need to be made clear at the outset. First, absent strategic shocks the US’s long term sights are set in the Asia Pacific (and this is something the Army is on board with as well). Second, in this environment the army does not boast the same importance relative to the other services as it did during the Cold War. The development of A2/AD capabilities & strategies (note – China) impinges upon U.S freedom of action by giving its adversaries the capability to make US power projection an unacceptably risky activity. The development of the Air-Sea Battle concept as a solution to assure joint forces operational access to the desired theatres has necessarily hinged on the concept of forces leveraging cross domain synergy.

To begin with it is necessary to dispel the notion that the Asia Pacific is a domain wherein the Air Force & Navy suffice by themselves to carry the day. That they shall lead what Frank Hoffman calls the long-range fight is indeed correct. However the close-in fighting requires the Army & the Marines who require the Navy & the Air Force both to get them in the fight and for purposes of targeting & support. That said neither the Navy nor the Air Force can do without their land counterparts to protect and/or seize forward bases. Absent a substantive airfleet capable of global strike both the Air Force & Navy require airfields and ports close to contested zones to operate from. Threats in such a scenario range from enemy missiles to cyber attacks to ground based assaults, all roles which the Army is uniquely equipped to handle.

The US Joint Concept for Entry Operations relies on mobile sea bases, expeditionary airfields and seaports to project power, precisely the kinds of assets that will face immense heat during wartime. As noted at USNI & Foreign Affairs as far back as in 2012 the army can act as both a shield and a sword both by and despite the army reducing its traditional focus on expeditionary land warfare and resorting to “low-cost high-payoff endeavours” by focusing on establishing “a constellation of forward-based missile forces”.  Normally capable of only sea denial by itself but when used in conjunction with sea and air power land based systems are an exceptionally useful tool in the pursuit of sea control too. By leveraging what Chuck Hagel called the Army’s, “suite of long-range precision guided missiles, rockets, artillery & defense systems,” it becomes possible to create bubbles of safety which not only harden the defence of US installations but also enable the enhanced mobility of other US naval assets. By focusing on offensive land based missile batteries rivals are forced to allocate precious resources to the purpose of expensive missile defence systems. Considering how such positions can generate and sustain far more firepower than anything the naval and air arm can and one sees how they create a serious incentive for rivals to deviate funds from their offensive weapons programs. Another vital contribution landpower can make in the Sea Control realm by covering key choke points relates to the maximization of existing sea control assets which allows for air & sea power to be concentrated in the most important regions. In a Navy struggling to stay afloat at even 300 vessels the value in terms of presence afforded by such a benefit spills over from war time to times of peace as well.

There have long been calls (Randy Forbes invoking this RAND report) for the Army to take on such a role. The recent Army Operating Concept (AOC) seems to have taken note of this as well when it says, “Army operations are inherently cross-domain operations...Future Army forces will support joint force freedom of movement and action through the projection of power from land across the maritime, air, space, and cyberspace domains,” & notes in its technology focus area, “The Army develops responsive surface-to-air, air-to-surface, and surface-to surface fires with extended range and enhanced precision to enable the Joint Force to overcome anti-access and area denial threats and project power from land into the air, maritime, and space domains.” Wide area security has been an Army core competency in which the AOC includes the, “employment of long-range precision-strike systems (missiles), high-quality air defenses, cyber capabilities, and long-range artillery and rocket systems to achieve focused control in support of strategic and operational joint force freedom of maneuver.”

Budgetary allocations have made clear the many capability areas being protected and even expanded. These offer a glimpse into the other envisaged role for land power as well. Targeting the whole panopoly of space based assets, ground ISR stations, extensive networking systems and operations centres upon which the efficacy of China’s A2/AD set up works is critical to ensuring the survivability of naval assets to fulfill their missions of sea control & power projection. Cyber operations, special operations forces and long range bombers while not specific to land power may in manifold instances require conjunctive operations with it to enable the fulfillment and maximization of their destructive effects. Whether this involve small special operations capable elements or larger formations making conventional landings, what is evident in today’s era is that inter service dependence necessitates a closer working relationship between all the services as never before.

I conclude with reiterating that in the Asia Pacific theatre the army is not the lead service and there is indeed much merit in the maritime community’s desire to take the lead. Given that they are the sole service capable of both “loitering” and being minimally intrusive simultaneously they do indeed provide immense flexibility. That said the relative lack of flexibility of land power is not necessarily a vice either (given their permanence, visibility, economy & lower escalation risk). The purpose as outlined in the beginning however was not to get into the nuances of Phase 0 & Phase 1 operations but examine operational utility. It is probably best then to think twice before condemning the utility of land power in the Asia Pacific.

Himanil Raina is a student at the NALSAR University of Law and a freelance writer on geopolitical and international affairs. Views expressed are personal.